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 Organizational change for the purpose of improving performance is 
extremely challenging, particularly for government institutions.  Large 
bureaucracies, hierarchical structures, and deeply rooted work cultures are some 
characteristics of governmental organizations that have proven to be serious 
impediments to performance improving change.  In May 2003, the 
NAVAIRDEPOT North Island Engineering Competency (NAVAIRNI 4.0) began a 
transformational process to improve organizational performance by providing 
higher value to its customers, generating higher quality of products and services, 
and attaining better financial performance.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
analyze the experience of government organizations in implementing 
performance related change efforts such as Total Quality Management (TQM), 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR), and Activity Based Costing (ABC).  
Specifically, this thesis will identify leadership characteristics and strategies 
employed by public firms during successful transformation initiatives.  By 
isolating leadership traits associated with these successful change efforts, this 
thesis hopes to develop a simplified relational model that can provide NAVAIRNI 
4.0 and other government organizations with effective leadership concepts for 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND   
The engineering competency at the Naval Air Systems Command Depot 
at North Island, CA (NAVAIRNI 4.0) is a department of professional engineers 
and scientists that provide various technical products and services to the U.S. 
fleet, systems acquisition program managers (PM), foreign military sales (FMS), 
and the NAVAIR North Island industrial competency (NAVAIRNI 6.0).  Generally, 
each of these customers has had a favorable view of NAVAIRNI 4.0 
performance.  The quality of its products and services, the cycle time for delivery, 
and the financial value provided over other potential suppliers of technical 
services has historically led customers to feel that NAVAIRNI 4.0 is the provider 
of choice.  Still, leadership made the strategic decision in the spring of 2003 to 
embark upon a major overhaul of its organization, philosophy, functions, form, 
vision and values with the goal of dramatically improving overall performance of 
the competency.  The NAVAIRNI 4.0 senior manager provided several reasons 
for this decision.  
First, organizations that do not change for the better will become 
uncompetitive (Brian Frank, personal communication, August 27, 2003).  After 
organizations experience a successful period, there is a tendency to believe that 
they have reached the pinnacle of customer service.  This condition can lead to 
complacency, contentment with performance, an internal focus, low creativity and 
increased bureaucracy (Blank, 1995).  As customers needs and expectations 
change, these organizations fail to recognize the shift and do not adapt to the 
new reality.  The result is that customers will seek other providers that meet their 
renewed expectations.  In today’s global marketplace, the likelihood of another 
organization that can meet these new requirements is high. 
The second reason for embarking upon change relates to leadership’s 
vision of the future.  It is believed that NAVAIRNI 4.0 is at a nexus of 
unprecedented opportunity.  With fewer new aviation systems under 
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development than ever before, existing aircraft will be required to serve the 
needs of the warfighter longer than intended.  Life extension programs, reliability 
improvements, and readiness-centric maintenance programs will be required to 
keep those systems fielded longer.  This should result in many opportunities for 
in-service engineering organizations to develop these types of solutions.  
NAVAIRNI 4.0 leadership recognizes this future potential.  Striving for the highest 
organizational performance possible through transformation is the primary 
strategy for becoming the provider of first choice to the warfighter and acquisition 
community (Brian Frank, personal communication, August 27, 2003).  
Leadership at NAVAIRNI 4.0 also believes strongly that the organization is 
simply not attaining its potential level of performance (Brian Frank, personal 
communication, August 27, 2003).  For over 80 years, NAVAIRNI has provided 
in-service engineering support to the U.S. Navy and has carved out a unique 
niche of supporting in-service aircraft and components that require unique repair, 
maintenance, and design not experienced in the private sector.  At various times 
during this period, there have been numerous attempts to redefine the 
organization’s mission, rework strategies and tactical plans, and revise internal 
processes in order to gain efficiencies.  While providing some improvement, 
these approaches did not fundamentally change the level of performance.    
While NAVAIRNI 4.0 is a leader in its field, events of the last 10-15 years 
have changed the competitive landscape. First, disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, post Gulf War military downsizing, and reduced weapon system 
acquisitions have led numerous private aerospace companies to enter into the 
business of aftermarket repair, overhaul, and in-service engineering for military 
aircraft as an alternate source of revenue.  Secondly, an increasing trend of 
public-private sector competition for workload historically reserved for organic 
agencies has resulted in additional pressure to optimize performance.   Thirdly, 
program managers of the few new weapon system programs currently under 
development or being fielded are increasingly selecting life cycle support plans 
managed by the system original equipment manufacturers and suppliers. These 
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support strategies leverage off of corporate engineering and logistics knowledge 
developed during the acquisition process.  These life-cycle support concepts 
have typically resulted in partnerships with publicly funded industrial 
organizations, however; recent political, regulatory, and legislative changes are 
increasingly allowing services historically reserved for government agencies to 
be competed exclusively in the private sector. 
Finally, NAVAIRNI 4.0 leadership desires to establish a higher moral 
purpose and overarching star to guide the organization into the future and create 
an alignment of all activities.  The NAVAIRSYSCOM organization is large with 
several competencies, business units, and field activities in addition to 
headquarters.  Each of these organizational subdivisions has their own vision, 
credo, and mission statement.  As part of the NAVAIRNI 4.0 HPO transformation 
effort, leadership intends to create a common strategy, vision, and philosophy 
that is (1) understood at by all in the organization, (2) aligns with the NAVAIR 
Depot and NAVAIRSYSCOM vision, strategy, and philosophy, and (3) acts as a 
guiding and aligning principle for all efforts within the competency (Brian Frank, 
personal communication, August 27, 2003).     
Recognizing that the path leading to high performance is long and will 
require much time to realize significant results, NAVAIRNI 4.0 leadership was 
concerned with its probability of success.  This was a key reason for selection of 
the Diagnostic/Change Model (DCM) developed by the Commonwealth Centers 
for High-Performance Organizations (CCHPO).  The result of a compilation of 
key organizational theories from numerous literature sources, this model 
integrates several key tenets, change mechanisms, and change agents into a 
single disciplined model that can be used by technically trained executives to 
implement continuous organizational change for higher performance. The model 
focuses on the critical nature of organizational leadership; its philosophy, 
functions, and forms and how by moving from vision through strategy, structure, 
and systems, organizational performance can be improved.  The model also 
illustrates how the values of leadership, individuals, and operating systems 
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influence behaviors (positively and negatively), overall work culture, and 
ultimately the performance of the organization. 
 Research conducted by CCHPO over the past several years has 
highlighted the importance of leadership as a fundamental factor in the success 
of strategic initiatives involving deep organizational change in public firms.  
Increasingly, organizations are moving toward use of new leadership forms that 
are more indicative of a participative, rather than a directive system.  It is hoped 
that by embracing these new ideas of leadership, the likelihood of transformation 
success will be increased.  Examination of these success stories can give 
organizations embarking on transformation initiates important lessons learned 
and examples of how leadership should be employed in their own situations. 
 
B. PURPOSE 
 The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the experience of government 
organizations in implementing performance related change efforts such as Total 
Quality Management (TQM), Business Process Reengineering (BPR), and 
Activity Based Costing (ABC).  Specifically, this thesis will identify leadership 
characteristics and strategies employed by public firms during successful 
transformation initiatives.  By isolating leadership traits associated with these 
successful change efforts, this thesis hopes to develop a simplified model that 
can provide NAVAIRNI 4.0 and other government organizations with effective 
leadership concepts for use in their own endeavor.  
  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 As stated earlier, while its customers are generally satisfied with the 
products, services, and efficiency of the organization, several factors have led 
NAVAIRNI leadership to conclude that large-scale improvements in performance 
are needed to remain competitive.  External competition from the private sector 
and other government agencies, outdated and unchanging internal cultures, and 
lack of organization alignment to and pursuit of a single guiding principle are 
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viewed as potential threats to the existence and mission of the competency.  By 
embarking upon an effort to improve performance and transform their 
organization, NAVAIRNI 4.0 hopes to position itself as the technical product 
provider of choice for its customers well into the future.  The difficulty in leading 
governmental organization reformations presents risks to the success of this 
effort.  Several questions warrant research and discussion that could provide 
valuable guidance to the management of NAVAIRNI 4.0 and other government 
organizations on how best to use the principle of leadership to improve the 
chances of a successful reformation.  The most overarching of which is used as 
the primary research question for this thesis: 
• How should leadership be employed in government organizations 
undergoing significant transformation initiatives designed to improve 
overall performance?  
Supporting this primary research question are three secondary questions that, 
when answered, will substantially have answered the primary research question.  
These are as follows: 
• What leadership philosophies are effective in guiding successful 
government organization transformations? 
• What are the functions of leadership in the transformational process of 
a government organization? 
• What forms of leadership have government organizations employed in 
transformation efforts? 
 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study will provide NAVAIRNI 4.0 and other governmental 
organizations with examples of how successfully transformed public firms 
employed leadership to help drive the change effort.  Contrary to the traditional 
belief that leadership is only the responsibility of upper management, this thesis 
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exposes alternative concepts of leadership and provides examples of how 
leadership, if widely performed across all levels of an organization, can help 
ensure organizational success, particularly during dramatic periods of change.  
 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLGY 
1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis will cover five areas of study.  First, a discussion 
will be provided on the background of the NAVAIRNI 4.0, its history of 
organizational change, and the reasons why its leadership has embarked upon a 
transformational process towards high performance.   
The second phase provides a discussion on key aspects and roles of 
leadership in organizational change.  This phase will also use theories and ideas 
taken from literature to construct a notional model of leadership that is effective in 
guiding an organization’s upper management, particularly through periods of 
change. 
Phase three of this thesis is a case analysis of three governmental 
agencies that have successfully implemented organizational change initiatives 
with the goal of improving overall performance.  The experiences of these 
organizations will be analyzed specifically for the attributes and characteristics of 
their leadership structure and concepts. 
The fourth phase of this study will use the data extracted from the three 
case analyses to validate the notional leadership model (develop during phase 
two).  Validation through examination and comparison will provide evidence 
supporting the viability of the leadership model for use in other organizational 
change efforts.  By selecting government organizations as case subjects, these 
results will be especially applicable to other public institutions. 
The fifth and final phase will provide conclusions, recommendations, and 




Details of methodology used in this thesis will be further described in 
Chapter III, however; a generalized process for research and analysis is provided 
below: 
• Conduct a literature review of previous research, books, magazine 
articles, CD-ROM systems, and other information resources on 
leadership theory and principles, organization performance, 
transformation theory, change processes, performance management 
and measurement to develop an organizational leadership model. 
• Conduct a thorough comparative multiple case study of other public 
sector organizations that have successfully applied performance-
improving organization transformational processes in order to extract 
leadership attributes. 
• Validate the leadership model through correlation of the experiences 
observed in the case studies with specific traits reflected in the model. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 This study consists of six chapters, which describe the driving forces 
behind the NAVAIRNI 4.0 organizational change effort, identify modern and 
theoretical leadership principles in guiding organizational change, and analyze 
other governmental agencies to identify attributes and characteristics of 
leadership used in their change efforts. 
 Chapter I provides a brief introduction on NAVAIRNI 4.0 background, why 
its leadership feels change is necessary, and why the CCHPO DCM was 
selected as its guiding model for transformation.  Chapter II describes behavioral 
theory, competencies, and structures related to effective modern organizational 
leadership. 
 Chapter III identifies why studying transformed firms is beneficial, defines 
criteria for designation as a transformed firm, and provides a detailed review of 
the research methods used in this thesis. Chapter IV contains analysis of the 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United States Coast Guard, and US Navy 
Nuclear Propulsion Program case narratives for elements of leadership during 
implementation of performance-improving change at these government 
organizations.  Chapter V condenses the data from the literature review into a 
model of leadership, discusses specific model attributes, and analyzes data 
extracted from case study.  Those leadership attributes extracted during literature 
review that are supported by the case study analysis are then used to validate 
the leadership model for use by other government organizations.  Chapter VI 
summarizes the research and conclusions of this thesis and provides 
recommendations for future research.  These recommendations will cover the 
specific topic of leadership during public organizations transformation as well as 
the more general theme of organizational change.  
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of literature sources on both organizational change and 
leadership revealed several key principles and factors in the effective use of 
leadership to guide organizational transformation efforts.   These factors include 
the importance of attaining an optimistic leadership philosophy, developing the 
trust between management and subordinates, providing for widespread 
development of leadership capabilities amongst workers, and effective use of 
human resources in accomplishing the work of leadership during pursuit of 




In Why Executive Development Programs (Alone) Don’t Change 
Organizations, Pickering and Matson (1992) assert that traditional executive 
development programs are ineffective in changing government organizations.  
Pickering and Matson state two primary reasons for failure of these programs 
result in significant organizational change.  First, they note that these programs 
focus on placing executives in an intense learning environment, exposing them to 
the latest in organizational theory, and concentrating on their personal 
developmental needs.  While this may result in life changing experiences and 
creation of change-ready executives, Pickering and Matson argue that placing 
these executives back into their organizations usually results in professional 
frustration and transformation failure.  The second reason these development 
programs fail to result in real change relates to the “unready” (p. 92) state of the 
executive’s home organization.  Pickering and Matson note that the executives 
return to their organizations ready to lead change, re-enter their organization’s 
deeply-rooted work culture and established environments, and attempt to employ 
change.  Since others in their organizations did not receive the same training and 
experience, the executives get little support.  Eventually, their efforts succumb to 
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non-cooperation, frustration, and the overwhelming press of existing issues and 
problems.  In examining the flaws associated with traditional organizational and 
executive development programs, Pickering and Matson (1992) concluded that in 
order to make change more effective, they needed “an integrated way for 
technically trained executives with little knowledge of (or interest in) 
‘management’ as a discipline to structure and think about what they already knew 
of their own organizations so that they could begin to design change strategies” 
(p. 92).  
Using their experience from working with numerous organizational 
management teams, Pickering and Matson developed a change model as a 
means of integrating several theories of organizational change and leadership 
into a single framework.  Their model (shown in Figure 1 below) considers the 
critical role of leadership in developing and sharing a clear vision, defining and 
perpetuating desired operating values, and ensuring that strategies, structures 
and systems are “integrated with and supportive of the organization’s shared 
vision and operating values” (p. 94).  Pickering and Matson refer to these six 
elements of the model (inside of the Organization block of Figure 1) as change 
“levers” (p. 93).  These levers (or in other words, enablers) are said to be key to 
moving an organization towards higher performance.  A simple examination of 
the model’s flow (designated by arrows) shows that organizational leadership, as 
the first lever, is the first element under the control of an organization.  As such, it 
influences the other five elements and therefore is the most crucial first step to 
transforming an organization towards higher performance.  Failing to successfully 
deploy effective leadership usually results in failure to utilize the other five levers. 






































Figure 1. Organizational Change Model (Adapted from: Pickering and 
Matson, 1992, p. 95) 
  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
In the Figure 1 model, the leadership module is not individual leadership, 
but rather it is organizational leadership.  The concept of organizational 
leadership is defined in Building High Performance Organizations in the Twenty-
First Century, by Pickering, Brokaw, and Harnden (2003) and is said to consist of 
three parts: 
A belief set—leadership philosophy—about the nature of people 
and their attitudes towards work, about how people are motivated, 
about the distribution of knowledge and creativity and how we make 
decisions, and about how we see the nature of work; a set of 
functions—the work of leadership—that must be performed at all 
levels of an organization if the organization is to become high-
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performance; and a new set of ‘forms’—formal and informal ways to 
share power—required to get the work of leadership done. (p. iv) 
Pickering and Matson make it clear that effectively deploying leadership 
philosophy, functions, and form not just in upper management, but also across all 
levels of an organization give the best opportunity to improve overall 
performance of the organization.  Supporting this assertion is the common 
understanding that most contact with customers usually occurs at the lower 
levels of an organization.  In the case of NAVAIRNI 4.0, it is the engineers at the 
working level that receive most phone calls, messages, project tasking and other 
requests for technical assistance directly from customers.  It is they who first 
encounter both threats and opportunities and the ability to quickly avoid crises or 
exploit chances hinges on basic leadership functions being contained within 
every individual.  Pickering and Matson acknowledge that the work of leadership 
is extensive.  They note that a crucial first step in leading an organization through 
a period of change is the realization that management cannot effectively do it 
alone (1992). 
 
C. LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY 
1. Theory X and Theory Y Behavior Models 
Douglas McGregor (1960) in his book, The Human Side of Enterprise, 
examined theories on work behavior of individuals.  He developed two opposing 
theories that described the assumptions of management on the nature of human 
behavior in the workplace.  Calling these Theory X and Y, McGregor describes 
how managers view employee’s source of motivation, level of involvement and 
responsibility, and commitment to the organization.   
Theory X assumes that, “the average human being has an inherent dislike 
of work and will avoid it if he can” (p. 33).   McGregor goes on to say that the 
systems of rewards in place at most organizations, aim to stimulate employees 
towards meeting organizational objectives.   The  effect  of rewards is believed to  
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counteract the tendency of people to avoid work.  However, under a Theory X 
view of the workplace, even the promise of rewards is not enough to overcome 
this tendency: 
Because of this human characteristic of dislike for work, most 
people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with 
punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the 
achievement of organizational objectives. (p. 34) 
McGregor states that while rewards will be accepted and continually 
demanded, management under the Theory X assumes that punishment must be 
used in order to motivate.  The third major assumption of Theory X concerns the 
level of responsibility for the organization willing to be born by the average 
worker.  Theory X assumes that “the average human being prefers to be 
directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, and wants 
security above all” (p. 34).  McGregor points out that while the prevailing 
tendency of management is to publicly espouse the value of employees to an 
organization, policy and processes usually do not reflect this assertion.  
McGregor concludes this discussion by claiming that most literature on 
organizational leadership and management still embrace Theory X assumptions, 
but that movement away from these beliefs towards those of Theory Y is 
occurring.   
Contrary to Theory X, McGregor’s (1960) Theory Y assumes the 
expenditure of effort is natural and that negative stimulus is not the only way to 
make people work.  Like in Theory X, McGregor (1960) lists key assumptions 
and beliefs that describe Theory Y management disposition towards employees: 
The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural 
as play or rest. (p.47) 
External control and the threat of punishment are not the only 
means for bringing about effort towards organizational objectives.  
Man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of 
objectives to which he is committed. (p. 47) 
Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated 
with their achievement. (p. 47) 
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The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only 
to accept but to seek responsibility. (p. 48) 
The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, 
ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is 
widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population. (p. 48) 
Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual 
potentialities of the average human being are only partially utilized. 
(p. 48) 
McGregor acknowledges that the assumptions of Theory Y have not been 
fully validated and that they will be refined over the course of time with the 
experiences of other organizations and analysis of other researchers.  However, 
the fundamental conclusion reached by McGregor (1960) is that Theory Y offers 
a superior philosophy on the management of human resources.   
Above all, the assumptions of Theory Y point up the fact that the 
limits on human collaboration in the organizational setting are not 
limits of human nature but of management’s ingenuity in 
discovering how to realize the potential represented by its human 
resources. (p. 48) 
Finally, McGregor indicates that for organizations to continue to develop higher 
performance, the adoption of Theory Y beliefs and disposal of Theory X beliefs 
must occur.  While Theory X offers management an easy rationalization for poor 
performance “It is due to the nature of the human resources with which we must 
work” (p. 48), it is a static and stagnant managerial strategy.  Contrarily, under 
Theory Y, blame for poor performance is “placed squarely in the lap of 
management” (p. 48).   
 
2. Likert’s Four Leadership Styles 
 In New Patterns of Management (1961) and The Human Organization 
(1967), Dr. Rensis Likert conducted extensive research on human behavior 
within many different types of organizations. His extensive examinations of 
various leadership styles led him to hypothesize that in order to achieve high 
performance (as defined by profitability, good labor relations and high 
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productivity), organizations should optimize use of their human assets (Likert, 
1967).  Through extensive research and surveys of hundreds of managers 
across several types of organizations, Likert (1967) identified four main 
leadership and managerial systems: 
• Exploitive: This is an authoritative system where decisions are 
imposed on subordinates, motivation is characterized by threats, upper 
management has nearly all responsibility for attaining organization 
goals and lower levels have none, and there is little or no 
communication between levels of the organization and there is little 
teamwork. 
• Benevolent:  This is also an authoritative system similar in many 
aspects to the exploitive system.  The main differences’ being that 
management feels a responsibility for the well-being and care of the 
“lower-level” workers and motivation is mainly through a system of 
rewards.  Like the exploitive system, this system places nearly all 
responsibility on management and there is little communication and 
teamwork. 
• Consultative: This system is characterized by superiors who have 
substantial trust in their subordinates, motivation is by rewards and 
limited involvement in the decision making processes.  People at 
various levels feel some responsibility for achieving organization goals 
and there is a moderate amount of communication (vertical and 
horizontal) and teamwork. 
• Participative: This group system, Likert argues, is the best 
management and leadership model.  Leadership is by superiors who 
have complete confidence in their subordinates and general leadership 
competencies can be found across all levels of the organization.  
Motivation is through economic reward based on level of participation 
in achieving organizations goals.  Personnel at all levels feel real 
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responsibility for the attaining organizational goals and extensive 
communication and cooperative teamwork is common. 
 Likert asserted that for an organization to attain its full potential and 
achieve higher performance, it needed to adopt a participative system.  His 
surveys of numerous companies found that firms with a participative system 
showed “high productivity, low scrap loss, low costs, favorable attitudes, and 
excellent labor relations” (1967, p. 46).  Likert’s surveys of managers of 
numerous companies also provided data suggesting that most modern 
organizations are either benevolent or consultative and therefore have not yet 
extracted their full performance potential. 
 Likert discussed the importance of three basic concepts of the participative 
system on organizational performance including “use by the manager of the 
principle of supportive relationships, his use of group decision making and group 
methods of supervision, and his high performance goals for the organization” 
(1967, p. 47).  Likert’s general principle of supportive relationships states: 
The leadership and other processes of the organization must be 
such as to ensure a maximum probability that in all interactions and 
in all relationships within the organization, each member, in the light 
of his personal background, values, desires, and expectations, will 
view the experience as supportive and one which builds and 
maintains his sense of personal worth and importance (1961, p. 
103). 
In applying this principle, Likert specifies that the relationship between superiors 
and subordinates should be one, which is “ego-building rather than ego-deflating” 
(1967, p. 47).  In getting the best possible performance from organization 
members, Likert argues that links between that performance and the member’s 
overall feeling of self-worth and importance must be established. 
 Likert’s participative management style also emphasizes the use of group 
decision-making and supervision concepts.  Rather than rely on “man-to-man” 
interactions as in the traditional hierarchical organizational structure, Likert 
describes a structure where each person in an organization holds membership in 
a group, some individuals are members of more than one group, and group 
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processes of decision making and supervision are utilized (1967, Ch. 4).  
Individuals with multiple group memberships are called “linking pins” (p. 50), and 
they are responsible for aligning the efforts of multiple work groups and the 






Figure 2. Likert’s Overlapping Group Structure and Linking Pin Concept 
(Adapted from: Likert, 1967, p. 50) 
 
 Likert (1967) makes it clear that for group processes of decision making 
and supervision to function properly, discussion must be centered on decisions 
to be made, communication must be clear and understood, and important issues 
must be recognized and addressed.  He notes that the work of groups must be in 
an atmosphere of “no nonsense with an emphasis on high productivity, high 
quality, and low costs” (p. 51).  While the decision making process in a 
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participative system is a group endeavor, Likert emphasizes that accountability 
for the results of the group’s actions and processes still rests with the superiors: 
The group method of supervision holds the superior fully 
responsible for the quality of all decisions and for their 
implementation.  He is responsible for building his subordinates into 
a group which makes the best decisions and carries them out well 
(p. 51).   
 Likert’s third basic concept of the participative system and its effect on 
organizational performance centers on performance goals.  In The Human 
Organization (1967), he cites several studies that show employee’s needs 
generally include stable employment, job security, opportunity for advancement, 
and satisfactory compensation.  In line with the principle of supportive 
relationships above, Likert maintains that meeting the needs and desires of 
employees is important, and this can best be done when the organization is 
economically successful.  Economic success “can only be met when the 
organization, its departments, and its members have high performance goals.” 
(p. 51).  Consequently, in a participative system where all members of the 
organization are members of groups, and those groups are involved with 
decision-making and supervision processes, each and every member must have 
high performance aspirations.  Likert concludes this point by linking the needs 
and desires of group members with economic performance of the organization: 
Since economic and status needs are importance to members of 
the enterprise, the goal-setting processes of (the participative 
system) necessarily lead to high performance goals for each unit 
and the entire firm (p. 52).   
 Theories by Likert and McGregor on organizational leadership and work 
behaviors both have at their core one very important assumption, that people are 
motivated not by threats or intimidation, but by the desire to contribute towards 
fulfillment of organizational goals, as long as those goals can be embraced.   
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 D. LEADERSHIP FUNCTIONS 
John Gardner (1986) defines the “tasks” of leadership as envisioning and 
communicating goals, affirming values, motivating people, managing priorities, 
resolving conflict, explaining and teaching, serving as a symbol, representing the 
group, and renewing.  Pickering, Brokaw, and Harnden (2002, p. IV-5) describe 
the five leader functions as: 
• Strategic Customer Value Analysis 
• Connecting Visions and Values to Strategy, Structure, and Systems 
• Suprasystems Integration and Stewardship 
• Learning, Thinking, Changing, Renewing 
• Enabling, Empowering, and Energizing 
Add to these, leadership succession planning, ensuring customer 
satisfaction, measuring performance, quality assurance, obtaining new business, 
and managing change and the result is a fairly representative set of leadership 
functions that, when performed, arguably help an organization to evolve, adapt, 
and improve.  All of these functions can be loosely grouped into five general 
leadership competencies: 
• Managing and Balancing Change 
• Empowering, Mentoring, Motivating People 
• Planning and Attaining Performance and Results 
• Managing and Developing the Overall Enterprise 
• Establishing and Leading Teams  
While many of these key competencies are commonly taught and in the 
numerous leadership development programs available for executives, Pickering,  
Brokaw, and Harnden (2002) emphasize that in order for an organization to attain 
high performance, these leadership competencies must be present across all 
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levels.  The Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Senior Executive Service 
(SES) Qualifications Guide (1997) contains five Executive Core Qualifications 
(ECQ) that mirror the five general leadership competencies listed above, 
including Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven, Business Acumen, 
and Building Coalitions/Communication.  The basic descriptions of these 
leadership competencies are described below in an adaptation of the OPM 
(1997) SES ECQs. 
 
1. Managing and Balancing Change 
This core qualification encompasses the ability to develop and implement 
an organizational vision that integrates key program goals, priorities, values, and 
other factors. Inherent to this leadership function is the ability to balance change 
and continuity, to continually strive to improve customer service and program 
performance within the existing organizational framework, to create a work 
environment that encourages creative thinking, and to maintain focus, intensity 
and persistence, even under adversity.  Supporting elements of this leadership 
function include motivating managers to incorporate vision, strategic planning, 
and elements of quality management into the full range of the organization's 
activities, integrating key issues affecting the organization, being open to change 
and new information, and displaying a high level of initiative, effort, and 
commitment. 
 
2. Empowering, Mentoring, Motivating People 
This key leadership trait involves the ability to design and implement 
strategies that maximize employee potential and foster high ethical standards in 
meeting the organization's vision, mission, and goals.  Leading people requires 
providing leadership in setting the work force's expected performance levels, 
inspiring and motivating others toward goal accomplishment, empowering people 
by sharing power and authority, and promoting quality through effective use of 
the organization's performance management system.  Maximizing employees’ 
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capabilities and contributions towards organizational goals necessitates 
assessing of unique developmental needs, providing developmental 
opportunities, developing leadership through coaching and mentoring, fostering 
commitment and group identity, and resolving conflicts in a positive and 
constructive manner. 
 
3. Planning and Attaining Performance and Results 
This core leadership trait stresses accountability and continuous 
improvement.  It includes the ability to make timely and effective decisions and 
produce results through strategic planning and the implementation and 
evaluation of programs and policies.  It requires an understanding and 
application of procedures, requirements, regulations, processes and policies 
related to the enterprise.  It also requires an understanding of the link between 
administrative competencies and mission needs.   This leadership competency 
stresses the importance of formulating strategic program, structuring and 
organizing work and setting priorities, performing risk analysis and mitigation, 
setting program and performance standards, and developing and marketing new 
products and services within or outside of the organization. 
 
4. Managing and Developing the Enterprise 
This core leadership trait involves the ability to acquire and administer 
human, financial, material, and information resources in a manner that instills 
stakeholder trust and accomplishes the organization's mission.  This may include 
assessing current and future staffing needs, overseeing the allocation of financial 
resources, managing the internal budgetary process, overseeing internal 
financial processes and external capital expenditures, and ensuring the efficient 
and cost-effective development and utilization of management, information 
systems, and other technological resources of the organization. 
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 5. Establishing and Leading Coalitions and Teams 
This core qualification involves the ability to explain, advocate, and 
express facts and ideas in a convincing manner and to negotiate with individuals 
and groups internally and externally. It also involves the ability to develop an 
expansive professional network with other organizations and to identify the 
internal and external politics that impact the work of the organization.  This 
leadership function includes representing and speaking for the organizational unit 
and its work, establishing and maintaining working relationships with all internal 
organizational units, developing and enhancing alliances with external groups 
and stakeholders, working in and fostering the use workgroups and teams, 
considering and responding appropriately to the needs, feelings, and capabilities 
of different people in different situations, and communicating the position and 
work of the organization clearly. 
 
E. LEADERSHIP FORMS 
In the discussion of leadership philosophy above, Likert (1967)  concluded 
that the use of participative leadership through group decision-making and 
supervision provided the most effective way to attain higher levels of 
organizational performance.   A key characteristic of this leadership form is the 
role of the leader.  In participative workgroup structures, the leader acts a 
chairman of the group and is responsible for making sure the group keeps 
oriented towards helpful and constructive problem solving (Likert, 1961).   The 
leader rarely engages in technical matters except to express “restless 
dissatisfaction with present accomplishments and a stimulus to innovation (p. 
58)”.  Likert lists the other key group leader functions as ensuring that all 
members are trained in decision making processes, setting top-level 
performance goals, fostering the development of a supportive work environment, 
ensuring that planning and scheduling are completed, and acting as a link to the 
rest of the organization.   Aside from these few functions, Likert asserts that the 
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group leader should not participate in the “analyses and interactions” of the group 
and should not exert anything other than an equal share of the decision making 
power. 
 
1. Distributing Power and Function 
In traditional organizations, upper management usually reserves the right 
to make most important decisions that affect the firm.  Contrary to the 
participative style of leadership, Likert’s research indicated that exertion of 
hierarchical pressures on decision making resulted in less innovation, lower 
performance, greater internal conflict, and less motivation to produce.  Even with 
a well-organized plan of operation, well-defined performance goal, and high 
technical competence, his analysis suggested that when managers used 
exploitive or benevolent leadership styles, the results were more often negative.    
Consistent with Likert’s ideas on the superiority of participative 
workgroups, Visa International’s former CEO, Dee Hock describes two key ideas 
that organizations should have as part of their leadership form (Waltrop, 1996).  
Power and function must be retained at the lowest possible level and the 
governing structure must be a loose framework for dialogue, deliberation, and 
coordination.  Hock asserts that the success of a company has more to do with 
factors such as these than with the “assets, expertise, operating ability, or 
management competence.”  
Through his observations and experience at Visa International, Hock 
likens distribution of power and function to the distribution of authority in the 
federal system. 
Authority, in other words, comes from the bottom up, not the top 
down. The U. S. federal system is designed so authority rises from 
the people to local, state, and federal governments; during Hock’s 
tenure at Visa, elements of the federal system were reflected in 
Visa leadership structure and form.  Member banks send 
representatives to a system of national, regional, and international 
boards.  While the system appeared to be hierarchical, the Visa 
hierarchy is not a chain of command. Instead, each board is 
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supposed to serve as a forum for members to raise common 
issues, debate them, and reach some kind of consensus and 
resolution (Waltrop, 1996, p. 84). 
  Hock designed Visa’s leadership as a large manifestation of the 
participative leadership form sharing key characteristics with Likert’s theories on 
participative leadership.  Specificly, it provided a support structure, facilitated 
interaction, established top level goals for the business, and distributed authority 
for decisions to the group (composed of member banks).   
 
2. Workgroups 
Likert’s (1961) analysis of organizations identified a key tenet of 
participative management style as the formation and use of semi-autonomous 
workgroups who are empowered to develop solutions to organizational problems.  
He points out that these workgroups are a somewhat informal structure and are 
parallel to the more formal hierarchical structure that dominates most 
organizations.  Workgroups in a participative leadership structure have several 
characteristics that lead to their ability to more efficiently develop solutions.  
Likert (Ch. 4) defined several of these key characteristics: 
• Membership in participative workgroups consists of people skilled in all 
the various leadership and membership roles and functions required 
for interaction between leaders and members and between members 
and other members.  Members of the group are attracted to it and are 
loyal to its members, including the leader.  Members and leaders also 
have a high degree of confidence and trust in each other regardless of 
the position of members within the formal hierarchical structure.  The 
values and goals of the group are essentially the same as the relevant 
values and goals of its members and have been shaped by the group 
itself.  Motivation in the group is high and the expectation is that each 
member will do all that he or she reasonably to accomplish the groups 
goals.  
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• All the interaction, problem-solving, decision-making activities of the 
group occur in a supportive atmosphere that is perpetuated by the 
group’s leader. Suggestions, comments, ideas, information, criticisms 
are all offered with a helpful orientation. Similarly, these contributions 
are received in the same spirit. Respect is shown for the point of view 
of others in the way contributions are made and received. 
• When necessary or advisable, other members of the group will give a 
member the help needed to accomplish successfully the goals set for 
that person.  Mutual help is a characteristic of highly effective groups 
and this supportive atmosphere stimulates creativity.  Value is attached 
to new, creative approaches and solutions to its problems and to the 
problems of the organization of which it is a part. 
• The group knows the value of "constructive" conformity and knows 
when to use it and for what purposes.   Although it does not permit 
conformity to affect adversely the creative efforts of its members, it 
does expect conformity on mechanical and administrative matters to 
save the time of members and to facilitate the group's activities 
• Communication is a strong motivation of members in the group.  There 
is high motivation in the group to use the communication process so 
that it best serves the interests and goals of the group.  While 
persistently conveying important information for the group, members 
strive to avoid communicating extraneous information.  There is an 
equally strong motivation to receive communications.  Members are 
genuinely interested in relevant information from other group members.  
Information is welcomed and trusted and not suspected of supporting 
alternative agendas or non-group goals. 
• Debate within effect workgroups is healthy and there is equally strong 
impetus to influence other members as well as to be influenced by 
them on matters pertaining to all group methods and processes.  The 
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ability of the members of a group to influence each other contributes to 
the flexibility and adaptability of the group. Ideas and solutions remain 
fluid because members are able to continuously influence each other. 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter identified reasons why typical executive development 
programs fail to effect organization transformation, discussed the role of 
leadership in changing an organization, and discussed effective leadership 
philosophies, functions, and forms of modern organizational theory.  Key 
leadership characteristics of high performance organizations were discussed.  
These included the need for upper management to recognize all employees as 
motivated by level of participation and responsibility, accept that a participative 
leadership system based on workgroups is more effective, and endeavor to 
foster, develop, and deploy leadership competencies across the organization.  
These effective leadership concepts of high performance organizations will be 
highlighted in the case study analysis of successfully transformed government 
organizations conducted in Chapter IV and V of this study. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Before studying transformed firms, it is first important to understand why 
case studies of the experiences of other organizations can be beneficial.  Robert 
K. Yin (2003b) in Case Study Research: Design and Methods points out that 
case studies are the preferred research strategy when “how” or “why” questions 
are posed.  Yin (2003b) states that case studies improve our understanding and 
“contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, 
and related phenomena” (p. 1).  Since this study proposes to determine how 
leadership should be employed in government organizations undergoing 
significant change, it is believed that careful selection and study of case subjects 
will lead to valuable lessons learned for others to apply.    
 After reviewing reasons for studying transformed firms, this chapter will 
define the criteria for being designated as a case study subject for this research, 
identify the three subjects selected for this research, and then provide a detailed 
explanation of the study research methodology.  
 
B. REASONS TO STUDY TRANSFORMED FIRMS  
Robert K. Yin (2003a) defines two motives for analyzing successfully 
transformed firms.  First, these firms have established performance levels and 
business results above and beyond those of their competition, partners, or 
industry.  Firms that are struggling financially or desire greater profits, market 
share, or simply need a model by which to grow their organization are naturally 
going to examine successful firms over firms that are experiencing difficulties.  
Successful organizations that are in a similar industry, have similar workforce 
demographics, and are exposed to the same (or similar) market forces or 
environmental shifts may possibly provide an example of how a lower performing 
or less mature firm should look for that given time.  The uncertainty in using only 
business metrics at a given point in time as a sole indicator of successful 
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transformation is that this provides no indication of longevity.  Logically, 
financially successful firms demonstrate that they are able to exploit the existing 
business environment, their own organizational structures, and the weaknesses 
of their competitors.  Indeed, Yin argues that it is possible for organizations with 
poor structure, processes, and facilities to exhibit superior financial 
performance.  While an importance indicator, studying firms with good current 
business performance will provide, at best, lessons on how an organization 
should look and act in an existing business environment to attain improved 
outcomes. 
Yin’s (2003a) second reason to study successful transformed firms is that 
they have managed to maintain their leading performance for an extended period 
of time, even as revolutions in technology, changes in markets, and other 
environmental shifts occurred.   Garvin (1993), in his article Building a Learning 
Organization, points out that maintaining a long-term competitive edge through 
changes in environmental conditions is an obvious indication that an organization 
has developed an adaptive or learning organizational structure.  Those firms that 
have existed and flourished over extended periods of time or those that have 
successfully navigated through massive technological, social, and political 
change have had to adapt to constantly changing environments.  Garvin (1993) 
goes on to say that the internal systems and cultures of these organizations must 
have had flexibility to change from one state to another in response to this 
change.  The experiences of these organizations provide lessons and possible 
paths for other organizations to follow in order to develop sustained high 
performance. 
Structuring or reinventing an organization for the purpose of attaining 
better performance is a complex endeavor with many different possible 
combinations of actions, initiatives, or programs that can be used as a path to 
follow.  Yin’s work on studying transformed firms indicates that vital lessons 
learned   can   be   extracted   from   case   studies   of   other   similarly  situated  
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organizations (Yin, 2003a).  Lessons learned from successful (and unsuccessful) 
transformation efforts give firms the best chance of developing and executing 
change programs. 
 
C. CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATION AS A TRANSFORMED 
ORGANIZATION  
Key to analyzing transformed firms is scrutinizing those organizational 
change efforts that are indicative of true transformation vice superficial technical 
improvements.  Yin (2003a) points out that technical improvement such as large 
capital investments, adoption of new production processes, and restructuring of 
workspaces and shop floors can be substantial and result in increases in 
productivity, profit, and overall performance.  However, these changes may not 
represent a true transformation. 
However, despite their significance, such improvements alone may 
not necessarily involve a change in the firm’s culture or produce the 
dynamic processes needed to sustain longer-term competitiveness 
that characterizes transformed firms (p. 149).    
Yin’s statement above emphasizes two top-level requirements for a 
change effort to be considered transformational.  First, the culture of an 
organization must experience a change.  One way this can occur, Yin (2003a) 
argues, is through the greater use of employees in developing the firm’s vision, 
strategies, and infrastructure and in sustaining effective and efficient operations.  
Through such things as profit-sharing, supporting employee educational 
development, increasing wages, improving work conditions, and implementing 
quality of life initiatives, firms call for greater employee participation and 
empowerment in a change effort.  As an example, creation of work cells based 
on Lean manufacturing philosophy generally results in reorganization of 
workspaces around products vice operations or processes.  Instead of moving 
products throughout a plant to designated process areas (machine shop, plating 
shop, paint shop, etc.), the processes are brought to the product.  In such an 
arrangement, employees traditionally trained in a single operation and paid 
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based on their skills in that specific trade may be required to conduct multiple 
operations on a single part.  The training and certification of those employees in 
multi-trades effectively create a more valuable company asset (multi-skilled 
employee).  To be part of an effective transformation effort, the change in 
technical operations (Lean manufacturing cells) must be accompanied by 
changes in human resource systems to properly compensate and promote multi-
skilled employees. Similarly, implementing improvements to human resource 
systems without making the complementary structural changes would also be 
insufficient for achieving true transformation.  
Yin’s (2003a) second indication of a true organizational transformation is 
the extent to which a change effort affects the strategic operation of the 
organization.  Strategic operation is a generic term that can include any or all of 
the functions typically performed by upper management.  Yin’s Transformed 
Firms Logic Model (2003a, p. 151-152) argues that changes to a firms 
management systems, industrial marketing, manufacturing systems, information 
technology, and human resources coupled with improvements to fundamental 
business results is an indication of a true organizational transformation. 
In short, Yin’s operational definition of transformation calls for change in 
the fundamental organization of the structure, operations, systems and 
management of a whole firm, not just in its processes.  Change of this magnitude 
is complex and can require extensive to time to effect.  Yin (2003a) 
acknowledges this point. 
The desired transforming changes need not occur all at once.  The 
total package of changes over time, however, should be sufficiently 
strong and different from previous practices to signal a significant 
competitive repositioning of the firm (p. 150).    
 
D. SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
For analysis purposes, this research defines a suitable case subject as 
having all of the following characteristics: 
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• The organization is a governmental institution that serves a public 
interest, is non-profit, and is publicly funded. 
•  Changes to the organizations' leadership philosophy, functions, and/or 
form were evident.  
• The change effort involved major strategic changes in the operations of 
the organization in areas such as strategic planning, management 
restructuring, shifting marketing strategy, or dramatically changing 
processes. 
• Employee participation in the change effort was not limited to upper 
management. 
• The change effort resulted in real and measurable improvements in the 
organizations' performance. 
Change efforts undertaken by three organizations were selected for 
examination and analysis based on meeting the criteria described above.  The 
United States Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program’s (commonly known as Naval 
Reactors) efforts towards attaining “institution constancy”, the United States 
Coast Guard’s initiative to implement Total Quality Management (TQM), and the 
United States Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) move to transform internal 
business processes all qualify as successfully transformed governmental 
institutions.  Summaries of their transformation experiences and an analysis of 
key findings used to develop answers to research questions posed in Chapter I 
are provided in Chapters IV and V of this thesis.  
 
E. METHODOLOGY OF CASE STUDY 
The literature review conducted in Chapter II highlighted traits of effective 
leadership philosophy, functions, and forms that can help guide organizations 
through performance improving transformation. Those characteristics are 
summarized in Table 1.  
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 Leadership Category Characteristics 
Philosophy • Theory Y Beliefs, Participative Style 
Function 
• Managing/Balancing Change 
• Empowering, Mentoring, Motivating 
• Planning/Attaining Performance and Results 
• Managing and Developing the Enterprise 
• Establishing and Leading Coalitions and 
Teams 
Form • Workgroups, Teams, Distributed Power and Function 




 Given that no organization’s experience with transformation can be exactly 
the same as any other organization, this study utilizes a multiple case study with 
literal replication logic to examine three organizations that have successfully 
implemented widespread organization change in their respective situations and 
environments.  As defined by Yin (2003b), the multiple case study technique is a 
holistic research strategy that examines more than one case to develop and 
support generalized theories.  Literal replication logic is the technique of selecting 
and analyzing case subjects such that “commonalities discovered support the 
initial set of propositions” (p. 47).   
       In this multiple case study, content analysis is used to determine the presence of 
certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts in each case description.  
Meanings and relationships of these text excerpts relative to the theories and 
models  developed  as  a  result of  the  literature  review  of Chapter II are then  
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derived using conceptual analysis.  Some subjectivity is included in the 
conceptual analysis in deciding the level of implication of implicit terms and 
concepts.   
 The cases are analyzed in order to determine if the experiences of the 
three organizations show evidence of leadership traits consistent with those 
outlined in Table 1 above.  From this analysis and the literature reviewed earlier 
in this study a generalized leadership model for organizational change is 
developed for use by other governmental organizations.  This model effectively 
answers the study’s research questions posed earlier, specifically: 
• How should leadership be employed in government organizations 
undergoing significant transformation initiatives designed to improve 
overall performance? 
• What leadership philosophies are effective in guiding successful 
government organization transformations? 
• What are the functions of leadership in the transformational process of 
a government organization? 
• What forms of leadership have government organizations employed in 
transformation efforts? 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter opened with a discussion on the benefits of studying 
transformed firms.  Organizations having undergone major change efforts in 
response to changing environments and having demonstrated enduring financial 
and business performance offer similarly situated firms valuable lessons learned.  
For these lessons learned to be valid, firms studied must have undergone true 
transformation versus superficial improvements to operations or processes.  The 
criteria used by this study for designating a firm’s change experience as a true 
“transformation” were identified and cases meeting these criteria were selected.  
The three cases chosen for this study are the U.S. Naval Reactors efforts 
towards attaining institution constancy, the Coast Guard’s initiative to implement 
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TQM, and the CIA’s transformation of internal business processes.  Leadership 
characteristics for each of these organizations during their change experiences 
will be extracted from case narrations in the next chapter. 
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter contains a case analysis of the transformation experiences of 
U.S. Naval Reactors, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the CIA during their periods of 
organizational change.  Specifically, excerpts that support elements of effective 
leadership characteristics discussed in the preceding chapter are extracted from 
case narrations.  The data extracted from these case narrations will be used to 
support elements of a simplified leadership model in the following chapter. 
 
B. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTANCY AT U.S. NAVAL REACTORS 
1. Case Background 
Appendix A contains an article written by John W. Crawford and Steven L. 
Krahn (1998) on the efforts of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (a.k.a 
Naval Reactors) to attain institutional constancy.  The article is a case study on 
Naval Reactors history, organization, and management and argues that this 
organization has achieved institutional constancy through its impeccable record 
of designing, building, and decommissioning naval vessel nuclear reactors safely 
for over 50 years.  As defined by Todd LaPorte and Ann Keller (1996), 
institutional constancy means, “providing a sustaining foundation to enable 
scientists and engineers to manage nuclear materials regardless of political, 
social, and institutional changes affecting that mission.” (p. 535).  This 
government and military organization is evaluated, through examination of this 
case study and extraction of key excerpts, for characteristics of its leadership 
components (philosophy, function, form) that led to attainment of institutional 
constancy. 
 
2. Leadership Philosophy 
The leadership philosophy of Naval Reactors reflects a Theory Y 
management and employee behavioral pattern.  Upper military management of 
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Naval Reactors believed that the ability of the organization to perform 
exceptionally rested in the hands of the personnel.  Because of this, great care 
was taken in selecting, promoting, and developing the talent at all levels in the 
organization.   Management also empowered the lowest level of the organization 
with duties and responsibilities critical to the mission of Naval Reactors.  For their 
part, employees accepted this empowerment and responsibility and used it as 
their driving force towards accomplishment of the organizations goals: 
Naval Reactors views its personnel, both government and 
contractor, as its primary asset. Obviously, all program personnel 
must be fully competent, especially concerning technical 
qualifications. Naval Reactors must have the competence, in all 
areas, to provide effective technical direction and guidance. 
Selection and training of Naval Reactors personnel is thus 
accorded the highest priority among all program endeavors (p. 
164).  -Theory Y Management Belief  
The technical excellence sought in the Naval Reactors program is 
embodied in the high quality reliability, and safety of the 
components, systems, and plants that it produces. In achieving this 
result, Naval Reactors makes wide use of quality assurance, but it 
does so in a manner that preserves to line management the final 
responsibility for quality (p. 163). -Theory Y Management Belief 
A principle of transcending importance is that every organizational 
unit and each individual has responsibilities that are defined clearly 
and understood thoroughly. Careful attention is given to seeing that 
these responsibilities are internalized, that the name of an 
individual is identified unambiguously with each required function, 
and that these responsibilities are put in writing (p. 161). -Theory Y 
Employee Belief, Participative Leadership Style 
(Responsibility) 
 The operational leadership employed by Naval Reactors had several 
attributes of both consultative and participative styles.  Extensive use of 
workgroups, extensive vertical and horizontal communication, cooperative 
teamwork, motivation based on participation, and widespread responsibility for 
attaining organization goals were evidence of the participative style: 
Formal, written goals have been the backbone of the Naval 
Reactors program since its inception. A formal, written goal (the 
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commitment to produce a nuclear reactor for submarine propulsion) 
launched the program in the late 1940s (p. 166). -Participative 
Leadership Style (Specified Goals) 
Since its very early stages the program has espoused a "cradle to 
grave responsibility" for the nuclear power plants that it designs and 
builds. In effect, such a philosophy operationalizes constancy, 
which is put to work in concepts such as responsibility, as well as in 
the clear definition of roles, and the need for technical excellence in 
all aspects of the program (p. 166). -Participative Leadership 
Style (Specified Goals) 
Program execution is strongly marked by the application of the 
principle of redundancy.  The objective is never to be dependent on 
a single source of anything: information, supply of material and 
equipment, design approaches, assessment of quality, or 
personnel.  The list could extend indefinitely.  Application of this 
principle can be seen in the early establishment of two reactor 
plant-engineering laboratories.  The strong, competitive capabilities 
of these two laboratories have been an important source of strength 
for the Naval Reactors program, and the laboratories are often 
used cooperatively to address technical problems of common 
program interest (p. 163). -Participative Leadership Style 
(Cooperative Teamwork) 
Communications do not just move up the chain of command. In 
keeping with Naval Reactor's commitment to formality, all actions 
taken by headquarters are promptly documented and 
communicated to all activities involved. This provides the basis for 
an ongoing dialogue between Naval Reactors headquarters, its 
field offices, and its contractors (p. 165). -Participative Leadership 
Style (Vertical and Horizontal Communication) 
The extensive internal communication system that Naval Reactors 
has in place also ensures that it is very responsive to problems as 
they arise. In addition to the management reports discussed above, 
several special reporting systems exist to document quality 
problems and unusual occurrences as well as to record changes 
required in the formal system of manuals and procedures that 
establish program requirements (p. 168). -Participative 
Leadership Style (Vertical and Horizontal Communication) 
Achieving technical excellence in design and execution is perhaps 
the supreme objective that informs and drives all Naval Reactors 
activities. All policies, practices, and procedures are directed 
toward achieving this objective. Achieving it requires that personnel 
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acquire the disposition-as a way of life-to examine matters in detail 
with an attitude of objectivity concerning assumptions, validity of 
data, and the like, coupled with an imaginative conjecture of how 
things could possibly conspire to go wrong (p. 163). -Participative 
Leadership Style (Responsibility) 
After suitable candidates are identified, utmost attention is given to 
the selection process. Each candidate is interviewed by at least 
three senior technical managers, personnel whose judgment is 
trusted by the director. The attributes sought include: technical 
ability, mental alertness, industry, imagination, dedication, moral 
integrity, and growth potential. In trying to gauge technical ability, 
the interviewers attempt to "get behind the grades" to understand 
the candidates' ability to apply the material they have learned in a 
logical, coherent fashion. The capstone of the process is an 
interview with the director, who, provided with the results of 
previous interviews, makes the final determination (p. 164). -
Participative Leadership Style (Motivation) 
The fact that Naval Reactors, as a military organization, had ultimate control 
of, and responsibility for, crucial decisions reserved for the top of the organization 
meant that elements of the consultative leadership style remained with the 
organization.  The top position of director (formerly held by Admiral H.G. 
Rickover) still exerted great control over important technical and managerial 
issues: 
Ultimate authority and responsibility resides with the director, who 
delegates appropriate authority to headquarters and field personnel 
(p. 161). -Consultative Leadership Style 
For example, at a perilously late stage in the development of the 
programs first reactor (the prototype for the first nuclear submarine, 
Nautilus) Rickover made the contractor scrap a fatally flawed 
design for a vital safety system and instead manufacture a totally 
new, simpler design (p. 162). -Consultative Leadership Style 
 
3. Leadership Function 
Naval Reactors’ organizational successes early in its existence are heavily 
attributed to the political and organizational skills of its top leadership in building 
powerful relationships with both sponsors and potential antagonists.  These 
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entities had direct or indirect power to affect the mission, goals, and performance 
of the organization.  By building coalitions and inculcating this process in the 
standards and procedures of the organization and the position of director, this 
legacy continues: 
Very early in the development of naval nuclear power, H. G. 
Rickover, then a Navy captain, saw that this statutory division of 
responsibilities posed grave difficulties. He recognized that the 
development and utilization of this revolutionary new source of 
power should be treated as a series of closely related technical 
functions including research and development, detailed design, 
procurement of apparatus, maintenance and repair of equipment, 
and selection and training of personnel. With these considerations 
in mind, Rickover moved boldly and with remarkable political 
astuteness to arrange that a single organization be assigned the 
key responsibilities of both the Navy and the Atomic Energy 
Commission (the Department of Energy's predecessor) (p. 160). -
Building Coalitions 
Naval Reactors provides an annual review of its operations to 
Congress along with its budget submittal. This review goes into 
great depth regarding the health and safety record of the program; 
a summary version of this report (known as the Grey Book) is also 
updated annually. These comprehensive reports, coupled with 
regular, effective congressional testimony, are very valuable in 
marshaling support for Naval Reactors programs (p. 165). -
Building Coalitions 
As a top priority, he set about quickly to establish a strong and 
enduring relationship with Congress, specifically the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, which had comprehensive oversight 
of all nuclear matters during that era (p. 160). -Building Coalitions 
Communications in writing, coupled with the formal proposals 
required by Naval Reactors of its contractors, provide a clear 
written record of the actions and decisions of the program. This 
permits effective interfacing with outside groups, whether they are 
auditors (e.g., the General Accounting Office) or they provide 
oversight (e.g., the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, an 
arm of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and even more notably, 
Congress) (p. 165). -Building Coalitions 
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In addition, since the mid-1980s, Naval Reactors has opened its 
program to external oversight of environmental matters. Naval 
Reactors has dedicated a separate division to deal with 
environmental protection and compliance matters. This division, 
working closely with Naval Reactors ' contractors, ensures that 
environmental problems are rapidly identified and corrected. This 
rapid response has led to good working relationships between 
Naval Reactors and state and federal regulators in this arena (p. 
167). -Building Coalitions 
Empowerment of the subordinate technical and managerial staffs to 
satisfy agreed upon objectives, planning and attaining expected results in spite of 
setbacks, and managing the overall enterprise (Naval Reactors) were other 
easily distinguishable leadership functions:  
Naval Reactors managers are imbued with the feeling of being part 
of a unified organization, one with dear management policies and 
practices and well-articulated goals. This organizational cohesion is 
not stultifying; all are encouraged to recommend improvements, 
organizational and technical, confident that optimal solutions will 
emerge from such ongoing dialogues (p. 167). -Empowering, 
Mentoring, Motivating People 
His effective transmission of this experience to the Naval Reactors 
organization has been a major factor in its success.  For example, 
at a perilously late stage in the development of the programs first 
reactor (the prototype for the first nuclear submarine, Nautilus) 
Rickover made the contractor scrap a fatally flawed design for a 
vital safety system and instead manufacture a totally new, simpler 
design.  His courage to face technical reality and take forceful 
action helped foster an organizational commitment to confront 
technical reality in all its details early and head on whatever the 
consequences.  This became a characteristic mode of operation at 
Naval Reactors and it works to avoid potential failure to meet 
agreed-upon program objectives, especially in safety and quality (p. 
162). -Planning and Attaining Results 
Program execution is strongly marked by the application of the 
principle of redundancy. The objective is never to be dependent on 
a single source of anything: information, supply of material and 
equipment, design approaches, assessment of quality, or 
personnel. The list could extend indefinitely. Application of this 
principle can be seen in the early establishment of two reactor 
plant-engineering laboratories. The strong, competitive capabilities 
of these two laboratories have been an important source of strength 
for  the  Naval  Reactors  program,  and  the  laboratories  are often  
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used cooperatively to address technical problems of common 
program interest (p. 163). -Managing and Developing the Overall 
Enterprise 
The remaining leadership function (Managing and Balancing Change) 
reflects the ability of Naval reactors to develop and implement an organizational 
vision that integrates key program goals, priorities, values, and other factors.  
Safe handling of nuclear material and systems, and the life cycle responsibilities 
for naval nuclear reactors provides simultaneous moral, ethical, and patriotic 
driving forces behind the organizational vision: 
In the area of demonstrating trustworthiness, Naval Reactors 
places particular emphasis on formal, written goals and a strong 
articulation of those goals. One of these goals, cradle to grave 
responsibility for its nuclear power plants, also helps produce the 
necessary commitment to constancy (p. 169). -Managing and 
Balancing Change 
Achieving technical excellence in design and execution is perhaps 
the supreme objective that informs and drives all Naval Reactors 
activities. All policies, practices, and procedures are directed 
toward achieving this objective (p. 163). -Managing and Balancing 
Change 
 
4. Leadership Form 
The overall form of leadership at Naval Reactors developed since its 
inception reflects structures consistent with participative leadership philosophies.  
Specifically, an avoidance of “stove piped” hierarchical structures, distribution of 
power and authority to the lowest levels, and the widespread use of intact 
workgroups with specific goals and finite life spans were all characteristic of 
Naval Reactors organizational leadership forms: 
As noted earlier, a single unified organization was established to 
carry out the respective responsibilities of the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Navy. This unified aspect was strengthened 
as the program grew and the organization was extended 
nationwide. The heads of each field activity in the Naval Reactors 
program reported to the director rather than to some key assistant. 
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This arrangement produces a very flat organization (p. 161). -
Distribution of Power and Authority 
In such an organization communications are very important (as 
discussed below). The mode of operation is highly unified, yet 
flexible; new groups are formed and old ones disbanded based on 
the demands of the work (p. 161). -Workgroups 
Field personnel truly function as a part of the headquarters 
organization, simply displaced by geography (p. 161). -Distribution 
of Power and Authority 
 
C. TQM IMPLEMENTATION AT THE U.S. COAST GUARD 
1. Case Background 
Appendix B is Susan Rosegrant’s (1993) Harvard Kennedy School of 
Government case narration title An Organizational Sea Change: Total Quality 
Management in the Coast Guard.  In the fall of 1992, the Commandant of the 
Coast Guard, Admiral J. William Kime recognized a need to change the 
organization and improve its performance.  Rosegrant (1993) indicates that 
Kime’s concerns stemmed from an expansion of the service’s mission, no 
increases in budget commensurate with those expanded requirements, and 
competition from other agencies and commercial firms.  These concerns in 
addition to “periodic proposals by outside critics to dismantle the Coast Guard 
and transfer its duties” (p. 2) threatened the existence of the nation’s smallest 
military service.  Rosegrant (1993) notes that Admiral Kime sought to better 
utilize the service’s existing budget and resources to successfully conduct all four 
of the service’s primary missions: maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, 
environmental protection, and national security.  He chose TQM because of three 
important reasons.  First, TQM had already been embraced by a broad cross-
section of commercial firms and federal agencies and service.  Second, 
organizations that successfully implemented TQM reported extensive 
improvements in quality of services they provided, flatter and more efficient 
management structures, better teamwork, and a more effective workforce.  
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Third, TQM offered an approach that emphasized continuous process 
improvement, people orientation, quantitative methods, and customer focus.  
By the time of Admiral Kime's departure from the Coast Guard three years 
after beginning TQM implementation, Rosegrant (1993) reports that the service 
already began to see improvements in the areas of cost, quality, and employee 
involvement.  This successful government organization transformation is 
evaluated, through examination of this case narration and extraction of key 
excerpts, for characteristics of its leadership components (philosophy, function, 
form) that contributed to its successful implementation of TQM.  Specifically, the 
prevailing leadership philosophy will be characterized during the implementation 
period, evidence of the leadership functions leadership functions will be 
extracted, and the leadership forms used to employ and drive change will be 
identified. 
 
2. Leadership Philosophy 
Leadership behavior beliefs of Coast Guard management and 
subordinates during the TQM implementation period had a predominantly Theory 
Y disposition.  Upper management understood that subordinates at various 
positions within the Coast Guard staff at headquarters and in the field would be 
the key change agents.  The implementation and perpetuation of TQM 
throughout the service would rely on their innovation, energy, and stamina.  
Because of this belief, management bestowed leadership responsibilities and 
empowered subordinates to set the ultimate course of implementation, with only 
top-level objectives and goals provided as a guiding star.  Trust in their judgment 
and capabilities enabled this empowerment.  Similarly, subordinates that were 
committed to the goals of TQM and the organization exerted great effort and self-
guidance in pursuit of success: 
‘The commandant made a very critical strategic decision that we 
would allow and encourage innovation in TQM,’ explains Captain 
Houle, the leader of the IPT-2, who compares his job to being the 
conductor of an improvisational jazz band.  ‘We would have 
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standard tools, but within each major command we would allow 
them, and, in fact, encourage them, to do TQM whichever way felt 
right to them’ (p. 9). -Theory Y Management Belief 
For commands whose leaders had embraced TQM, however, the 
looseness of the Coast Guard’s implementation plan allowed for 
flexibility and innovation.  TQM coordinator Captain James Ingham, 
for example, led the Fifth District in an intensive TQM rollout, which 
took the Coast Guard’s standard plan as just a starting point.  In the 
first three months of the implementation, Ingham met regularly with 
his district admiral and chief of staff, contracted with a local quality 
management institution for additional training and resources, 
nagged senior officers to read books on quality, and arranged for 
Executive Steering Committee members and other senior officers 
to attend quality management seminars in addition to their three-
day ODI training (p. 11). -Theory Y Employee Belief 
The Fifth District was not alone in its impressive TQM debut.  One 
unit and an area-level division, after implementing TQM, had 
demonstrated enough overall process improvements to be named 
in October as finalists in the Secretary of Transportation’s First 
Annual Quality Award.  ‘We’ve been criticized by people who have 
since turned out to be the laggards: Tell me what to do and I’ll do it, 
and I’ll do it very well,’ Captain Houle recounts.  ‘Those folks were 
left behind for a while, but it allowed the real innovators–the 
chargers–to surge ahead’ (p. 11). -Theory Y Employee Belief 
Leadership at the Coast Guard during the TQM implementation period 
heavily reflected Likert’s participative group style.  From the outset, extensive use 
of workgroups and substantial teamwork contributed towards attainment of the 
goals laid out by upper management.  As mentioned above, upper management 
did not prescribe the methods to be used in meeting goals, but simply expressed 
the desired end state through its vision.  Workgroups included both “true 
workgroups” (those with specific goals and finite lives), and teams (groups with a 
more generalized mission and indefinite life): 
By January 1991, the team had hammered out a five-sentence 
Coast Guard Vision Statement, gotten Kime’s approval, and 
distributed it to all the flag officers.  ‘Ideally, we would have liked the 
commandant to put pen to paper and spill his guts out on what he  
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thought the Coast Guard of the future should be,’ remarked one 
team member, ‘but he didn’t do that’ (p 5).  -Participative 
Leadership Style (Decisions) 
In between were a cascading series of groups, usually linked 
vertically by having a member of the higher level group chair the 
next lower group, and often linked horizontally by drawing team 
members from across functional boundaries.  Executive Steering 
Committees, the highest-level group within major commands at 
headquarters, area, and district levels, were to develop plans, 
review progress, and reward success on a more local level (p. 6).  -
Participative Leadership Style (Teamwork) 
Extensive vertical and horizontal communication was prevalent from the 
beginning of the TQM implementation effort.  Vertical communication in the form 
of directives, instructions, and guidance from top management to senior officers 
was disseminated throughout the Coast Guard.  While not explicitly a 
characteristic of the participative leadership style, this strong vertical 
communication was necessary since the Coast Guard was still a military 
organization with a hierarchical organizational structure.   Complementing this 
legacy communication philosophy, a new horizontal communication structure 
took hold once the use of intact workgroups increased.  The new structure 
created the nested matrix of communications characteristic of the participative 
leadership style: 
…Admiral Kime – who saw spreading the word about TQM as a 
key leadership function – stepped up his discussions with senior 
officers and others about the importance of TQM.  ‘I was talking 
everywhere I went about what we were doing and why I felt this 
was not only a good idea, but something that was almost a 
necessity,’ he says.  At the same time, IPT-1 published the first 
commandant instructions devoted to TQM.  Although the instruction 
did not address why the Coast Guard was implementing TQM, it 
briefly described the philosophy, introduced the overlay structure 
concept, and provided a glossary of TQM terms.  The second 
instruction, released in February, gave more details about the 
overlay and training procedures, and in June, the group sent out 
two final instructions, one on communications and measurement, 
and one on rewards and recognition.  The four instructions  
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constituted the formal guidance give to Coast Guard personnel for 
implementing TQM (p. 7). -Participative Leadership Style 
(Communications) 
According to Houle, the guidebook for the first time presented 
coordinators with a clear plan.  The document described TQM 
structural overlay, how each piece fit in the overlay, the basic 
responsibilities of the various TQM teams and boards, and what 
each entity’s charter should contain (p. 10). -Participative 
Leadership Style (Communications) 
There were also less heralded improvements.  At headquarters, 
many people were most impressed not by the stories of specific 
money- or resource-saving innovations, but by the fact that people 
were talking to each other.  The increase in communication was 
slowly changing how things got done (p. 12). -Participative 
Leadership Style (Communications) 
But under the TQM process, we have dialogue going on among 
groups that never, ever talked about issues across the boundaries.  
The net result is that rather than having a fix put into place based 
on the strength and personality of the person who called the 
meeting, and that would only live as long as that person was there 
to beat the system into submission, you now are putting into place 
something that will endure.  Through a process of inclusion you 
have a long-term solution (p. 12). -Participative Leadership Style 
(Communications) 
The participative leadership style employs motivating forces that are 
based on reward commensurate with level of participation in achieving 
organizational goals.  While not necessarily indicative of new widespread 
motivating forces based on this concept, excerpts from the case study do 
indicate that promotion of senior officers were predominantly based on the 
commitment to deploy TQM across the organization.  Indeed, that goal is the 
most important: 
More significantly, perhaps, senior officials agreed that the four 
admirals considered most likely to succeed Kime were all 
supporters of a quality management program.  ‘The people who are 
not supporters will not compete well for the commandant position.’ 
Ingham, the incoming quality advisor, asserts.  ‘I predict the name 
may change.  But the content of what we’re embarked on will not 
change’ (p. 17-18)  -Participative Leadership Style (Motivation) 
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At its November 1992 meeting, the Quality Council took Houle’s 
advice and approved the new position of a quality advisor reporting 
directly to Admiral Kime and overseeing the Quality Management 
Branch.  Soon after, council chose Captain James Ingham, who 
had already made a mark as TQM coordinator for the Fifth District, 
to fill the post (p. 15). -Participative Leadership Style 
(Motivation) 
 
3. Leadership Function 
Commonly, a first major step in managing and leading a change effort is to 
articulate the organizations vision and desired end state.  This top-level guidance 
is what all subordinates use to align their independent tactical efforts towards 
implementing the prescribed change.  Clearly, a major concern within upper 
management at the Coast Guard was that these efforts towards implementing 
change would interfere with the service’s primary missions.  The competing 
priorities of implementing widespread organizational change and maintaining a 
superior level of service to the nation are leadership functions required for 
successful organizational change: 
At the end of the day, Kime directed that an Implementation 
Planning Team (IPT-1) be chartered to develop a two-year TQM 
implementation plan under the leadership of a top-level Executive 
Guidance Team.  Among its tasks, the ten-member IPT-1 team was 
to create a Coast Guard vision statement, articulating the agency’s 
desired future state; a structure of committees and groups to lead, 
support, and carry out the implementation (p. 5). -Managing and 
Balancing Change 
As its array of responsibilities grew, however, the Coast Guard, like 
other federal agencies, was also confronting the reality of leaner 
times.  The federal government had proclaimed its commitment to 
cutting costs, improving productivity, and becoming more efficient, 
and although the Coast Guard’s budget had risen slightly in the 
previous two years to $2.7 billion in 1990, the sense through the 
organization was that the service was being asked to do 
substantially more with less.  In TQM, Admiral Kime saw the dual 
promise of boosting internal efficiencies with offering proof that the 
Coast Guard was doing all that it could to trim fat and streamline 
operations (p. 2). -Managing and Balancing Change 
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Since being placed under the Department of Transportation in 
1967, the agency tended to favor one mission area at the expense 
of the others, a strategy that the commandant believed had 
weakened the Coast Guard.  But Kime also realized it would take 
more than a reapportionment of resources to convince skeptics that 
the service was ideally suited to carry out the diverse tasks it had 
been given.  Here, again, TQM might help in demonstrating the 
Coast Guard’s commitment to accomplishing all its assigned 
missions capably and at a reasonable cost (p. 2-3). -Managing and 
Balancing Change 
The use of workgroups and teams to meet the objectives outlined by 
upper management and the presence and source of subordinate motivation at 
the Coast Guard during TQM implementation is discussed extensively above.  
Most of the people outside of senior management did not know much about TQM 
or its implementation, so in order to fully empower employees, creation of a 
system of learning and relearning was necessary.  The Coast Guard addressed 
this by first conducting widespread training on TQM fundamentals.  Secondly, the 
service designed an internal TQM training program and created an institute to 
promulgate the latest TQM training to the ever-changing workforce: 
In January 1991, as IPT-1 was laying out the fundamental policies 
and structures that would support the TQM implementation, the first 
groups of TQM coordinators and facilitators reported to the Coast 
Guard’s Reserve Training Center in Yorktown, Virginia, for training.  
ODI offered three different programs:  about 150 coordinators 
would attend five-day sessions; the approximately 350 facilitators 
would receive the most training – nine days – to prepare them for 
becoming teachers themselves; and some 1,800 senior managers 
who would be serving on executive steering committees and quality 
management boards were slated to begin three-day workshops in 
May (p. 6-7). -Empowerment, Mentoring, Motivating 
In addition, IPT-2 had to design and establish the Leadership 
Institute, a TQM school, to be based at the Coast Guard Training 
Center in Petaluma, California, that would eventually assume 
responsibility for all training and consultation (p. 9). -
Empowerment, Mentoring, Motivating 
The excerpts above that outline IPT-1 ad IPT-2 efforts at managing and 
leading change and empowering, mentoring, and motivating the workforce also 
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provide strong evidence of strategic planning and the implementation and 
evaluation of programs and policies.  In this case, the ten-member IPT-1 was 
chartered to develop the implementation plan and structure of groups and teams 
that would be used to put that plan into action.  IPT-2 was responsible the actual 
execution of the implementation plan, necessary resource procurement, 
monitoring and evaluating the process, communicating problems to upper 
management, and recommending necessary changes (Rosegrant, 1993). All of 
these activities engaged in by IPT-1 and IPT-2 are direct examples of the 
“Planning and Attaining Performance and Results” and the “Establishing and 
Leading Teams” leadership functions.  The following excerpt provides additional 
support for this premise: 
In May IPT-1 presented its two-year implementation plan.  Phase 1 
covered the work just completed, while Phase 2 would include 
dissolving IPT-1 and forming a new Implementation Project Team 
(IPT-2), activating the overlay structure, and chartering the first 
QATs.  During Phase 3, the Leadership Institution would open, and 
there would be a solid network of working QATs.  The final phase 
would see a trained ‘critical mass’ of personnel, a TQM impact 
review, the retirement of IPT-2, and transition to ‘routine TQM 
maintenance’ (p. 6) -Planning and Attaining Performance and 
Results 
The last leadership function, “Managing and Developing the Overall 
Enterprise” in this case applies to the management and implementation of TQM 
throughout the Coast Guard.  This primary function was assigned to the 20+ 
senior officers in management assigned to IPT-1 and IPT-2 as part of their 
charters: 
Like IPT-1, IPT-2 had a full plate.  The team was chartered to 
execute the TQM implementation plan; to identify and procure 
sufficient resources to do that; to monitor and evaluate the process; 
to communicate problems and needs to the Quality Council; and to 
recommend necessary changes (p. 9). -Managing and 




4. Leadership Form 
As discussed earlier, the leadership style and philosophy exercised by the 
Coast Guard during implementation of TQM used forms of leadership consistent 
with participative leadership structures.  Management at the Coast Guard 
realized that distributing power and authority to the absolute lowest levels of the 
organization was not possible.  After all, the organization was still a military 
service and the concepts of accountability and responsibility still followed strict 
military codes and regulations.  However, the creation of a “shadow” 
organizational structure that did not interfere with the hierarchical military 
structure contributed greatly to the success of TQM implementation: 
Among the team’s – and the commandant’s – key concerns was 
the creation of an implementation framework that would not 
challenge or interfere with the Coast Guard’s existing operational 
chain of command.  ‘A lot of concern was expressed by the more 
skeptical members of our organization at the meeting in 
Williamsburg about the fact that we do have a certain 
organizational structure.’ Kime explains, ‘that we’re a military 
organization, and that we’ve got to be very careful about how we do 
this’ (p. 6).  -Distribution of Power and Authority 
The plan that the team devised, with Kime’s approval, seemed to fit 
that requirement.  The ‘parallel overlay structure,’ as it was 
described, established a hierarchy of groups linking all parts of the 
Coast Guard, relying on the existing chain of command without 
exactly duplicating it.  At the top, the Quality Council, made up of 
the commandant and the four most senior flag officers, would be 
responsible for the overall TQM plan – setting policy, providing 
resources, establishing measures, and rewarding TQM efforts (p. 
6). -Distribution of Power and Authority 
The use of naturally occurring workgroups was a cornerstone of the TQM 
implementation plan.  These groups were not hierarchical or centrally controlled, 
but rather had semi-autonomy and were empowered to develop solutions to 
specific problems.  Membership was centered around the applicable functions 
needed to solve those problems.   
Quality Management Boards, comprised of senior managers from a 
specific command level, were to be cross-functional entities 
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responsible for an individual command’s tactical TQM efforts.  
Among the boards’ most important functions would be to charter 
Quality Action Teams (QATs), small groups convened to address 
specific problems (p. 6). -Workgroups 
At the bottom, natural work groups, comprised of any group of 
individuals who normally shared in a task, would apply TQM tools 
to continuously improve their own work processes (p. 6). -
Workgroups 
After IPT-1 presented its implementation plan in May 1991, the 
team was dissolved and replaced by the TQM Implementation 
Project Team (IPT-2)…(p. 8). -Workgroups 
The final phase would see a trained ‘critical mass’ of personnel, a 
TQM impact review, the retirement of IPT-2, and transition to 
‘routine TQM maintenance’ (p. 7). -Workgroups 
 
D. BUSINESS PROCESS TRANSFORMATION AT THE CIA 
1. Case Background 
Appendix C is Professor Steven Kelman’s (1999a, 1999b, and 1999c) 
Harvard Kennedy School of Government case narration and epilogue titled 
Business Process Transformation at the CIA.   
Kelman (1999a) notes that during the 1990’s, the CIA, like several other 
federal agencies, was under pressure to reduce cost because of the need to 
reduce the federal budget deficit and because of the end of the Cold War.  At the 
CIA, the Directorate of Administration (DA) was the group furthest from the 
primary mission of the CIA so it bore a disproportionate share of budget cuts.  
Their mission was to provide all the support services for the three primary 
mission directorates:  The Directorate of Operations (DO, responsible for 
intelligence-gathering by humans), Directorate of Intelligence (DI, responsible for 
intelligence analysis), and the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T, 
responsible for intelligence gathering by technical means such as satellites and 
eavesdropping).  Support services included personnel management, training, 
information technology, and logistics. 
 51 
Compounding the vulnerability to budget cuts due to its indirect link with 
the CIA’s mission, the perception of its primary customers (the other three 
directorates) was that the DA inefficiently utilized its existing resources and 
sometimes delivered poor service quality services.  In 1996, the new leader of 
the DA, Dick Calder, launched an organizational change initiative that radically 
transformed the way the DA did business; the way it interacted with its 
customers; and even the way its customers behaved. 
The DA leadership proposed to give back its annual budget allocation to 
the three missions directorates and then competitively offer and sell the services 
of its fifteen support offices back to the directorates.  This strategy had two 
primary goals.  First, giving up control of its budget and its monopoly as a service 
provider (through competition) would stimulate the DA to provide better services 
at lower cost.  Second, putting the administrative services budget in the hands of 
the customers would make the missions directorates co-responsible for solving 
the agencies shrinking administrative services budget (Kelman, 1999a).   
The transformations process introduced by DA management in late 1996 
and 1997 aimed to use new management techniques such as activity based 
costing and total quality management, and the concept of a working capital fund 
to operate the DA under the new business strategy.  Through a process of 
preparation, limited deployment, adjustment, reengineering, and expansion, the 
DA was able to attain several key successes in its new business model within a 
few years.  These successes helped maintain external support, generate 
additional internal support, and provide welcome momentum to the 
transformation initiative.   
In preparing for, launching, executing, and sustaining this successful 
business process transformation, leadership at the DA exhibited key leadership 
characteristics that warrant examination.  These characteristics are captured 
through excerpts from Appendix C text and mapped to leadership philosophies, 
functions, and forms discussed in this thesis.  
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 2. Leadership Philosophy 
Management at the DA under Dick Calder believed in ability of employees 
to use innovation and creativity to solve the directorate’s problems.  In 
preparation for deployment of the “budget giveback” program, much work had to 
be done by employees and middle managers to quantify costs of doing business 
so that the customers could be accurately charged.  A great deal of management 
trust was necessary to turn this critical function over to subordinates: 
So Ericson got to work figuring out how specifically to implement 
giveback.  ABC was of course an important first step, since if an 
office’s services went up for sale, and had to be funded through 
payments from customers rather than appropriated funds, the 
operation would need to know what its costs were so it knew what 
to charge (1999a, p. 7). -Theory Y Management Belief 
Furthermore, responsibility for the overall budgetary problems of the entire 
organization (CIA) was bestowed upon employees and managers of the DA’s 
customers, that is, the employees of the other directorates.  This delegation of 
leadership responsibility is a key tenet of Theory Y leadership beliefs: 
The second (initiative advantage) was that it would make the 
mission directorates co-responsible for thinking about how to deal 
with the shrinking Agency administrative service budget (since they 
would now have an incentive to reduce unnecessary demand for 
services because they were paying for them instead of getting them 
‘for free’) (1999a, p. 5).  -Theory Y Management Belief 
Evidence of direct employee empowerment could not be found in the case 
study, however; authority and control was transferred between the DA and the 
other directorate.  This action of giving the customer unprecedented control over 
the DA’s budget reflected internal institutional empowerment: 
They announced a ‘Fundamental Shift’: the ‘support budget [would 
be] transferred to customer/mission managers’ (1999a, p. 8).  
Theory Y Management Belief 
The reaction of DA employees to the launch of the organizational change 
effort was initially resistant.  The culture at the CIA in general and within the DA 
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specifically was such that the imperative for change was not recognized.  DA 
employees felt misunderstood and blamed the other directorates as the source of 
their problems.  However, there were instances where once employees 
understood the goals of the effort and the need for change, they became 
committed to contributing to the mission: 
‘I was one of the first converts to what Dick was trying to do,’ Good 
recalls. ‘The first time I head Dick talking about a working capital 
fund, I was convinced.  He’s pretty passionate. And I had read 
management books and articles in the Harvard Business Review 
on my own that made similar points to the ones he was making’ 
(1999a, p. 12). -Theory Y Employee Belief 
As the business process transformation continued with the launching of 
the first pilot program, the Logistics Operations Center, employees exhibited their 
own innovations and creativity in finding new ways to save money.  This initiative 
is indicative of the effort that can be expected when employees embrace an 
organizational goal, have that goal communicated to them, and are given latitude 
to implement new ideas: 
A number of contractor employees and detailees were let go.  
Previously, the LOC had staffed at a capacity allowing it to deal 
with sudden surges in demand for its services.  Now, instead, it 
contracted with a commercial firm to deliver unclassified material, 
with another company to deliver cleared contractor employees on 
short notice, in the event of demand surges (1999b, p. 1). -Theory 
Y Employee Belief 
Truck cleaners had previously done their work on Saturdays, when 
they needed two escorts, on overtime pay, provided by the LOC.  
They began to work on Fridays, when things were quiet (so they 
could get their jobs done) but no escorts were needed (1999b, p. 
1). -Theory Y Employee Belief 
Truck drivers on the road started buying gas at cheaper gas 
stations, rather than more expensive truck stops (1999b, p. 1). -
Theory Y Employee Belief 
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Customer service representatives were merged into the 
transportation booking operation; the two kinds of employees were 
cross-trained to do each other’s jobs, to minimize employee 
downtime due to peaks and valleys in demand for the two kinds of 
skills.  Something similar was done with employees who did 
receiving of inbound shipments and crating of outbound ones 
(1999b, p. 2). -Theory Y Employee Belief 
Early in the transformation process upper management at the DA utilized 
techniques indicative of a participative leadership style including the use of 
extensive teamwork and regular vertical and horizontal communication.  
Teamwork included use of internal teams within DA and cross-functional teams 
with representatives of the other directorates.  Horizontal communication came in 
the form of meetings between office directors and upper management and the 
verbal exchanges therein.  Vertical communication predominantly occurred via 
written communication or “town meetings” with employees: 
At the end of 1996, Calder held a series of town meetings with 
employees over a two-month period to talk about his goals for 
business process transformation in the DA (1999a, p. 8). -
Participative Leadership Style (Communication) 
Calder realized that if any of this was every going to succeed, he 
had a massive task of organizational change management on his 
hands. So, as a first step, he did what many organizational leaders 
do when they want to get a process of change going.  In May 1996, 
he called an offsite meeting for DA office directors at the Wye River 
Plantation (1999a, p. 5). -Participative Leadership Style 
(Communication) 
In August a glossy booklet called The River House Report 
appeared to ‘summarize’ the conclusions of the Wye retreat 
(1999a, p. 5). -Participative Leadership Style (Communication) 
The document also clearly introduced the idea that the DA might 
have to compete for customer business.  ‘Competition is a new 
word in our setting.  But it’s not a pejorative word.  We know about 
it and we welcome it elsewhere – indeed it’s the central theme of 
our economic system’ (1999a, p. 6). -Participative Leadership 
Style (Communication) 
The document also mentioned – as part of a subordinate clause 
referring to development of a ‘business ethic’ – moving ‘into a 
competitive, internal marketplace where warranted or to better 
manage services we provide centrally.’ And it did announce that 
‘we will begin a yearly process of selecting two or three business 
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areas for competition for implementation in [fiscal year] 1999’ 
(1999a, p. 6). -Participative Leadership Style (Communication) 
As in most such meetings, lots of different ideas were tossed 
around.  The office directors did a fair amount of complaining about 
how they were misunderstood and expressed the hope that the 
ABC process would help them demonstrate to the mission 
directorates that the DA wasn’t a bloated bureaucracy.  But amidst 
the cacophony, Grayson in particular was vocal about the DA’s 
need to abandon its monopoly status and subject itself to the test of 
the marketplace (1999a, p. 5). -Participative Leadership Style 
(Teamwork) 
Sources of motivation in the workforce at the DA, similar to the Coast 
Guard experience with TQM implementation, was based on a reward system 
related to promotional opportunities for those who embraced the change effort.  
Assignment of key personnel to lead parts of the effort was based on their level 
of participation and support for the overall organizational goal: 
Calder chose a DA manager, Paul Ericson, who had run the Office 
of Training and Education, to head the new office.  It was an 
interesting choice, since Ericson was an abrasive, controversial 
figure (‘the most disliked program director in the DA’ according to 
one critic).  Word got out that Ericson had been given marching 
orders to be a ‘junkyard dog’ vis-à-vis the offices (1999a, p. 7). -
Participative Leadership Style (Motivation) 
Good has been a supervisor placed in charge of the LOC’s ABC 
effort.  When his predecessor was promoted in April 1997 to be the 
Agency’s chief procurement official, Calder chose Good as LOC 
chief (1999a, p. 11). -Participative Leadership Style (Motivation) 
Calder left much of the implementation preparation work up to the 
individual offices within the DA.  This included the costing of services and 
development of business plans necessary for deployment of the “pay-as-you-go” 
strategy, one of the top-level goals conveyed by management to the 
organization’s subordinates: 
In October 1996, Calder established a Business Process 
Transformation Program Office (BPTPO), reporting directly to him, 
to ‘help’ the offices undertake activity-based costing (1999a, p. 7). -
Participative Leadership Style (Decisions) 
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But there was an important next step as well:  the development, by 
offices destined for competition, of business plans that showed how 
they would improve, tailor, and market their services against likely  
commercial competitors so as to be able to survive without 
appropriated funds (a999a, p. 7). -Participative Leadership Style 
(Decisions) 
 
3. Leadership Function 
Management’s drive to improve customer service and organizational 
performance within the existing structural framework of the CIA, the extensive 
incorporation of vision in strategic planning that preceded launch of the business 
process transformation initiative, and utilization of new ideas and information 
demonstrated the existence of the change management leadership function: 
It presented competition as one prong in a two-part over-arching 
strategy the document summarized with the phrases, ‘We will be 
our customers’ provider of choice,’ and ‘we will be – now and future 
– an employer of choice’ (1999a, p. 6). -Managing and Balancing 
Change 
That task force came upon an accounting technique, originally 
developed by Harvard Business School professor Robert Kaplan, 
called ‘activity-based costing’ (ABC), a methodology that allowed 
companies to learn how various indirect costs should be assigned 
to a company’s different activities or products.  Calder decided he 
needed to bring ABC to the DA (1999a, p. 4). -Managing and 
Balancing Change 
Building external and internal coalitions was critical to the success of the 
organizational change program.  The endorsement of Stakeholders such as 
Congress, the White House, the Office of Management and Budget, and the 
National Security Agency would help provide external pressure on the change 
efforts.  Internal teaming with key competencies needed in the DA’s restructuring 
would also be needed.  These activities, indicative of the Establishing and 
Leading Teams leadership function were prevalent: 
To establish a working capital fund, the CIA needed congressional 
approval.  In early 1997, Calder and Ericson went to the Office of 
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Management and Budget to get administration endorsement for 
language in the upcoming CIA reauthorization bill allowing such a 
fund to be set up, and then to the congressional authorizing 
committees that would need to approve the idea (1999a, p. 8). -
Building Coalitions 
In their visits, they were accompanied by the chief legislative liaison 
in the CIA Office of the General Counsel.  (Mary Sturtevant, the 
Agency’s new comptroller, or chief financial/budget official, and a 
support of Calder’s ideas, helped Calder to get the legislative 
liaison to go with them downtown.) (1999a, p. 8-9). -Building 
Coalitions 
Calder got Mary Sturtevant, the comptroller and a strong supporter 
of his efforts, to help them with this potentially deadly problem.  
Sturtevant announced to the mission directorates that savings after 
giveback would not be scooped up (1999a, p. 10). -Building 
Coalitions 
The DA leadership recognized advantages to becoming a provider of 
choice for administrative services within the CIA.  If they could get control over 
their costs and processes and become an efficient service provider, recent 
reforms in government would allow them to compete for business outside of the 
CIA.  This forward-looking and aggressive business plan demonstrates excellent 
capacity in the Planning and Attaining Performance and Results leadership 
competency: 
During these months, Calder’s team also came upon two new ideas 
that allowed them to give more flesh to their plan.  One was the 
idea of franchising, which Ericson learned about at the website of 
Vice President Al Gore’s ‘reinventing government’ program. Under 
the franchising concept, one agency was authorized to sell its 
services to another agency…(1999a, p. 7). -Planning and 
Attaining Performance and Results 
…Franchising was appealing to Calder because it added a carrot 
for the DA in addition to the stick of losing appropriated funds.  The 
carrot was the prospect of gaining new revenue by selling DA 
services to other agencies in the intelligence and diplomatic 
communities…(1999a, p. 7-8). -Planning and Attaining 
Performance and Results 
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In developing the complex financial arrangements to allow for DA’s 
customers to reclaim the funding that they saved through cutting back their own  
needs for services or from the efficiencies gained in the DA’s processes, 
enormous competency in managing several elements of the overall enterprise 
was necessary: 
The perception (and often the reality) in government agencies is 
that if an operation succeeds in saving some amount of money by 
doing business in a smarter way or eliminating an unnecessary 
activity, the entire sum will be taken away (or ‘scooped up’) by the 
organizations own budgeters, by the Office of Management and 
Budget, or by congressional appropriations committees at the first 
opportunity an redistributed to other programs or activities seen as 
more worthy.  This, of course, eliminates any incentive to save 
money in the first place.  Business as usual would kill giveback 
immediately.  The way to convince customers that the new order 
was a good idea was to dangle in front of them the prospect that if 
they didn’t spend their whole giveback because they had gone to 
cheaper sources or economized on their use of services, the 
money left over would be theirs to keep for mission needs (1999a, 
p. 10). -Managing and Developing the Overall Enterprise 
 
4. Leadership Form 
The DA transitioned from an organization that was externally funded 
(outside control of the customers, that is) with little incentive to improve its 
efficiency or service quality into one that relied on customers to select it, amongst 
other competitors, as the provider of choice.  Doing this in an organization with a 
deeply rooted work culture in a short amount of time (as was perceived to be 
required due to budgetary pressures) required a revolutionary approach and 
redistribution of power and authority.  DA leadership elected to adopt an 
approach that took the ultimate lever of power and authority, its entire operating 
budget, and placed it in the hands of its customers.  The courage of this move is 
compounded by the fact that the three mission directorates had the power to 
choose other commercial or governmental firms for many of the services the DA 
historically provided:    
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In 1996 the DA embarked on a radical journey.  As a solution for its 
budget and responsiveness problems, the DA proposed to give its 
budget back to the mission directorates and to sell its services to 
those directorates, in competition with commercial (or even other 
government agency) providers.  The DA would exchange the 
security of its status as a monopoly provider for the uncertainty of 
competition (1999a, p. 3). -Distribution of Power and Authority 
The use of groups within the DA for the purposes of specific problem-
solving activities is prevalent.  As mentioned earlier, workgroups were used to 
develop in business plans for the individual offices.  The case study also implies 
that the task of developing accurate costing of services was left up each office, 
with the help of a central facilitator (Business Process Transformation Program 
Office).  These are two instances that support the premise that workgroups were 
an important leadership form utilized by the DA during its organizational change 
effort. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an initial extraction and analysis of case data 
associated with the successful transformation experiences of the U.S. Naval 
Reactor’s efforts towards attaining institution constancy, the Coast Guard’s 
initiative to implement TQM, and the CIA’s transformation of internal business 
processes.  Case narrations from each experience were reviewed and excerpts 
were extracted using content analysis and then categorized as elements of 
leadership philosophy, function, or form in accordance with the “Leadership 
Characteristics of High-Performance, Transformed Organizations” derived in 
Chapter III of this thesis (see Table 1).  These excerpts will be used in the 
Chapter IV to develop data tables that support a relational model of leadership 
developed from the Chapter II literature review. 
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V. DATA RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The case analysis of Chapter IV provides supporting evidence that the 
three subject organizations (Naval Reactors, U.S. Coast Guard, and CIA) 
deployed leadership philosophy, functions, and form consistent with the traits of 
effective leadership discussed in Chapter II and III.  Data results and analysis 
presented and conducted in this chapter begins by condensing the data from the 
literature review into a new model of leadership.  Then, specific attributes of the 
model are described.   Finally, a tabular presentation of data extracted from each 
organization examined during the case study analysis is provided.  It will be 
shown that each of the key characteristics of this new leadership model is 
supported by the experiences of the three cases examined in this study.  By 
showing that other governmental organizations have successfully deployed 
leadership structures consistent with the model, this chapter intends to validate 
and verify the utility of the model for other government organizations.   
 
B. THE LEADERSHIP MODEL 
The leadership model developed in this study for government 
organizations implementing change contains elements of the participative 
leadership system.  Literature reviewed in Chapter II indicates that this system is 
the most effective method of problem solving in modern human-centered 
organizations.  A review of the model’s structure shown in Figure 2 reveals that 
distribution of power and authority in the form of empowered workgroups is the 
outcome from an organization’s successful deployment of leadership philosophy 
and function.  Discussion of model elements and the relationship between 

































Figure 3. Leadership Model for High-Performance 
 
Organizations employing a participative style of leadership philosophy 
optimize use of their human resources and achievement of higher performance.  
It is through the use of workgroups that participative leadership styles are 
deployed in organizations.  A key enabler of these independent, cross-functional 
workgroups is the empowerment bestowed upon them by upper management.  
Without this empowerment, the workgroups would simply be less effective 
extensions of the hierarchical management structure.  One of two key 
prerequisites to distribution of power and authority is the belief by management 
that employees as responsible enough to look out for the well-being of the firm, 
capable of using ingenuity and innovation to solve problems, and internally driven 
by a desire to help the organization flourish.  This disposition makes up the core 
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of Theory Y beliefs from McGregor (1960) shown in Table 2 and forms a 
fundamental basis of trust in employees by management. 
Theory Y Trait Management Employees 
Motivation 
• Believes employees are 
best asset and prefer to 
work 
• Naturally expend effort when 
committed to goals  
Trust 
• Trusts of employees to 
use innovation and 
creativity to solve 
organizational problems 
• Empowers employees 
• Trust management to 
accurately determine long-
term vision and strategy of 
organization 
Leadership 
• Realizes that all 
leadership functions must 
be distributed 
• Lead and manage 
themselves if given the 
opportunity 
Responsibility • Bestows responsibility for health of organization  
• Accepts responsibility for 
organization health 
Table 2.   Theory Y Leadership Attitudes and Behaviors 
 
The second prerequisite to distribution of power and authority in the 
leadership model concerns the dispersion of leadership competencies throughout 
the organization.  In order for participative workgroups to successfully address 
the problems of management, Likert (1961) argues that the team and group 
members must engage in leadership activities.  It logically follows that 
workgroups should have the leadership capabilities reflective of the five principle 
leadership competencies outlined in OPM’s SES Qualification Guide (1997) and 
(described in Table 3).  These include: (1) Managing and Balancing Change, (2) 
Empowering, Mentoring, Motivating, (3) Planning and Attaining Performance and 
Results, (4) Managing and Developing the Overall Enterprise, and (5) 
Establishing and Leading Teams.  Since workgroups in a participative leadership 
system act somewhat independently to solve organizational problems, they must 
be able to lead themselves, establish their own milestones, develop their own 
methods, and be internally motivated.  Management, therefore, must take steps 






• Develop org vision integrating program goals, priorities, 
values 
• Improve performance within existing org framework 
• Motivate people to incorporate vision, planning, and 
quality into all org activities 
• Being open to new ideas 




• Deploying strategies maximizing employee potential 
• Fostering high ethical standards in meeting the 
organization's vision, mission, and goals 
• Set the work force's expected performance levels 
• Inspiring/motivating others toward org goal 
• Sharing power and authority 
• Assessing unique employee development needs, 
providing development opportunities, developing 
leadership through coaching and mentoring 
Planning/Attaining 
Performance/Results 
• Ability to make timely and effective decisions 
• Ability at strategic planning, structuring and organizing 
work, setting priorities, 
• Capable of performing risk analysis and mitigation, 
• Setting program and performance standards 




• Ability to acquire/administer human, financial, material, 
and information resources 
• Assessing current and future staffing needs 
• Overseeing/managing allocation of financial resources, 
budgetary process, and capital expenditures 
• Ensuring efficient development and utilization of 
management, information systems, and other 




• Ability to negotiate with individuals and groups 
internally and externally 
• Ability to develop an expansive professional network  
• Developing and enhancing alliances with external 
groups and stakeholders 
• Working in and fostering use of workgroups/teams 
• Communicating the position and work of the 
organization clearly 
Table 3.   Leadership Functions 
 
 64 
workforce and give leadership opportunities to people at all levels of the 
organization.  Once there is confidence that people can responsibly perform the 
work of leadership at all levels of the organization, empowerment of employees 
to make organizational decisions can occur. 
As stated above, adoption of Theory Y beliefs by management and 
development of leadership competencies among subordinates are two 
prerequisites necessary before a form of leadership reflecting greater distribution 
of power and authority can be enacted.  As validated in Chapter II, the most 
effective form of leadership that uses greater empowerment of subordinates is 
based on use of workgroups.  It is important to distinguish between true 
workgroups in the participative style and other efforts by groups of people within 
the organization. Participative workgroups, as defined by Likert (1961), embody 




• Through use of debate and equality of influence 
• Occur in supportive atmosphere 
• Consider specific goals and empowerment given by org 
Membership and 
Teamwork 
• Members and leaders have high degree of confidence, 
respect, and trust in one another 
• Values and goals of members are the same 
• Motivation of members is high 
• Economic reward or promotion based on level of 
participation in achieving org goals skills 
• Extensive cooperation and general leadership  
• Members support needs of one another 
Communication 
• Extensive vertical and horizontal communication 
• Communications are in interest of group, not individual 
• Avoidance of communicating extraneous information 
• Guidance from other workgroups constantly sought 
• Interest in ideas and positions of other members 
• Information is trusted 
• Equal disposition between influencing and being 
influenced 
Responsibility • All personnel feel responsible for attaining org goals 
Table 4.   Participative Workgroup Characteristics 
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C. VALIDATION OF LEADERSHIP MODEL 
The following tables are used to frame supporting elements for each 
leadership model component extracted from the case study analysis of Chapter 
III.  As can be seen below in Table 5, each of the three cases contained 
substantial data supporting the relationships between the model elements.  
Specifically, evidence of Theory Y beliefs in management and deployment of 
leadership competencies by management across a widespread subset of 
subordinates was easily discernable in the case descriptions.  Additionally, the 
use of workgroups to carry out problem solving and leadership responsibilities 
indicated that all three case subjects employed a participative leadership 
structure in the execution of their organizational transformation initiatives.   
The successful adoption of Theory Y beliefs, engagement in activities that 
indicated management’s willingness and confidence that leadership 
competencies were held by their workforces, and the distribution of power and 
authority in the form of workgroups are the three key indicators that, if true, 
validate the utility of the leadership model in implementing organizational change.  
In each of the experiences examined, Institutional Constancy at Naval Reactors; 
TQM implementation at the U.S. Coast Guard; and Business Process 
Transformation at the CIA, all three indications were present (Table 5).  





Adopted Theory Y Traits? Yes Yes Yes 
Engaged in Activities that Demonstrated 
Distribution of Leadership Functions? Yes Yes Yes 
Employed Workgroups Demonstrating 
Distribution of Power and Authority? Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5.   Summary of Case Study Evaluation 
 










• Management viewed employees as “primary asset”  
• Employees expended great effort because of commitment to org 
goals (national defense)  
• Key functions such as safety and quality entrusted by upper 
management to “line management” 
• National defense and long term goals embraced by all people 
• Every unit and individual has responsibilities that were “defined 
clearly and understood thoroughly”  
• “Flat organizational structure”  
• Individual components of org given freedom to engage in 
independent management and development  





• Coalitions established and maintained with Navy, Department of 
Energy, Congress, environmental groups 
• Detailed reviews of budgets used to gain program support 
• Formal communication used to interface with outside groups 
• Improvements in organization solicited from all personnel 
• Forceful, decisive action taken to confront technical realities 
• Use of simultaneously cooperative and competitive energies of 
redundant laboratories to enhance results 
• Formal written goals established reflecting organizational 
mission, values, and vision 
• Policies, Practices, Procedures driven by org goal of technical 
excellence 




• Groups form to address problems, disband when complete 
• Established formal, written goals incorporating org vision 
• HQ and field activities interacted as one organization displaced 
by geography 
• Cooperative teamwork employed between field activities, 
headquarters, and labs 
• Documentation and communication of all actions from HQ and 
between field activities, contractors and HQ 
• Use of special reporting systems to formally document problems 
and record solutions 
• Technical excellence/responsibility instilled as “way of life”  
• Promotions and reward based on defined traits that contribute 
towards goal of institutional constancy 









• TQM implementation innovation encouraged by management 
• Flexible implementation plan empowering employees to use 
innovation  
• Subordinates expended great effort pursuing program goals 
• Subordinates assigned to lead teams cross-functional teams 




• Teams created vision statement, articulated desired future 
state 
• Performance improvement sought under existing org 
structure and system while change effort executed  
• Need for change vice superficial improvements recognized by 
managers and subordinates 
• Training on TQM initiated to meet employees development 
needs, facilitate implementation 
• TQM institute launched to maintain employee TQM 
competency 
• Subordinates actively participated in TQM implementation at 
individual commands and at HQ 
• Strategic planning, execution scheduling, resource 





• Groups formed to address implementation problems, 
disbanded when objectives is met 
• Use of cross-functional QATs and “natural work groups” to 
address specific problems and improve processes  
• Use of QMB to guide and align individual command’s TQM 
efforts 
• Implementation teams used to conduct strategic planning and 
execution for global org TQM effort 
• Established formal, written goals incorporating org vision 
• Groups and teams empowered to make critical decisions, 
without oversight by upper management 
• Regular and recurring communication from management to 
subordinates, within and across teams and groups 










• Key efforts such as activity based costing entrusted to 
subordinates 
• Responsibility for overall budget and health of organization 
bestowed on employees and other directorates 
• Subordinates embraced org goals and exerted effort in 
support 
• Employees used innovation and creativity in pursuing goals 
of the first pilot program, the LOC 




• Customer service and performance improvement within 
existing org framework balanced with change effort 
• Vision and values incorporated into strategic planning 
• New ideas incorporated into planning and execution 
• Coalitions built with OMB, Congress, NSA, internal customers 
and partners 
• New business sought outside organization with other 
agencies 
• Stewardship of the organizations financial resources despite 
potential impacts to DA 




• Regular communication between upper management and 
subordinates 
• Other directorates empowered as participative workgroups 
through giveback program 
• Use of empowered teams to develop solutions to org 
problems, such as activity based costing and business plans 
• Principles and reasons for change effort communicated down 
through organization and across to other stakeholders 
• Groups empowered to effect change in financial and 
administrative functions of organization 
• Promotion of personnel based on belief in and support of 
organizational goals 
Table 8.   CIA: Validated Leadership Model Elements 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 The case studies of three government organizations that successfully 
employed organizational change for improved performance yielded a wealth of 
information that supported applicability of a new leadership model.  The model 
asserts that by management’s adoption of leadership philosophy based on 
McGregor’s Theory Y beliefs and the development and deployment of leadership 
functions throughout all subordinates, an environment conducive to distribution of 
organizational power and authority can be created.  This environment provides 
the basic prerequisites needed to deploy cross-functional and self-directed 
workgroups that are empowered to enact change and entrusted with long-term 
health of the organization.  The transformation experience of the three case 
subjects fit the leadership model developed in this chapter, however; by no 
means is this model exclusive.  It is a general model that can be used by 
organizations to help plan their change efforts.  For example, they can look to 
see whether their management has the right Leadership Philosophy and whether 
their workforce has adequately matured Leadership Functions prior to deploying 
empowered, self-sustaining workgroups.  While not the only workable blueprint 
for deploying leadership in organization change, this new leadership model can 





 This research examined literature on change management and effective 
leadership, developed a leadership model that can be used by other government 
organizations as a blueprint for their own change effort, and validated that 
leadership model through case analysis of three public institutions that 
successfully implemented significant change.  Implementing change in any 
organization for the purpose of improving performance or responding to 
environmental changes is extremely challenging.  Government organizations in 
particular experience mixed success in such change efforts due to their firmly 
established work cultures, hierarchical management and chains of command, 
and traditionally non-competitive business environment.  This thesis 
encapsulates the existing body of knowledge on organizational leadership and 
case analysis of a control group of government organizations into a simple, 
usable leadership model. While certainly not the only leadership model capable 
of guiding an organization through difficult transformation efforts, this thesis and 
the leadership model developed herein should yield benefits to other public firms 
through lessons learned and further comparative analyses of change efforts at 
the U.S. Naval Reactors Program, U.S. Coast Guard, and CIA.   
 The new leadership model incorporates three key leadership elements: 
philosophy, function, and form.  It was shown in the leadership model that in 
order for organizations to deploy the most effective leadership form (participative 
workgroups), they must first satisfy the two pre-requisites.  First, upper 
management must feel confident enough in their workforce to adopt Theory Y 
attitudes and behaviors.  That is, a large degree of trust must be built between 
the people at the top of the organization and their subordinates.  Management 
must believe that the people are the most important asset, that they choose to 
expend effort for the betterment of the organization, and that they can lead 
themselves if given the opportunity.  The workforce must trust that their 
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management can accurately steer the organizations towards the correct long-
term goals, must be accepting of responsibility and empowerment, and must take 
an overall responsibility for the health of the organization.  After both 
management and the workforce adopt the above beliefs and attitudes, the 
leadership philosophy conducive to participative workgroups will be present. 
 In addition to a Theory Y based leadership philosophy, the model asserts 
that the five leadership functions should be present across a wide range of the 
workforce in order for participative workgroups to be effective.  The ability to (1) 
manage and balance change, (2) empower, mentor, and motivate, (3) plan and 
attain results, (4) manage and develop the enterprise, and (5) establish and lead 
teams are all functions traditionally held by upper managers.  For the 
participative system to be effective these leadership functions must be present, 
to some degree, in each member of each workgroup.   
 Once both model pre-requisites are satisfied, a ripe environment for power 
and authority distribution will be present in the organization.  Recognition by 
upper management that the work of leadership cannot be effectively completed 
by those at the top of the traditional hierarchical management structure provides 
the impetus to deploy leadership responsibilities across and down through 
subordinates and the workforce.  Couple this motivation with a leadership 
philosophy based on mutual trust and widespread presence of leadership 
functions and capabilities and the deployment of effective leadership forms, 




 The goal of this study as embodied by its primary research question was 
to identify how leadership should be employed in government organizations 
undergoing significant transformation initiatives designed to improve overall 
performance.  Key elements of governmental organizational leadership during 
change were identified, a simple leadership relational model was developed, and 
validation of that leadership model was performed through review of literature 
and conduct of a multiple case study analysis.  By answering the three 
secondary research questions, this study effectively answered the primary 
research question.  Answers to the secondary research questions are contained 
in Chapter V and are summarized below: 
• What leadership philosophies are effective in guiding successful 
government organization transformations?   
McGregor (1960) identified core Theory Y beliefs as an effective 
leadership philosophy.  This philosophy centers around the belief that 
management and employees alike are motivated to see the organization 
succeed, responsible enough to be entrusted with the well being of the firm, and 
are innovative and creative in seeking solutions to the problems faced by the 
group. 
• What are the functions of leadership in the transformational process of 
a government organization? 
Key functions of leadership were summarized into five core leadership 
competencies derived from OPM’s SES Qualification Guide (1997).  The 
competencies included (1) Managing and Balancing Change, (2) Empowering, 
Mentoring, Motivating, (3) Planning and Attaining Performance and Results, (4) 
Managing and Developing the Overall Enterprise, and (5) Establishing and 
Leading Teams.  These functions were determined to be critical skills and 
abilities for anyone charged with executing leadership responsibilities and duties, 
particularly during transformation periods. 
• What forms of leadership have government organizations employed in 
transformation efforts? 
 73 
Participative workgroups have been successfully employed as forms of 
leadership.  Among the many traits of this leadership form, these workgroups 
make decisions through use of debate, have membership consisting of 
employees from all levels of the organization, extensively communicate vertically 
and horizontally across the organization, and take responsibility for attaining 
organizational, not individual, goals.  Participative workgroup members are 
capable of utilizing the leadership functions discussed above and are effective 
when utilized in conjunction with in Theory Y based leadership philosophy.  
 By answering the secondary research questions, this study provides 
information that should help NAVAIRNI 4.0 and other public organizations with 
the difficult task of effectively leading through periods of change.  Understanding 
the relationship between the three supporting elements of leadership 
(philosophy, function, form) as outlined in the leadership model of Figure 3, 
improves the chance of meeting the challenges of changing business realities, 
increased competition, or other environmental shifts.  This relationship between 
leadership philosophy, function, and form effectively answers the primary 
research question of this study.  
 It is important to understand that while the new model of leadership 
developed and discussed during this analysis is effective, it is not exclusive.  It is 
important for every organization, public or private, to scan the available body of 
knowledge on the subject of organization change and leadership to determine 
what theories, models, or ideas best fit its needs.  The infinite number of 
environments, conditions, or situations that are possible do not allow for the 
application of a single uniform model of leadership during change.  Variables 
such as a unionized workforce, extremely short period available for change, or 
work encompassing classified material or high-level national security issues may 
prevent firms from employing the leadership model of this thesis in its exact form.  
Changes or adaptations to the model would need to be made in order to apply to 
each organization’s reality, yet its basic tenets should still apply. 
 
C. RECOMMENDED TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research used a multiple case study analysis of government 
institutions to support theories and ideas on leadership during periods of 
organizational change.  The following topics are areas that should be considered 
for future research on this subject.  
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• Compare the change experiences of government and 
private/commercial organizations.  The leadership model developed 
in this thesis from literature used case analysis from three government 
organizations to validate each of the models supporting elements.  
Examining case studies from the commercial/private sector for 
evidence of leadership philosophies, functions, and forms may expand 
the model’s applicability.  This expansion of study may also show how 
the leadership model is not supported by the experiences of private 
organizations. 
• Analyze firms that experience transformation failure.  This study 
examined three cases of public firms that enjoyed success in their 
transformational efforts (as defined in Chapter III).  A further 
examination of government firms that failed to attain change goals 
would provide valuable lessons learned on pitfalls to avoid.  
Determining how leadership philosophy, functions, or form differed with 
the ideas presented in this thesis could be helpful in identifying the 
most critical leadership factors in transformation success.  This 
analysis can also be expanded to include private firms. 
• Examine transformed firms that did not utilize philosophy, 
function, form consistent with those defined in leadership model.  
As mentioned in the conclusions above, there are other leadership 
models that can be successfully applied, depending on the situation 
faced by each firm.  For example, use of a consultative leadership style 
is inconsistent with the leadership model (it favors a participative 
leadership style) yet the overwhelming majority of firms today fall into 
this category.  Indeed, some firms can even be characterized as 
having a benevolent leadership style.  Many of these forms have 
successfully completed true transformations and improved their 
performance.  An examination of these firms will help identify factors 
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for their success, which may or may not have a relationship with the 
type of leadership utilized.  
• Evaluate non-governmental organizations (NGO) that do not have 
steep hierarchies or military background.  The three cases 
examined in this thesis were all government organizations that utilized 
a military or other steeply hierarchical chain of command.  Deployment 
of participative workgroups in these organizations ran counter to the 
culture of command and control present in each.  Energy and effort 
during their transformation efforts were expended to ensure that the 
new leadership structures meshed with the legacy command structure 
still required.  NGOs that do not operate for profit and that have flatter 
command structures may enjoy significantly more success in change 
efforts because more organizational energy can be exerted on the 
problems faced by the firm.  A study comparing the change 
experiences of these two types of organizations may provide data on 
the true potential of participative workgroups as a leadership form. 
• Independently evaluate the individual supporting elements of the 
leadership model presented in this thesis.  A deeper examination of 
the leadership philosophy, functions, or forms employed by 
successfully transformed forms may provide additional data on the 
weighting of importance for each.  This could be helpful in the 
prioritization efforts to deploy the leadership model.   
 
Successfully navigating any organization through a major period of 
change is an extremely difficult challenge for management to meet.  Government 
organizations with their entrenched work cultures, deeply regulated workplaces, 
and historically stable missions have found the task of change management 
particularly difficult.  Without many past efforts from which to draw experiences, 
leadership of public firms that encounter an imperative for change can struggle to 
develop change strategies.  As an alternative to actual change management 
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experience, this thesis provides government organizations with (1) specific 
lessons learned from the Naval Reactors, the US Coast Guard, and the CIA, and 
(2) a leadership model to employ in their own effort.  A third and arguably most 
important development of this study is the multiple case analysis process used to 
evaluate the experiences of other government organizations.  This process can 
be duplicated for the recommended topics of research above or with any number 
or combination of case subjects.  It is the utility of this process that provides other 
organizations with a valuable tool that can be used to analyze their own 
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APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTANCY AT NAVAL 
REACTORS 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The following text is an excerpt from “Institutional Constancy at Naval 
Reactors” authored by John W. Crawford and Steven L. Krahn (1998).  
 
B. THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM: A BRIEF CASE 
STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL CONSTANCY 
1. Introduction 
 Institutional constancy is a concept that has been proposed to help explain 
how, given the close scrutiny that now pertains to such activities, organizations 
can effectively manage large technical systems that involve hazardous materials 
with potentially significant long-term consequences.  One organization that has 
effectively managed within such an environment for almost 50 years is the Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion Program. 
 The program's management methods involve careful organization, 
meticulous program execution, the achievement of technical excellence, close 
management of program and contractor personnel assets, and effective 
communications.  The attributes of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
compare well to those that have been ascribed to organizations that exhibit 
institutional constancy. The program demonstrates both trustworthiness and the 
capacity to enact programs.  The program’s consistent emphasis on the technical 
competence of its personnel is a distinctive feature.  
 The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors.  They do not 
represent the views of either the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Directorate or those of 
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 
 In an article published in the November/December 1996 issue of Public 
Administration Review, LaPorte and Keller argued that the management of large 
organizations that deal with hazardous materials (materials that pose significant 
risks over long periods) presented "extraordinary challenges for public 
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institutions."  They postulated that, in our society, such organizations are 
"pressed to operate at nearly fault-free levels" in order to remain viable.  LaPorte 
and Keller went on to describe a concept they called "institutional constancy."  
They argued that such constancy is a necessary (but not sufficient) attribute of 
organizations, if they wish to achieve public acceptance in their operations with 
hazardous materials. 
 LaPorte and Keller describe institutional constancy from a number of 
perspectives: the perceived need for it, the barriers to achieving it, and an outline 
of the matters that must be attended to if institutional constancy is to be 
achieved.  In suggesting further paths for research, LaPorte and Keller urge that 
case studies be developed that examine "the characteristics and experiences of 
institutions" that have achieved a degree of institutional constancy.  They 
mention a number of organizations that, based on externally available 
information, appear to meet their criteria for institutional constancy.  One of these 
organizations is the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. 
 The authors concur that much can be learned regarding institutional 
constancy by reviewing the history, organization, and management of such 
organizations as the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (or Naval Reactors , as it 
is more commonly known).  This program is responsible for the design, 
construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of the nuclear power 
plants that propel approximately 40 percent of the major combatant ships of the 
U.S. Navy.  As such, Naval Reactors has managed the building and operation of 
approximately 240 nuclear reactors and, importantly in today's environment, 
safety and responsibly decommissioned more than 50 of these reactors and their 
associated equipment.  Since the organization has safely and effectively dealt 
with the hazards associated with nuclear power for almost 50 years, it seems 
appropriate to evaluate some of the reasons for that success. 
 In the following discussion, Naval Reactors will first be described from an 
insider's perspective, that is, discussed in terms that the program (and its 
chroniclers) have employed.  This description is intended to provide a "feel" for 
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the program.  The attributes that emerge during this discussion will then be 
compared to the basic structure of institutional constancy described by LaPorte 
and Keller. 
 
2. Inside Naval Reactors 
 Naval Reactors is a joint program of the Navy and the Department of 
Energy.  The need for a joint effort stems from the fact that the Department of 
Energy is the only government agency empowered by law to conduct research 
and development on power reactors.  In basic terms, the Navy defines the 
required features of the nuclear power plants; the Department of Energy 
develops and tests the plants to ensure that they meet the requirements.  The 
Navy builds, operates, and decommissions the shipboard plants, and then turns 
the decommissioned reactor plants over to other organizations within the 
Department of Energy for burial. 
 Very early in the development of naval nuclear power, H. G. Rickover, 
then a Navy captain, saw that this statutory division of responsibilities posed 
grave difficulties.  He recognized that the development and utilization of this 
revolutionary new source of power should be treated as a series of closely 
related technical functions including research and development, detailed design, 
procurement of apparatus, maintenance and repair of equipment, and selection 
and training of personnel.  With these considerations in mind, Rickover moved 
boldly and with remarkable political astuteness to arrange that a single 
organization be assigned the key responsibilities of both the Navy and the Atomic 
Energy Commission (the Department of Energy's predecessor). 
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 There were imposing barriers to such an arrangement. Rickover had to 
overcome inertia and active resistance within both the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Navy.  For example, the Atomic Energy Commission was 
preoccupied with the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons; 
however, for its early research and development, Naval Reactors had to rely on 
the national laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission.  The Navy, for its 
part, would have preferred to fit the nuclear submarine program into its well-
established organizational structures and methods of designing and constructing 
ships, rather than experiment with this radical joint organization with the Atomic 
Energy Commission. 
 Rickover overcame these impediments, and more, by working at the top of 
both organizations.  He first garnered the support of the Chief of Naval 
Operations for the concept of a nuclear-powered submarine and elicited a memo 
from him directing the Navy's ship design agency to undertake such an effort 
jointly with the Atomic Energy Commission.  Rickover then inveigled the Bureau 
of Ships to assign him the responsibility of negotiating an agreement with the 
Atomic Energy Commission.  When the dust settled, Rickover was the only 
person with feet solidly planted in both camps, and he was named director of the 
program.  As a top priority, he set about quickly to establish a strong and 
enduring relationship with Congress, specifically the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, which had comprehensive oversight of all nuclear matters during that 
era.  It was, however, a consistent string of design and operational successes 
that solidified Naval Reactors ' relationship with Congress.  It is a relationship that 
served the program well and endures to this day. 
 In parallel with these political maneuverings, Rickover worked to impart his 
vision and inculcate his principles and standards of excellence in every facet of 
Naval Reactors.  He did so in a way that ensured success during his own tenure 
as director of the program (from its inception through 1982), and in a way that 
laid the foundation for enduring success.  To appreciate the magnitude of this 
technical undertaking and the managerial tour de force that it involved, one 
needs to understand where Rickover began.  When he started, no reactor 
designed for useful amounts of power production had ever been built.  Yet he 
undertook to build one immediately for the extraordinarily difficult application of 
submarine propulsion.  It was an immensely inspiring vision, one that both 
motivated his organization and ensured success in selling its program.  In 
achieving success, he and his organization scored an engineering 
accomplishment of historic magnitude. 
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To understand how Rickover accomplished all of this requires that one 
become acquainted with his principles and methods of organization, program 
execution, the achievement of technical excellence, the management of 
personnel and other resources, and the ensuring of effective communications.  
These were the ingredients of his success; they offer valuable lessons for other 
hazardous, technically complex programs that wish to have enduring success. 
 
3. Organization 
 The Naval Reactors organization embodies a number of basic principles of 
sound management, which are all too often "more honor'd in the breach than in 
the observance."  The unique strength of Naval Reactors has been that these 
principles are applied throughout the program logically and consistently with 
unremitting rigor. 
 A principle of transcending importance is that every organizational unit and 
each individual has responsibilities that are defined clearly and understood 
thoroughly.  Careful attention is given to seeing that these responsibilities are 
internalized, that the name of an individual is identified unambiguously with each 
required function, and that these responsibilities are put in writing.  Naval 
Reactors policy and practice gives emphasis to this principle to a degree 
matched by few organizations. 
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 Assigning responsibilities with this IIS Stark clarity presupposes that there 
exists a dear definition of the respective responsibilities for the organizations 
involved, notably the government and its contractors.  The cardinal principle 
applied by Naval Reactors is that the government itself is the customer-and an 
exacting one at that-for each and every activity and function that contractors are 
engaged to perform.  The contractor is required to meet the requirements of the 
contract in all respects.  Naval Reactors built up an outstanding technical staff 
(discussed further below) to ensure that it could perform as a "demanding 
customer."  However, it is clear Naval Reactors policy that the competence of the 
Naval Reactors staff is not to be used to compensate for weaknesses in the 
capabilities of the contractor but rather to cause them to be corrected.  Few 
policies are more central to the success of the program than maintaining this 
clear distinction between the roles of the government and the contractors. 
 As noted earlier, a single unified organization was established to carry out 
the respective responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Navy.  
This unified aspect was strengthened as the program grew and the organization 
was extended nationwide.  The heads of each field activity in the Naval Reactors 
program reported to the director rather than to some key assistant.  This 
arrangement produces a very flat organization; at times more than 20 people 
report directly to the director.  In such an organization communications are very 
important (as discussed below).  The mode of operation is highly unified, yet 
flexible; new groups are formed and old ones disbanded based on the demands 
of the work.  Ultimate authority and responsibility resides with the director, who 
delegates appropriate authority to headquarters and field personnel.  Field 
personnel truly function as a part of the headquarters organization, simply 
displaced by geography. 
 This close-knit style of organization enhances program unity and helps 
ensure uniform application of policies, standards, and practices. Unity is also 
fostered by the practice of staffing senior field positions from among those who 
have demonstrated effectiveness at headquarters.  Finally, this unified 
organizational structure helps to suppress factions and avoid the tensions and 
conflicts between headquarters and field organizations that all too often hamper 
the progress of large, technically-complex, hazardous endeavors. 
 
4. Program Execution 
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 A salient feature of program execution at Naval Reactors is the willingness 
to face facts squarely and objectively, especially those concerning technical 
matters. Central to this approach is the Rickover philosophy that "technology had 
imperatives of its own," based on immutable laws of nature, to which deference 
must always be paid.  These laws cannot be challenged with impunity; yet all too 
often, otherwise capable managers, whether from lack of technical knowledge, 
contractual incentives, or personal ambition, imagine that they can do so.  With 
his many years of engineering and program management experience, Rickover 
was especially vigilant to detect and counter these tendencies.  
 His effective transmission of this experience to the Naval Reactors 
organization has been a major factor in its success.  For example, at a perilously 
late stage in the development of the programs first reactor (the prototype for the 
first nuclear submarine, Nautilus) Rickover made the contractor scrap a fatally 
flawed design for a vital safety system and instead manufacture a totally new, 
simpler design.  His courage to face technical reality and take forceful action 
helped foster an organizational commitment to confront technical reality in all its 
details early and head on whatever the consequences.  This became a 
characteristic mode of operation at Naval Reactors and it works to avoid potential 
failure to meet agreed-upon program objectives, especially in safety and quality. 
 Significant attention is always given to assigning work consistent with 
priorities.  For example, at a crucial stage in the program, during a burgeoning 
nuclear shipbuilding program, one of the corporations involved decided to do a 
study for a new design of a reactor plant for destroyers.  Over Rickover's 
objections, the firm was awarded a large contract to study its radical design 
concept.  Two years later, the firm issued a report urging that a major program be 
undertaken.  To avoid having resources diverted from building up the nuclear 
fleet, Rickover dedicated a team of his top engineers to develop a report for the 
Atomic Energy Commission that technically demolished the proposed reactor 
design.  The destroyer reactor project based on the discredited technology was 
never advanced again.  
 The engineers at Naval Reactors who were involved complained that they 
had been diverted from higher priority work to scotch this effort; Rickover 
convinced them that a high visibility failure (as this concept would have proven to 
be) would have had adverse impacts on the industry in general, and on naval 
nuclear power in particular.  Rickover always awarded high priority to protecting 
the program. It remains a high program priority today. 
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 Another distinguishing feature of Naval Reactors is that operations are 
conducted with a high degree of formality and are rigorously documented.  All 
work is conducted with a disciplined engineering approach, making full use of 
available program and consensus standards.  The all too common "laissez faire" 
approach, in which an individual or organization, however well qualified, is 
allowed to conduct work without due attention to sound engineering principles 
and independent checks, is simply not tolerated.  This disciplined, formal 
engineering approach is pervasive in every phase of activities at Naval Reactors: 
development of codes and standards where none exist, the availability of 
formalized design manuals and engineered test procedures, the detailed analysis 
of proposed designs, and the rigorous application of quality assurance, to name 
a few.  Some individuals may find this rigor irksome when they first encounter it.  
However, over the years, a comprehensive set of standards and procedures has 
been developed that has contributed importantly to the safety and reliability of the 
reactor plants that Naval Reactors builds.  This set of standards and procedures 
permits innovation to be applied in a controlled manner and allows focus to be 
placed on truly important areas, while ensuring that routine work gets done 
competently. 
 Program execution is strongly marked by the application of the principle of 
redundancy.  The objective is never to be dependent on a single source of 
anything: information, supply of material and equipment, design approaches, 
assessment of quality, or personnel.  The list could extend indefinitely. 
Application of this principle can be seen in the early establishment of two reactor 
plant-engineering laboratories.  The strong, competitive capabilities of these two 
laboratories have been an important source of strength for the Naval Reactors 
program, and the laboratories are often used cooperatively to address technical 
problems of common program interest. 
 
5. Achieving Technical Excellence 
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 Achieving technical excellence in design and execution is perhaps the 
supreme objective that informs and drives all Naval Reactors activities.  All 
policies, practices, and procedures are directed toward achieving this objective.  
Achieving it requires that personnel acquire the disposition-as a way of life-to 
examine matters in detail with an attitude of objectivity concerning assumptions, 
validity of data, and the like, coupled with an imaginative conjecture of how things 
could possibly conspire to go wrong.  Development of this disposition 
complements the disposition mentioned earlier of giving due regard to the laws of 
nature.  It is tested most when careful analysis discloses flaws that might 
compromise excellence and therefore require adopting new approaches, even 
though such a change may sometimes threaten cost and schedules. 
 Another key way of achieving excellence is through effective use of 
consensus engineering codes and standards.  In principle, this is not unusual. 
What was unusual in the early days of Naval Reactors was the technical 
thoroughness and managerial force with which the program applied the principle.  
Since there were few standards specific to the newly born nuclear power 
industry, Naval Reactors examined and upgraded applicable standards from 
conventional power plant practice and submarine design.  
 Where no standards were available or suitable for use, Naval Reactors 
developed its own standards and continually upgraded them as the program 
accumulated experience. 
 Yet another obstacle had to be overcome in the early days of the program 
-unsound notions of the role of research and development in mission-oriented 
endeavors.  The Naval Reactors view was that research and development work 
funded by the program had to contribute directly to program objectives.  A 
different view, encountered frequently at the time in the national laboratories of 
the Atomic Energy Commission, was that scientists and engineers ought to be 
funded on the basis of competence and be allowed substantial latitude in the 
choice of problems to be addressed and methods used.  Such an attitude did not 
support the high national priority Rickover perceived for the nuclear submarine 
project.  In addition the anticipated need for substantial industrial experience for 
the actual shipbuilding programs caused Naval Reactors to establish its own 
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laboratory structure dedicated to naval reactor applications, run by industrial 
giants (Westinghouse and General Electric), and operated under close Naval 
Reactors supervision and guidance. 
 The technical excellence sought in the Naval Reactors program is 
embodied in the high quality reliability, and safety of the components, systems, 
and plants that it produces.  In achieving this result, Naval Reactors makes wide 
use of quality assurance, but it does so in a manner that preserves to line 
management the final responsibility for quality.  It emphatically does not tolerate 
the aberrant and harmful interpretation that "the quality department is responsible 
for quality"; its proper responsibility is to confirm that quality is achieved. 
 
6. Asset Management 
 Naval Reactors views its personnel, both government and contractor, as 
its primary asset.  Obviously, all program personnel must be fully competent, 
especially concerning technical qualifications.  Naval Reactors must have the 
competence, in all areas, to provide effective technical direction and guidance.  
Selection and training of Naval Reactors personnel is thus accorded the highest 
priority among all program endeavors.  Similarly, Naval Reactors continually 
evaluates the technical competence of its contractors to ensure that it is sufficient 
to a very demanding task. 
 To meet its own needs for personnel Naval Reactors has drawn on many 
existing sources and developed others tailored to its needs.  Initially, large 
numbers were drawn from among naval officers with advanced technical 
education who had specialized in engineering.  As this source dwindled, cadres 
of gifted graduates of the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) at 
colleges and universities were selected and given advanced engineering 
education at the Bettis Reactor Engineering School, established by Naval 
Reactors at the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory.  
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 As needs continued to mount, additional programs were developed to 
harvest talent available from other sources such as other college graduates and 
graduates of other Navy programs.  It came to be recognized that the essential 
approach was to cast a wide net to attract individuals of outstanding technical 
and managerial capability early on and then educate and train them further in the 
task of working on nuclear power.  It has been a highly successful approach, and 
indeed, is considered one of the hallmarks of the Naval Reactors program. 
 After suitable candidates are identified, utmost attention is given to the 
selection process.  Each candidate is interviewed by at least three senior 
technical managers, personnel whose judgment is trusted by the director.  The 
attributes sought include: technical ability, mental alertness, industry, 
imagination, dedication, moral integrity, and growth potential. In trying to gauge 
technical ability, the interviewers attempt to "get behind the grades" to 
understand the candidates' ability to apply the material they have learned in a 
logical, coherent fashion.  The capstone of the process is an interview with the 
director, who, provided with the results of previous interviews, makes the final 
determination. 
 These two approaches, casting a wide net to garner the best qualified 
candidates, and a rigorous, comprehensive interview process, ensure a steady 
stream of well-qualified personnel into the nuclear fleet and Naval Reactors' 
technical staff Regular, detailed reviews of long-term performance ensure that 
only top performers move into positions of responsibility.  In the fleet, major 
"checkpoints" occur when mid-career officers cycle back through Naval Reactors 
headquarters to qualify as engineering department heads.  Senior officers run the 
qualification gauntlet again prior to achieving command of a nuclear ship.  At 
Naval Reactors headquarters, young engineers are rigorously reviewed prior to 
being granted "signature authority" (authorizing them to sign contractually binding 
correspondence for the director).  They are reviewed again when their initial four 
to five year tour at Naval Reactors is complete, at which point the program  
determines whether or not to offer them a permanent job. 
 This approach to meeting personnel needs-wide recruitment, rigorous 
screening, and regular, comprehensive reviews is not unique to Naval Reactors; 
in fact, other institutions of long standing, such as the U. S. Marine Corps and a 
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number of religious orders, focus similarly on "growing their own" talent. 
Institutions that endure share with Naval Reactors the attribute of consistent 
attention to the development of their personnel.  This attribute enables them to 
adapt to an ever-changing environment. 
 Acquisition of the Naval Reactors customer capability is the sine qua non 
of achieving the needed level of contractor capability.  The two phenomena may 
seem unrelated at first; however, it is Naval Reactors' experience that contractor 
performance will only be as capable as a capable customer makes it be.  The 
contractor is often obliged to distribute top technical talent, always in short 
supply, among many projects and programs.  The consistently demanding 
customer is the one most likely to have the needs of its program met. Few can 
match Naval Reactors in this category. 
 When a contractor has been able to acquire the strong capability needed 
to perform well, often with considerable difficulty, it is tempted to reassign these 
newly found strong performers to other corporate needs.  Naval Reactors has 
always exercised consistent vigilance to assure that its programs are not 
misused in this manner.  Generally, Naval Reactors uses its contractual vehicles, 
in concert with other less formal mechanisms, as strong incentives against such 
corporate actions, but these incentives do not develop automatically. 
 
7. Communications 
 The final component to the Naval Reactors structure-the one, which ties 
the program together-is communications.  The communication system is based 
on effective and thorough internal communication, which lays a solid foundation 
for building communication links to outside groups. 
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 Keeping up with what is going on in nationwide programs such as Naval 
Reactors has always been daunting.  The comprehensive approach taken is 
characteristic of the program.  Each top manager in the field, both government 
and contractor, is required to write the director of the program a weekly report 
(headquarters personnel are clearly at the call of the director whenever reports 
are required).  This report is expected to be concise, but care is taken to describe 
each problem adequately, to assign a responsible individual, and to provide a 
schedule for updates and resolution.  For fast-breaking issues these reports are 
often followed up with phone calls to the director.  
 Due to the broad responsibilities assigned personnel in the program, the 
director often receives reports of the same problem from several perspectives; 
this ensures that Naval Reactors receives complementary, independent reports 
on vital issues. 
 Communications do not just move up the chain of command.  In keeping 
with Naval Reactor's commitment to formality, all actions taken by headquarters 
are promptly documented and communicated to all activities involved.  This 
provides the basis for an ongoing dialogue between Naval Reactors 
headquarters, its field offices, and its contractors.  Communications in writing, 
coupled with the formal proposals required by Naval Reactors of its contractors, 
provide a clear written record of the actions and decisions of the program.  This 
permits effective interfacing with outside groups, whether they are auditors (e.g., 
the General Accounting Office) or they provide oversight (e.g., the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards, an arm of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and even more notably, Congress). 
 Naval Reactors provides an annual review of its operations to Congress 
along with its budget submittal.  This review goes into great depth regarding the 
health and safety record of the program; a summary version of this report (known 
as the Grey Book) is also updated annually.  These comprehensive reports, 
coupled with regular, effective congressional testimony, are very valuable in 
marshaling support for Naval Reactors programs. 
 
8. Naval Reactors and Institutional Constancy 
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 LaPorte and Keller postulate two major avenues by which organizations 
build institutional constancy.  First, they demonstrate that they are worthy of trust, 
and second, they develop and demonstrate the capacity to execute the programs 
entrusted to them.  The following sections will describe how the attributes of the 
Naval Reactors program contribute to achieving these two ends. 
9. Demonstrating Trustworthiness 
 The attributes that LaPorte and Keller delineate under this category 
include: (1) the development and implementation of formal written goals, (2) the 
strong articulation of a commitment to constancy, (3) the fostering of strong 
institutional norms and processes, and (4) the presence of vigorous external 
enforcement or oversight. 
 Formal, written goals have been the backbone of the Naval Reactors 
program since its inception.  A formal, written goal (the commitment to produce a 
nuclear reactor for submarine propulsion) launched the program in the late 
1940s. Prior to that no firm foothold could be found for the program.  From that 
basic goal a number of subsidiary goals were derived that further defined the 
design requirements of the submarine propulsion plant.  Other written goals 
followed, many having to do with public health and safety, such as a goal of "no 
significant discharges of radioactivity to the environment," and other similar 
technical challenges. 
 The Naval Reactors program embodies its commitment to constancy in a 
philosophy of operations.  Since its very early stages the program has espoused 
a "cradle to grave responsibility" for the nuclear power plants that it designs and 
builds.  In effect, such a philosophy operationalizes constancy, which is put to 
work in concepts such as responsibility, as well as in the clear definition pf roles, 
and the need for technical excellence in all aspects of the program. 
 Even very visible advertisement of the goals and objectives of the program 
is not enough, however, as LaPorte and Keller point out.  These goals and 
objectives must be supported by institutional norms and formal internal 
processes.  Naval Reactors ensures that its goals and objectives are put into 
practice through a number of program attributes.  
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 First, the program inculcates the norm of personal responsibility; each 
member of the program is personally responsible for the work he or she 
performs.  Second, the program ensures that the cutting edge of program 
management, the field element managers, have first been successful in 
headquarters assignments.  Their track records make it possible for 
headquarters to delegate wide latitude to them once they are in the field.  A third 
institutional norm or set of norms concerns the manner in which the technical 
work of the program is performed.  Such norms include attention to detail, 
adherence to consensus and program standards, and a dedication to technical 
inquisitiveness and appropriate research and development.  These program 
norms and processes help to ensure that program objectives are met. 
 Naval Reactors was born in an age where there was less focus than today 
on external regulation.  However, from the very early days the program 
recognized the value that could be provided by external review of its design and 
practices.  Under the aegis first of the Atomic Energy Commission and 
subsequently the Department of Energy, the reactor plant designs for each class 
of ships are reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.  
Comments received from the committee, although not mandatory for the 
program, are treated seriously and are resolved prior to design acceptance.  In 
the early years of the program close congressional scrutiny was provided by the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.  This powerful committee was responsible for 
all nuclear matters until the early 1970s and it provided detailed oversight of the 
program.  The format and content of Naval Reactor's testimony to Congress was 
developed in those early days of detailed scrutiny and endures to this day.  Thus, 
significant external oversight of nuclear safety in the program exists, although it is 
not as formal as it is in some programs. 
 In addition, since the mid-1980s, Naval Reactors has opened its program 
to external oversight of environmental matters.  Naval Reactors has dedicated a 
separate division to deal with environmental protection and compliance matters.  
This division, working closely with Naval Reactors ' contractors, ensures that 
environmental problems are rapidly identified and corrected.  This rapid response 
has led to good working relationships between Naval Reactors and state and 




10. Agency Capacity to Enact Programs 
 In describing the conditions necessary to ensure that agencies have the 
capacity to enact their programs, LaPorte and Keller cite three major attributes.  
These attributes are: (1) adequate administrative and technical capability to 
assure performance, (2) analytical supports that incorporate the interests of the 
future, and (3) effective capacity to detect and remedy failures early on.  How the 
Naval Reactors program achieves each of these attributes is discussed below. 
A critical foundation for the program's infrastructure is its ability to establish, 
define, and protect a domain that encompasses its responsibilities totally This 
was never easy to do.  From the outset of the Naval Reactors program, the 
Atomic Energy Commission (now the Department of Energy), the Navy, and 
other organizations made repeated attempts to curtail or modify those 
responsibilities.  Naval Reactor's policy has been to defend its domain vigilantly 
against such intrusions.  Its effective protection of its prerogatives gives it the 
freedom to meet its programmatic goals and responsibilities and prevents its 
energy from being sapped on unnecessary squabbles. 
 Naval Reactor's ability to define and maintain the boundaries of its 
program is best illustrated in its establishment and maintenance of control of the 
selection, education, and training of program personnel.  Personnel have always 
been an issue of major importance to the Navy.  Rickover and later directors 
have insisted that they be the final arbiters of an officer's acceptability for 
technical or operational duty, and that the decision be based (in key part) on a 
personal interview with the director.  The Navy blanched at placing such authority 
with a single individual; however, Naval Reactors sustained its position based on 
the issue of nuclear safety and the personal responsibility for safety that the 
Director has demonstrated. 
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 Naval Reactors ability to enact its programs is further enhanced by its 
unity as an organization.  This unity renders it relatively immune to the conflicts 
that have beset other programs, especially the tensions between headquarters 
and field organizations.  Naval Reactors managers are imbued with the feeling of 
being part of a unified organization, one with dear management policies and 
practices and well-articulated goals.  This organizational cohesion is not 
stultifying; all are encouraged to recommend improvements, organizational and 
technical, confident that optimal solutions will emerge from such ongoing 
dialogues. 
 Few aspects of Naval Reactors activities are more essential to enacting 
programs effectively, especially programs associated with hazardous materials, 
than the formal measures used to execute them.  These measures, which apply 
to each stage of the program from design through decommissioning, have been 
developed to meet specific needs and are progressively strengthened, 
incorporating experience as the program progresses.  As with other Naval 
Reactors management methods, the use of disciplined formal methods is not 
new; however, the thoroughness and discipline with which the concept is applied 
throughout the program is rarely found elsewhere. 
 Important as the development of formal systems is, the success of such 
systems depends on their discerning use by contractor and Naval Reactors 
personnel.  Thus, selection of such personnel is accorded the highest priority 
among all activities.  The policy is to pick the brightest, best educated, and most 
accomplished, and then to give them the best nuclear education and training that 
can be found or developed within the program.  Attention is then paid to 
personnel development, ensuring that staff members receive assignments of 
progressively increasing responsibility and also that the more pedestrian 
performers are screened out. 
 It is in the strength of its personnel, at all levels, that Naval Reactors differs 
most from other government organizations. The strength of Naval Reactor's 
personnel supports another fundamental premise of the program: that Naval 
Reactors has technical and managerial capability at least equal to that of its 
contractors.  Otherwise, Naval Reactors could not reasonably expect to provide 
contractors  with  meaningful  technical  and  programmatic  direction  or act as a  
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demanding customer in reviewing products delivered.  Because of the safety 
implications of the work performed, contractor personnel have to be among the 
very best.  
 Another distinguishing feature of Naval Reactors is the depth to which it 
manages its contractor.  Naval Reactors considers the acquisition and 
maintenance of technical competence on the part of contractors a contractual 
obligation.  It has established adequate contractual structures and, more 
importantly, strong, enduring relationships with its contractors to ensure that 
contractual obligations are met. 
 A principle paradigm of the Naval Reactors program, one that contributes 
to the program's "future focus," has been the aforementioned "cradle to grave" 
responsibility that it maintains for the nuclear power plants under its purview.  
This understanding of the long-term responsibility associated with using 
radioactive materials, coupled with the program's commitment to clearly 
delineated and documented roles and responsibilities, has provided the 
necessary emphasis on responsible, forward-looking technical decision making.  
It has also led to outstanding performance in the areas of environment, safety, 
and health, as documented by recent independent assessments. 
 The extensive internal communication system that Naval Reactors has in 
place also ensures that it is very responsive to problems as they arise.  In 
addition to the management reports discussed above, several special reporting 
systems exist to document quality problems and unusual occurrences as well as 
to record changes required in the formal system of manuals and procedures that 
establish program requirements.  All of these systems require formal, technical 
resolution of the problems identified and appropriate, authoritative approval of 
problem resolutions. 
 
11. Challenges to the System 
 The systems put in place by Naval Reactors worked well the vast majority 
of  the  time.   However,  that  does  not  mean  that  the  perturbations  to  these  
 96 
systems did not happen-they did.  Naval Reactors' responses to three systematic 
challenges are described below in an effort to further explicate important aspects 
of the Naval Reactors program. 
 Naval Reactors ' attention to personnel matters does not mean that no 
"turkeys" ever slip through.  In fact, roughly 10 percent of those brought in for 
training fail, mostly for academic reasons-this is one of the functions of the 
rigorous, phased training program that Naval Reactors uses.  However, each 
problem case is handled individually, and the causes are thoroughly researched.  
Often, extensive remediation efforts are attempted, and no naval officer (or for 
that matter, civilian engineer) is dropped from the program without the personal, 
written approval of the director. 
 Perhaps at no time are programs and their systems tested more severely 
than during disasters; Naval Reactors went through one such searching period 
when the nuclear submarine Thresher was lost at sea in 1963.  Towards the end 
of the Navy's investigation of that tragedy, a senior naval officer questioned 
whether the rigorous, detailed procedures that were used to operate the reactor 
might not have impeded the doomed ship's ability to re-establish propulsion as 
the submarine sank.  Rickover reacted to this stimulus immediately and 
characteristically.  He responded on two fronts.  First, he had his engineers 
review the existing Navy technical analysis of the incident.  They detected 
significant discrepancies and were able to exonerate the reactor from potential 
blame.  
 However, Naval Reactors did not stop there, it accelerated an already 
existing program to simplify reactor startup procedures.  By the time Rickover 
was asked to respond to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, he was armed 
with revised technical analyses and a forward-looking corrective action program. 
 The ultimate test of the system Rickover built came in 1982, when "The 
Admiral" was involuntarily retired for "actuarial reasons"-he had just turned 82.  
How would the program change?  The answer?  Very little. 
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 Given the difficulty that most organizations go through in making the 
transition from a charismatic leader such as Rickover, how was it accomplished?  
The answer to this question harkens back to one of the fundamental tenets of the 
Naval Reactors program –formality.  The well-established standards that existed 
pertaining to the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and 
decommissioning of reactors remained in effect and continued to guide the 
technical work of the program.  Also, agreements were reached between the 
program (supported by its allies in Congress) and the White House to codify the 
management arrangements between Naval Reactors and the Navy and the 
Department of Energy By and large, Rickover's personal boundary management 
efforts had maintained these arrangements previously.  Now they were based on 
Executive Order 12344 (which was later superseded by statute). 
 
12. Conclusion 
 We believe that the Naval Reactors program comports well with the 
programmatic attributes that LaPorte and Keller deem necessary for institutional 
constancy.  Review of the program's response to several systematic challenges 
provides additional support to this conclusion.  It is clear that some attributes are 
addressed more strongly than others, as will be discussed briefly below. 
 In the area of demonstrating trustworthiness, Naval Reactors places 
particular emphasis on formal, written goals and a strong articulation of those 
goals.  One of these goals, cradle to grave responsibility for its nuclear power 
plants, also helps produce the necessary commitment to constancy.  Due to the 
program's outstanding safety record, it has yet to be subjected to formal external 
oversight or regulation of nuclear safety; however, it does submit its reactor plant 
designs to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for review and is 
subject to regulation in environmental matters. 
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 Naval Reactors has placed its major emphasis in the area of developing 
agency capacity to perform.  Primary program focus is applied to developing and 
maintaining the capability to execute programmatic goals.  The major source of 
such capability is the truly outstanding men and women, both government and 
contractor, who have been attracted to the program.  It is their acumen and 
commitment that makes the error detection capability of the program so 
responsive and ensures that the program is always looking to the future. 
 It is the view of the authors that the importance placed on the selection, 
education, and training of personnel, and their subsequent retention in an 
organization, is of preeminent importance to government organizations trying to 
exhibit institutional constancy.  By carefully screening its personnel, developing 
their capabilities, and ensuring that they continue to have meaningful work, Naval 
Reactors has performed well in this area, to date.  This capability has been aided 
by the program's relative autonomy, which has been aggressively defended. 
Such autonomy permits constancy of purpose (George, 1995).  It is in their 
personnel that government organizations develop their capacity to excel and 
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APPENDIX B: TQM IMPLEMENTATION AT THE U.S. COAST 
GUARD 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The following text is an excerpt from “An Organizational Sea Change:  
Total Quality Management in the Coast Guard” authored by Susan Rosegrant 
(1993). 
 
B. AN ORGANIZATION SEA CHANGE: TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
IN THE US COAST GUARD 
1. Introduction 
 In the late fall of 1992, Admiral J. William Kime, the commandant of the US 
Coast Guard, issued a challenge to the agency’s almost 40,000 military and 
civilian personnel.  Two years earlier, he had launched the most sweeping 
cultural change in the Coast Guard’s 200-year history, declaring that the smallest 
of the five armed forces would embrace and implement Total Quality 
Management (TQM), a management approach that encourages a methodical 
and on-going self-analysis of organizational processes at all levels.  Now, Kime 
declared, the Coast Guard was at a “critical juncture.”  In order for TQM to 
succeed, the organization needed to work harder, to focus its improvement 
efforts, and to begin to institutionalize quality principles in the Coast Guard 
culture.  
 The early implementation already had been a formidable, and sometimes 
hectic, process.  Specially chartered TQM teams had created a Coast Guard 
vision; laid out a two-year plan; established a management structure to oversee 
and execute TQM goals and activities; and founded an internal TQM training 
center.  Admiral Kime had traveled widely throughout the agency, preaching the 
benefits of the management approach to groups ranging from district office staffs 
to field units stationed on high-powered cutters.  In addition, an outside 
consultant had helped train the top five percent of the Coast Guard in the 
principles and goals of TQM. 
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 But with all that had been accomplished, Kime knew that the real test of 
the program lay in the organization’s ability to surmount the challenges that still 
lay ahead.  Now more than halfway through his four-year tenure, the 
commandant was determined to see TQM solidly entrenched in the Coast Guard 
before his time ran out.  “This third year will be critical to our success,” Admiral 
Kime predicted, calling on the entire agency to unite behind his goal.  “We must 
maintain the momentum.  In fact, we must move forward aggressively with TQM.”   
 
2. Forces for Change 
 When Admiral Kime became commandant on May 31, 1990, he soon 
become convinced that implementing TQM would benefit the agency in several 
important ways.  The management philosophy, based on the ideas of such 
quality gurus as W. Edwards Deming, Joseph Juran, Armand Feigenbaum, and 
Kaoru Ishikawa, had already been embraced by a broad cross-section of 
American corporations.  Now a growing number of federal agencies, including 
the US Navy, were trying TQM.  Although the specific approaches varied, TQM 
programs shared the common components of continuous process improvement, 
people orientation, quantitative methods, and customer focus.  Organizations that 
had implemented TQM successfully often reported dramatic overall quality 
improvements in the goods or services they provided; flatter, less hierarchical, 
and more efficient management structures; an increase in teamwork and 
cooperation; and more “empowered” employees, capable of handling new 
responsibilities and actively contributing to the realization of organizational goals.  
“We seemed to fit the mold of the type of organization that should be looking 
towards TQM,” Kime explained.  
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 Indeed, the Coast Guard appeared to need a new way to respond to an 
increasing assortment of pressures to change.  The service’s missions had 
expanded dramatically during its 200 years as the agency with primary maritime 
authority for the United States.  Its traditional duties had remained intact, such as 
regulating commercial vessels; conducting search and rescue missions at sea; 
maintaining lighthouses and other navigational aids; and staying ready to assist 
as an armed, naval force.  But the Coast Guard had also absorbed other 
responsibilities including interdiction of Cuban and Haitian vessels carrying illegal 
immigrants; patrol of waters frequented by drug traffickers; containment of oil 
spills; and support and transportation for scientists on polar expeditions. 
 As its array of responsibilities grew, however, the Coast Guard, like other 
federal agencies, was also confronting the reality of leaner times.  The federal 
government had proclaimed its commitment to cutting costs, improving 
productivity, and becoming more efficient, and although the Coast Guard’s 
budget had risen slightly in the previous two years to $2.7 billion in 1990, the 
sense through the organization was that the service was being asked to do 
substantially more with less.  In TQM, Admiral Kime saw the dual promise of 
boosting internal efficiencies with offering proof that the Coast Guard was doing 
all that it could to trim fat and streamline operations. “Our budgets have been 
fairly stable and we’ve been given lots of new missions,” declared chief of staff 
Rear Admiral Robert Kramek.  “The only way we can accomplish those is to grow 
from within and to become more efficient somehow.” 
 More worrisome than mere budget cuts, though, were periodic proposals 
by outside critics to dismantle the Coast Guard and transfer its duties to agencies 
such as the US Navy, the Customs Service, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, and the Drug Enforcement Agency.  In addition, private companies in 
such fields as commercial search and rescue, buoy maintenance, and 
engineering consulting, were greedily eye jobs traditionally handled by the Coast 
Guard. 
 To help reduce the Coast Guard’s vulnerability to attack, Kime hoped to 
better balance the attention and resources that the agency gave its four central 
missions: maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, environmental protection, 
and national security.  Since being placed under the Department of 
Transportation in 1967, the agency tended to favor one mission area at the 
expense of the others, a strategy that the commandant believed had weakened 
the Coast Guard.  But Kime also realized it would take more than a 
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reapportionment of resources to convince skeptics that the service was ideally 
suited to carry out the diverse tasks it had been given.  Here, again, TQM might 
help in demonstrating the Coast Guard’s commitment to accomplishing all its 
assigned missions capably and at a reasonable cost.  
 Cries for change were also arising from within the Coast Guard.  For the 
most part, officers and enlistees in the field believed they had already logged an 
impressive performance record.  When it came to operations, the organization 
gave them the autonomy and the support they needed to make decisions quickly 
and act independently.  Whether arresting armed drug runners, containing an oil 
spill, teaching children about water safety, or rescuing capsized fishermen in 
rough seas, most Coast Guard members were intensely proud of their 
organization, as well as of their own abilities to work under pressure, take risks, 
and operate as part of a highly effective team. 
 But mixed with pride was a large measure of cynicism and frustration.  The 
same organization that placed such importance on responding quickly and boldly 
to a variety of emergencies seemed to lose its decisiveness and aptitude for risk-
taking as soon as it moved out of the operational sphere.  Indeed, a numbing 
progression of regulations, administrative procedures, and reporting 
requirements imposed from above had left many in the field frustrated, 
overworked, and filled with a sense of impotence.  The anger generated by the 
tangle of requirements had created an “us versus them” mentality:  Many field 
commanders were convinced that their productivity and efficiency would soar if 
only headquarters would leave them alone.  
 Cynicism was also rife at headquarters.  Under the agency’s bureaucratic 
and military-style management structure, decision-making had become a careful 
and cautious process, with parties anxiously seeking consensus while at the 
same time adhering to a strict chain of command.  “I had escaped coming to 
headquarters for 23 years because I thought this was the most dysfunctional 
place in the Coast Guard,” exclaims Captain Ronald Marafioti, chief of the Naval 
Engineering Division at headquarters.  The sense of organizational paralysis was 
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captured in the tortuous process reported by one commander who needed the 
chief of staff’s signature on a simple thank you note: Nineteen people, including 
secretaries, reviewed the letter before it was signed by the chief of staff.  “The 
supporting infrastructure has got a lot of arthritis,” one captain summed up.  For 
Coast Guard personnel hoping to break through the administrative and 
bureaucratic logjam, TQM’s reputation for flattening hierarchies and empowering 
employees offered the possibility of some relief.  
 Admiral Kime had seen internal issues to resolve, as well.  The Coast 
Guard was notoriously week in long-term planning, and this deficiency had 
become even more pronounced in the late 1980s when the agency dismissed 
most of its planning staff to fund enforcement-related missions.  “I think that the 
Coast Guard traditionally has done an A-plus, outstanding job in short-term 
things,” Kime later remarked.  “In long-term things, whether they’re continuing to 
implement existing programs, finding better ways to do things, or long-term 
acquisitions, we leave a little bit to be desired.”  Moreover, loyalties to specific 
mission areas and geographic locations within the Coast Guard had effectively 
divided the organization into a number of separate and often highly competitive 
program specialties – what the commandant referred to as organizational 
“stovepipes.”   If TQM could focus the Coast Guard on serving its customers, and 
improve cooperation among mission areas, Kime believed, the agency would be 
well on its way to achieving its full potential.  
 
3. TQM in the Coast Guard 
 The agency that Kime hoped to transform had a rigidly structured 
hierarchy, and was both operationally diverse and geographically dispersed (for 
an organization chart, see Exhibit 1).  At headquarters, the commandant, vice 
commandant, and chief of staff were top-ranking admirals.  Ten rear admirals ran 
the major headquarters offices, overseeing about 30 different program areas.  
The ten Coast Guard districts – including Alaska, Hawaii, coastal regions, and 
the Great Lakes – reported to either a Pacific or an Atlantic area commander of 
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the same rank as the vice commandant.  In addition, about 25 headquarters units 
scattered around the country reported directly to headquarters.  
 Each district office supervised four different categories of field units; 
groups, air stations; marine safety offices; and cutters, or boats designed for 
extended operations, of 110 feet or longer.  Personnel at this field units often 
numbered in the hundreds.  In addition, the first category of field units, the 
groups, typically supervised smaller units, including boats under 110 feet long; 
small stations, which might consist of just a handful of personnel; and aids to 
navigation teams, teams whose responsibility was to maintain and repair a 
variety of navigational aids, including lighthouses and buoys. 
 Bringing major change to an organization this complex would not be easy.  
As the result of a 1998 headquarters reorganization, the agency had already 
created a Productivity Improvement Branch that had launched several initiatives 
quite limited in scope.  Such efforts as the Beneficial Suggestion program – later 
renamed Idea Express – and the Productivity Improvement Fund, for example, 
were both designed to spur money-saving innovations, with the former program 
rewarding individuals for successful ideas, and the latter provided startup funding 
for projects that might save money or personnel.  The Model Unit Program, 
begun in 1989, had sought to address the issue of bureaucratic overkill by 
allowing a selected cadre of unit commanders to challenge policies and 
procedures that they viewed as unproductive.  
 But Admiral Kime wanted a big program – something to jolt the Coast 
Guard into action.  TQM seemed ideal.  A few headquarters offices and at least 
one field unit had already implemented TQM on their own with some success.  
The time was ripe, Kime felt, to commit the Coast Guard to top-down 
organization-wide implementation of the management philosophy.  In September 
1990, four months after becoming commandant, Kime formally announced his 
TQM plans at the Williamsburg Flag Conference, a biannual meeting of the 
Coast Guard’s top leadership.  
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 As Kime and his staff had designed it, an entire day was to be devoted to 
presenting TQM to the flag officers and allowing the officers to air their feelings.  
Gaining widespread support would give the program a strong early start.  The 
kickoff, however, did not go quite as planned.  Despite Kime’s enthusiasm, some 
of the admirals were wary of the management approach, and highly skeptical 
about the value of a comprehensive TQM rollout. 
 According to a story later told and retold around Coast Guard 
headquarters, Kime began to grow impatient as the questioning and doubts 
persisted, and finally lost his temper.  After one dubious admiral remarked that 
the Coast Guard seemed to need either a carrot at the end of a stick, or the 
threat of a bear in the woods before it would change, Kime was said to have cut 
the conversation dead.  “If you people need a bear in the words, you’re looking at 
him,” the commander reportedly declared.  “His name is J.W. Kime.” The TQM 
discussion was over.  
 At the end of the day, Kime directed that an Implementation Planning 
Team (IPT-1) be chartered to develop a two-year TQM implementation plan 
under the leadership of a top-level Executive Guidance Team.  Among its tasks, 
the ten-member IPT-1 team was to create a Coast Guard vision statement, 
articulating the agency’s desired future state; a structure of committees and 
groups to lead, support, and carry out the implementation; and a series of 
commandant instructions to provide formal guidance for the implementation – all 
within six months. 
 
4. The Plan 
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 One of IPT-1’s first acts was to hire Boston area-based TQM consultant 
Organizational Dynamics, Inc. (ODI) to guide the implementation planning and 
provide TQM training.  The Executive Guidance Team, chaired by the 
commandant, had approved a budget of $5.2 million to provide headquarters 
support during the first two years of what was expected to be a five-to six-year 
implementation process. In addition to covering ODI’s role, the money would fund 
quarterly flag officer briefings at headquarters, and the establishment of the 
Leadership Institute, an internal TQM resource center that would eventually 
provide training and expertise and develop Coast Guard-specific TQM materials.  
Once ODI had trained a critical mass of the Coast Guard, and the Leadership 
Institute was opened, Kime planned to dismiss ODI and to cut off most 
headquarters funding.  Local commands would then take on the financial 
responsibility of driving TQM forward. 
 With ODI’s guidance, and periodic input from the Executive Guidance 
Team, IPT-1 set to work.  Captain James Townley, head of the Plans Policy 
Division, and chairman of IPT-1, admitted that at first, TQM was an appealing 
enigma.  “Quite honestly, none of us fully understood what it was,” he confesses.  
“But we liked the sound of it.  There was quite a lot of hype going around 
Washington as more and more federal agencies discovered this new way of 
doing business.”  By January 1991, the team had hammered out a five-sentence 
Coast Guard Vision Statement, gotten Kime’s approval, and distributed it to all 
the flag officers.  “Ideally, we would have liked the commandant to put pen to 
paper and spill his guts out on what he thought the Coast Guard of the future 
should be,” remarked one team member, “but he didn’t do that.” 
 Simultaneously, IPT-1 and ODI began devising the management structure 
that would support the implementation of TQM principles and tools throughout 
the Coast Guard.  Although ODI would use its standard materials to train Coast 
Guard personnel, the overall implementation plan was to be a custom job.  “The 
Coast Guard has its own very, very strong traditions and cultures,” explains ODI 
Vice President David Dennen.  “If you ignore that and say, ‘Here’s how you’re 
going to do it,’ it just doesn’t work.” 
 Among the team’s – and the commandant’s – key concerns was the 
creation of an implementation framework that would not challenge or interfere 
with the Coast Guard’s existing operational chain of command.  “A lot of concern 
was expressed by the more skeptical members of our organization at the 
meeting in Williamsburg about the fact that we do have a certain organizational 
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structure.” Kime explains, “that we’re a military organization, and that we’ve got 
to be very careful about how we do this.” 
 The plan that the team devised, with Kime’s approval, seemed to fit that 
requirement.   The “parallel overlay structure,” as it was described, established a 
hierarchy of groups linking all parts of the Coast Guard, relying on the existing 
chain of command without exactly duplicating it.  At the top, the Quality Counsel, 
made up of the commandant and the four most senior flag officers, would be 
responsible for the overall TQM plan – setting policy, providing resources, 
establishing measures, and rewarding TQM efforts.  At the bottom, natural work 
groups, comprised of any group of individuals who normally shared in a task, 
would apply TQM tools to continuously improve their own work processes. 
 In between were a cascading series of groups, usually linked vertically by 
having a member of the higher-level group chair the next lower group, and often 
linked horizontally by drawing team members from across functional boundaries.  
Executive Steering Committees, the highest-level group within major commands 
at headquarters, area, and district levels, were to develop plans, review progress, 
and reward success on a more local level. Quality Management Boards, 
comprised of senior managers from a specific command level, were to be cross-
functional entities responsible for an individual command’s tactical TQM efforts.  
Among the boards’ most important functions would be to charter Quality Action 
Teams (QATs), small groups convened to address specific problems.  Once a 
QAT presented its analysis and recommendations, it would be up to the Quality 
Management Board that chartered it to approve and act on the 
recommendations.  
 In addition to the overlay, IPT-1 specified two roles critical to the 
implementation – those of the TQM coordinator and facilitator.  Each 
headquarters office, district, and field command was to have a TQM coordinator, 
typically a mid-to senior-level officer, responsible for the overall coordination of 
the implementation.  This included providing technical and administrative 
support; scheduling and overseeing training; helping to arrange meetings; 
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administering awards and recognition; overseeing facilitators; and coordinating 
the TQM budget.  Reporting to coordinators were the TQM facilitators, whose 
primary job was to teach those not already trained by ODI. 
 The Productivity Improvement Branch, the two-year-old group that had 
sponsored the agency’s other recent productivity and quality initiatives, was 
named the TQM coordinator for the entire Coast Guard, charged with organizing 
ODI’s training sessions, and developing, administering, and evaluating TQM 
policies and plans.  
 In January 1991, as IPT-1 was laying out the fundamental policies and 
structures that would support the TQM implementation, the first groups of TQM 
coordinators and facilitators reported to the Coast Guard’s Reserve Training 
Center in Yorktown, Virginia, for training.  ODI offered three different programs:  
about 150 coordinators would attend five-day sessions; the approximately 350 
facilitators would receive the most training – nine days – to prepare them for 
becoming teachers themselves; and some 1,800 senior managers who would be 
serving on executive steering committees and quality management boards were 
slated to begin three-day workshops in May.  The 29 flag officers, the top 
echelon of the Coast Guard, would attend a half-day briefing in January on their 
roles in, and responsibilities for, implementing TQM. 
 As flag officers and district and field commanders began to select their 
coordinator and facilitator candidates and send them off for training, Admiral 
Kime – who saw spreading the word about TQM as a key leadership function – 
stepped up his discussions with senior officers and others about the importance 
of TQM.  “I was talking everywhere I went about what we were doing and why I 
felt this was not only a good idea, but something that was almost a necessity,” he 
says.  At the same time, IPT-1 published the first commandant instructions 
devoted to TQM.  Although the instruction did not address why the Coast Guard 
was implementing TQM, it briefly described the philosophy, introduced the 
overlay structure concept, and provided a glossary of TQM terms.  The second 
instruction, released in February, gave more details about the overlay and 
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training procedures, and in June, the group sent out two final instructions, one on 
communications and measurement, and one on rewards and recognition.  The 
four instructions constituted the formal guidance give to Coast Guard personnel 
for implementing TQM.  
 In May IPT-1 presented its two-year implementation plan.  Phase 1 
covered the work just completed, while Phase 2 would include dissolving IPT-1 
and forming a new Implementation Project Team (IPT-2), activating the overlay 
structure, and chartering the first QATs.  During Phase 3, the Leadership 
Institution would open, and there would be a solid network of working QATs.  The 
final phase would see a trained “critical mass” of personnel, a TQM impact 
review, the retirement of IPT-2, and transition to “routine TQM maintenance.” 
 
5. Early Reactions 
 By the spring of 1991, most Coast Guard personnel were aware of Admiral 
Kime’s rallying cry for quality, although in many cases, their exposure had ended 
there.  But that didn’t stop TQM from provoking strong reactions, both among 
those who still had scant knowledge of the process, and those who had started to 
implement it.  
 Captain Ronald Marafioti, who had done his best to avoid the 
“dysfunctional” environment at headquarters, was an early and avid supporter.  
“Anything that brought people together and got them to talk and work as a team 
is what the Coast Guard needed,” Marafioti declares.  “TQM seemed to have that 
label, and I was for it from the first moment I heard about it.” 
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 Captain James Ingham, chief of the Fifth District’s Administration Division, 
says he went to the first TQM coordinators’ training session a skeptic, but 
emerged a convert.  “I was fired up,” he recalls.  “I thought, this is the best stuff 
I’ve seen in the Coast Guard for 15 years.  I saw it as the only real prospect for a 
way to deal with the problems the Coast Guard was facing.”  Lieutenant 
Commander Carl Bromund, who also trained with the first group of coordinators, 
describes himself as “a big believer in TQM,” and states bluntly, “Clearly the old 
paradigms didn’t work, so we have very little to lose.” 
 Others, however, had quite the opposite reaction.  “The TQM program was 
just another high level headquarters program,” declares Captain Richard O. 
Buttrick, who retired as chief of staff of the First Coast Guard District in June 
1990, a few months before the Coast Guard-wide TQM initiative was announced.  
“If you truly knew what the Coast Guard was about and how it operated, you 
didn’t need it because that was the way we already ran the Coast Guard.” 
 Although early critics found a number of reasons not to like TQM, 
Buttrick’s statement captured the most common complaint.  TQM was “just good 
management,” and Coast Guard officers who were already doing it right didn’t 
need all the jargon and fuss.  “ODI tried to stress it as something new and 
wonderful,” explains Lieutenant Thomas Beistle, a senior investigating officer at 
Marine Safety Office Port Arthur who trained as a TQM coordinator.  “They would 
have encountered a lot less resistance if they had simply presented this as tried 
and true.  The military is evolutionary; it is not a revolutionary organization.”  
Captain Larry Hyde, a district chief of staff, voices a similar criticism.  “The way it 
was presented in the Fourteenth District was, ‘This is a great thing and nobody 
ever thought of it before,’” he gripes.  “Instead of building on our successes, they 
said, “You’ve been doing everything wrong for the last 30 years and TQM is 
going to be the savior of the Coast Guard.’ And, it’s not.” 
 Consultant David Dennen of ODI blames some of the early bad press on 
how the four commandant instructions presented TQM, claiming that a 
“professional commandant instruction writing team: had muddled an originally 
lucid set of directions.   Dennen, who has shepherded TQM implementations at a 
number of public and private organizations, also insists that the agency’s 
resistance was not unusual.  Yet he observed a different quality to the intensity of 
some of the Coast Guard’s early opposition.   “They just despise consultants,” he 
confides.  “A tremendous strength they have is their cohesiveness and loyalty, 
but because they are so cohesive and loyal, they tend to reject everything from 
the outside.  It’s almost as if TQM threatens the life from of the Coast Guard.” 
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6. The Implementation 
 After IPT-1 presented its implementation plan in May 1991, the team was 
dissolved and replaced by the TQM Implementation Project Team (IPT-2), a 
group of 11 senior executives led by Caption Robert Houle, who simultaneously 
replaced Captain Townley as head of the Coast Guard’s Plans and Policy 
Division.  IPT-2s charter listed the following “Guiding Principles and Policies”: 
• TQM will be headquarters-driven. 
• Headquarters will fund TQM implementation and training during the 
start-up phase (first eighteen months). 
• We will build independence from the contractor after the first 
eighteen months. 
• We will train the critical mass of our people (5 percent/2000 people) 
during the start-up phase.  
• We will use standard tools, methods and language. 
• We will balance application of TQM and training. 
• We will focus our efforts on behavior.   
 Like IPT-1, IPT-2 had a full plate.  The team was chartered to execute the 
TQM implementation plan; to identify and procure sufficient resources to do that; 
to monitor and evaluate the process; to communicate problems and needs to the 
Quality Council; and to recommend necessary changes.  In addition, IPT-2 had 
to design and establish the Leadership Institute, a TQM school, to be based at 
the Coast Guard Training Center in Petaluma, California, that would eventually 
assume responsibility for all training and consultation.  To carry out its tasks, IPT-
2 formed six focus teams to look at measurement, training, rewards and 
recognition, information and technology, communications, and customer focus. 
 As IPT-2 was gearing up, the newly training TQM coordinators were 
assessing how to get started.  Although every flag officer has to have a trained 
TQM coordinator, each admiral controlled the decision of whether to make the 
coordinator’s job full-time.  Less than a handful chose to do that.  As a result, 
most coordinators had to oversee TQM implementation on top of their regular 
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full-time jobs, what consultant Dennen dubbed the “collateral duty curse.”  
Although the original estimate was that TQM duties would take only 20 percent of 
a coordinator’s time, most coordinators found themselves “doing” TQM at least 
half-time, a commitment that often stirred up considerable friction among 
overworked co-workers and supervisors.  “The organization should have 
provided this full-time at our level to all the admirals,” asserts Office of Personnel 
coordinator Commander Bruce Wallisch, one of just three full-time coordinators 
at headquarters.  “Most of our counterparts are part-timers, and it shows.” 
 Clearly, implementing TQM had the potential to be a demanding job.  The 
coordinators, with the support of their commanding officers, were to begin 
training personnel, getting the overlay structure in place, identifying processes to 
be improved, and forming QATs and natural work groups to use the tools of 
TQM.  Just exactly how to do this was largely up to their individual coordinator.  
“The commandant made a very critical strategic decision that we would allow and 
encourage innovation in TQM,” explains Captain Houle, the leader of the IPT-2, 
who compares his job to being the conductor of an improvisational jazz band.  
“We would have standard tools, but within each major command we would allow 
them, and, in fact, encourage them, to do TQM whichever way felt right to them.” 
 For coordinators at many of the ten major offices at headquarters, as well 
as at many of the ten district offices around the country, what “felt right” was to 
move forward cautiously, and to watch what others were doing.  After senior 
officers received their ODI instruction, training often slowed or stalled.  Some 
offices did not follow the overlay exactly as described, establishing a Quality 
Management Board, for example, but not forming an Executive Steering 
Committee.  Participants at some early Quality Management Board meetings 
reported that it took several months for the boards to move beyond normal senior 
staff business.  When the boards did take up TWM, they typically looked at 
internal process improvements, such as encouraging better communication, 
rather than at such external issues as identifying and serving customers.  QATs 
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were more prevalent than natural work groups, perhaps because natural work 
groups required more lower level involvement and training. 
 The four commandant instructions had provided only a bare bones 
framework of guidelines and expectations.  In part to address this void, the 
Productivity Improvement Branch, renamed the Quality Management Branch to 
reflect its growing TQM thrust, in November published a “TQM Implementation 
Guidebook,” “the major policy and procedure manual guiding the actions of all 
TQM coordinators and facilitators as they carry out their assigned role.” 
 According to Houle, the guidebook for the first time presented coordinators 
with a clear plan.  The document described TQM structural overlay, how each 
piece fit in the overlay, the basic responsibilities of the various TQM teams and 
boards, and what each entity’s charter should contain.  A “Roadmap” detailed the 
first two years of implementation, charting a month-by-month account of when 
particular events would occur, such as Executive Guidance Team reviews, 
impact assessments, and training.  But while the guidebook provided a useful 
summary of mostly headquarters-related oversight and structural goals, it did not 
answer such tactical questions as whether everyone in an office or unit should be 
trained before attempting to apply TQM tools; whether the initial emphasis for 
results should be put on QATs or natural work groups; how often teams should 
meet; or how field units might integrate TQM into their “regular” activities.  
 For some coordinators, the lack of direction proved problematic.  
Commander Art Crostick, planning officer for the Seventeenth District in Juneau, 
Alaska, was warned at the first coordinators’ training in January 1991 that he 
would face resistance.  And, in fact, when he returned to Juneau, he discovered 
that “most people weren’t really interested” in TQM.  According to Crostick, the 
lack of guidelines made it even harder to motivate his co-workers.  “Headquarters 
has never come out and said, ‘You will be at such and such a point with your 
implementation  by such  and  such  a  date.’” Crostick  observes.   “Most  of  the  
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district coordinators would have preferred more of a firm target date, because it 
gives you something to shoot for and there’s some implied pressure from the top 
guy.” 
 The lack of coordination also made it difficult for more aggressive groups 
that had embraced TQM to use the tools beyond their own areas of operations.  
“We were frustrated,” admits full-time coordinator Commander Bruce Wallisch.  
“You almost need to have this whole building working in unison in implementing it 
for it to be effective.  You can only go so far before you have to interact with 
someone who doesn’t understand what you’re talking about.” 
 The decentralized nature of the Coast Guard, and the tendency of 
personnel to identify strongly with their specific mission areas, contributed to the 
differences in TQM implementation.  Although the commandant hoped to use 
TQM to break down these organizational “stovepipes,” TQM coordinator 
Commander Jeff Way confides that the coordinators still referred to the various 
admirals’ operations as “29 different kingdoms.”  Reflects Captain Richard 
Davison, head of the Quality Management Branch, “All those communities think 
differently, just have different thought processes that are driven by their missions.  
That diversity makes it difficult.” In fact, most of he headquarters and district 
offices had already drafted separate TQM vision statements, reflecting their own 
operational perspectives and goals.  
 But the most critical factor in a group’s progress with TQM, most 
coordinators agree, was the degree of top-level support and commitment.  
Because financial backing from headquarters essentially stopped with the ODI 
training, it was up to the flag officers, or their Executive Steering Committees, to 
decide how much time and money to devote to local training, how quickly the 
effort should move forward, and how much time the coordinators should devote 
to TQM.  “The amount of time invested in TQM has been directly proportional to 
the priority placed on it by the leader of the command,” Commander Art Crostick 
declares.  “Without the command’s strong backing and motivation it’s very, very 
difficult.”  Indeed, coordinators who had not garnered strong support from their 
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flag officers reported such problems as poor attendance at training sessions, the 
inability to agree on process improvements, and widespread cynicism among 
both the enlisted and officer ranks. 
 For commands whose leaders had embraced TQM, however, the 
looseness of the Coast Guard’s implementation plan allowed for flexibility and 
innovation.  TQM coordinator Captain James Ingham, for example, led the Fifth 
District in an intensive TQM rollout, which took the Coast Guard’s standard plan 
as just a starting point.  In the first three months of the implementation, Ingham 
met regularly with his district admiral and chief of staff, contracted with a local 
quality management institution for additional training and resources, nagged 
senior officers to read books on quality, and arranged for Executive Steering 
Committee members and other senior officers to attend quality management 
seminars in addition to their three-day ODI training. 
 With the chief of staff’s blessings, Ingham convinced each of the district’s 
six division officers to assign a lieutenant to serve on a special Quality Process 
Advocate team to tackle the many nuts-and-bolts issues of the implementation.  
In addition, Ingham solicited four volunteers from the Executive Steering 
Committee to form a Design Group, a sub-committee that would do additional 
research, visit other organizations’ quality programs, and report back to the 
committee on processes and topics to be addressed.  In order to keep the middle 
layer of the organization involved, Ingham sent 45 mid-level officers off-site for a 
half-day TQM briefing, followed by a brainstorming session.  The 111 ideas 
generated there were later narrowed down by the Design Group and the 
Executive Steering Committee to arrive at the first seven ideas for QAT process 
improvements.  In June, seven facilitators began training QAT team members, 
and then expanded the training to the rest of the organization.  
 By October, nine months after Ingham had set to work, all 28- members of 
the district staff were trained and participated in a natural work group, seven 
QATs had been chartered, and the district was preparing to export TQM to the 
field.  “Islands of excellence are the way to start off,” Ingham declares.  “Some 
 117 
commander somewhere will get fired up by this, produce some results, and then 
his peers will see that the risk is relatively low.  Only after you have a few islands 
of excellence do you try to import it back into the center of the organization and 
make it happen there.” 
 The Fifth District was not alone in its impressive TQM debut.  One unit and 
an area-level division, after implementing TQM, had demonstrated enough 
overall process improvements to be named in October as finalists in the 
Secretary of Transportation’s First Annual Quality Award.  “We’ve been criticized 
by people who have since turned out to be the laggards: ‘Tell me what to do and 
I’ll do it, and I’ll do it very well,’” Captain Houle recounts.  “Those folks were left 
behind for a while, but it allowed the real innovators – the chargers – to surge 
ahead.”  Adds consultant Dennen: “If we had tried to push any harder, the Coast 
Guard would have pushed back and killed it.” 
 By late spring 1992, the Coast Guard had fulfilled its goal of training the 
top five percent of Coast Guard management ahead of schedule.  Most field 
units, however, still had not formally introduced TQM. 
 
7. Successes 
 With the second year of implementation well underway, the Quality 
Management Branch began collecting TQM success stories.  A QAT convened to 
improve the often inefficient and delay-plagued process of repairing the Coast 
Guard’s largest ships made recommendations that resulted in a 44 percent 
reduction in lost operational days for the Atlantic area’s 32 cutters, saving about 
$4 million a year.  A team at the Coast Guard Yard in Curtis Bay, Maryland, 
charged with investigating unexplained excess water usage discovered winter 
freeze protection valves mistakenly left open all year.  Closing the valves during 
the summer cut daily water consumption by 47 percent, and was expected to 
save over 40 million gallons of water annually. 
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 A natural work group in the Office of Personnel, looking to cut the cost of 
the “sea bags” given initial recruits, discovered the some clothing and personal 
care items were wasted because recruits usually preferred to supply their own.  
By eliminating the military issue underwear, and a few other unpopular items, the 
group estimated it would save $250,000 a year.  The Reserve Training Center in 
Yorktown, Virginia, relied on QAT recommendations to revamp how it prepared 
students for and administered a military requirements test, raising the initial pass 
rate from about 50 percent to 85 percent.  In addition, the Coast Guard 
incorporated TQM methods into studies on boarding procedures, healthcare 
delivery, and work life, as well as a new programming, planning, budgeting, and 
evaluation system.  
 By May 1992, when the commandant presented the Coast Guard’s 1993 
fiscal year budget request to the US Senate Subcommittee on Transportation 
and Related Agencies, he was able to cite some of these successes as proof of 
the service’s pledge to provide more with less.  “We have committed ourselves to 
improving our performance as the world’s leading maritime humanitarian and 
safety organization,” Admiral Kime declared, “and intend to give the American 
public the greatest possible return on its investment in the form of high-quality 
service.” 
 There were also less heralded improvements.  At headquarters, many 
people were most impressed not by the stories of specific money- or resource-
saving innovations, but by the fact that people were talking to each other.  The 
increase in communication was slowly changing how things got done.  Deputy 
chief of staff Captain Howard Gehring offers this example: 
 Three years ago, if we were going to have a meeting on a particular topic, 
we would have brought in people with opinions similar to ours.  But under the 
TQM process, we have dialogue going on among groups that never, ever talked 
about issues across the boundaries.  The net result is that rather than having a 
fix put into place based on the strength and personality of the person who called 
the meeting, and that would only live as long as that person was there to beat the 
system into submission, you now are putting into place something that will 
endure.  Through a process of inclusion you have a long-term solution. 
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 In those field units where TQM had taken hold, advocates of the process 
seemed similarly impressed by the little changes.  “The true, clear win success 
stories are going to be changes that are made on the margin – the little small 
things,” muses Lieutenant Thomas Beistle, TQM coordinator for Marine Safety 
Office Port Arthur.  “It’s kind of Zen.  Let’s make tiny, subtle process changes that 
will save us a paper clip, or save us from routing through on in-box that we don’t 




 But enthusiasm for TQM was by no means universal, either at 
headquarters or in the field.  Some critics charged that the problems QATs were 
chartered to attack were too large.  Others claimed they were too often 
insignificant.  “To be very honest,” one officer confides, “when I read the reports 
that come out of headquarters about the successes of TQM, I see that the 
examples are very shallow.” 
 Many agency members questioned how the Coast Guard was 
implementing TQM.  According to some critics, heavy-handed TQM enthusiasts 
were trying to enforce style changes that had nothing to do with substance.  
Captain Art Whiting, commander of the Marine Safety Office in Tampa, Florida, 
angrily describes how a young officer who volunteered to become the unit’s TQM 
facilitator “failed” the training.  “He went through twice,” Whiting exclaims.  “Just 
because he wasn’t open enough to jump on desks and scream and shout, they 
wouldn’t certify him as a facilitator and he didn’t pass.”  Adds on frustrated 
admiral:  “Our leadership is making a gigantic mistake on TQM.  There is a 
hunger for more knowledge and more tools.   But when I’ve gone to these TQM 
sessions, they’re presenting what should be a prerequisite for Management 101 
like it’s the Holy Grail.” 
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 Others challenged whether the Coast Guard leadership was really 
following the principles it espoused.  Lieutenant Junior Grade Laura Pearson, 
who served on a natural work group asked to reorganize a division within the 
Office of Personnel and Training at headquarters, became disillusioned after 
senior officers suggested that the group alter its recommendations, a violation of 
the basic tenets of participatory decision-making.  “Some of the people in the 
group didn’t see what was happening, but I certainly did,” she says.  “If they were 
just telling us to have a brainstorming session and come up with some 
suggestions, and then they’d mold it into what they wanted, that would have been 
one thing.  But to call it TQM bothered me.  And they do.  The still talk about that 
as one of their success stories.” 
 There were other process-oriented criticisms.  The Coast Guard’s military-
style, top-down implementation, and the widespread focus on QATs rather than 
natural work groups, had reinforced the oft-held belief among lower level officers 
and enlistees that their input and reactions weren’t important.  Roger Monyhan of 
Marine Safety Office Port Arthur, commissioned as a chief warrant officer after 17 
years in the enlisted ranks, says he was “ready to be convinced” of TQM’s worth, 
but remained skeptical.  “I would say at the field level and the enlisted person 
level, the feeling is that it’s just some officer’s idea, and we just have to go do it.” 
Captain Paul Garrity, commanding officer of Air Station Cape Cod in 
Massachusetts, adds this perspective: “We have spend upwards of $5 million in 
our organization to introduce about seven percent of our people to the real inner 
workings and hidden mechanisms of TQM, and the rest of the people are on the 
outside.  The majority of the people in the Coast Guard looking at TQM think it 
has decoder rings and secret handshakes and buzzwords that only those chosen 
few have seen.” 
 Finally, a lack of regular feedback on TQM matters had left some 
coordinators, facilitators and team members feeling isolated and uninformed.  As 
originally envisioned, a sophisticated Coast Guard-wide electronic bulletin board 
was to have linked coordinators by providing a centralized system for sharing 
information, articles, and anecdotes about their TQM implementation 
experiences.  In fact, the “TQM Implementation Guidebook” specifically stressed 
the importance of communication.  “The overlay cannot operate without general 
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awareness of the types of processes and problems receiving attention 
throughout the Coast Guard . . . “  However, the computer link, which one caption 
described as “the unpopular, dysfunctional bulletin board,” still had not worked 
properly.  Instead, the Quality Management Branch relied on an existing 
electronic-mail system to make sporadic TQM announcements. 
 IPT-2 concluded its work on July 1992.  In its final report, the committee 
made several recommendations, including the creation of a full-time quality 
advisor reporting to the commandant, a concept first raised by IPT-1. “This 
position . . . is critical to the continuing institutionalization of Total Quality 
Management throughout the Coast Guard,” the report concluded, “and it sends 
the right signal.” The report also urged that the Coast Guard keep ODI as a 
consultant to the Quality Council at this “very critical juncture” in its TQM 
evaluation. 
 At the IPT-2 closeout ceremony, Admiral Kime reiterated his strong 
support for TQM: 
 “There are four stages to TQM: The first is “Awakening.”  We’ve just gotten 
out of that stage.  The second one is “Activity.” That’s where we are right now.  
Third is “Breakthrough,” and the fourth is “World-Class.”  In my travels around the 
Coast Guard, I’ve seen and heard the “Awakening.”  In most places it’s been like 
a “general quarters” alarm; in a few it’s been like a “hibernating bear.”  But 
summer comes even for a hibernating bear.” 
 “For those of you who don’t know me . . . if I’m nothing else, I am 
persistent, I am dogged, I don’t change, I don’t get tired, and I can’t be swayed 
from where I honestly think I want to go unless someone has a good reason.  I 
don’t see a reason for changing one iota from where we’re going with TQM.” 
 
9. The View at the Top 
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 Almost no one at Coast Guard headquarters questioned Kime’s 
commitment to making the TQM implementation succeed.  The Commandant’s 
Bulletin, a monthly magazine for the entire Coast Guard, featured regular 
commentary by Kime on the TQM implementation.  After deciding that personally 
appearing at headquarters training sessions was too time-consuming, Kime 
circulated a half-hour video in which he spoke extemporaneously on TQM issues 
and answered audience questions.  TQM was one of the first topics Kime 
addressed in his 1992 State of the Coast Guard address.  And the commandant 
had begun lecturing on TQM to other government agencies interested in the 
management approach, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  “He never 
missed an opportunity to talk about TQM,” says Captain Houle, head of IPT-2 
and the Plans and Policy Division. 
 But the level of support among the other flag officers was much less 
certain.  Although most admirals back TQM in public, in private, some spoke out 
against the concept.  “Those people who want to be part of the very upper level 
management in the Coast Guard have embraced Kime’s attitude, whether they 
agree, or not,” states Captain Paul Garrity of Air Station Cape Cod.  “If you’re not 
a proponent, you must be an opponent, and if you’re an opponent, you’re going 
to be released from the organization.”  According to consultant Dennen, only 40 
to 50 percent of the admirals were truly committed to TQM.  The remaining 50 to 
60 percent were “all over the map,” he says, “from counter-revolutionaries trying 
to fight each other, or complete apathy, to ‘I’ll play along until Admiral Kime is 
replaced.’”  Two admirals were even said to have cited TQM as a reason for 
retirement. 
 The unevenness of senior backing was not lost on those below.  One 
coordinator, noting that TQM required the active support and involvement of the 
top brass, complained about the shallowness of senior manager training, likening 
it to “trying top dip your big toe in the pool when it is time to start swimming some 
laps.”  A district chief of staff griped that the flag officers weren’t obeying basic 
TQM processes at their own meetings.  Some observers at headquarters even 
described Kime, despite his demonstrated commitment, as “not very TQM-ish” in 
his management style and treatment of personnel. 
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 But Captain Houle wanted more.  In a memo to the chief of staff, one 
month after IPT-2 dissolved, he again raised the issue of a dedicated quality 
advisor: 
 “The Commandant needs a TQM conscience.  Even if the Quality Council 
picks up a proactive, driving role in TQM, that won’t be enough . . . a high level, 
continuous and dedicated focus on, and focusing of, TQM is needed.”  
 At its November 1992 meeting, the Quality Council took Houle’s advice 
and approved the new position of a quality advisor reporting directly to Admiral 
Kime and overseeing the Quality Management Branch.  Soon after, council 
chose Captain James Ingham, who had already made a mark as TQM 
coordinator for the Fifth District, to fill the post.  According to the vice 
commandant, Vice Admiral Robert Nelson, “We want somebody who can go in 
and talk to the commandant on a regular basis and say to him, ‘You have to do 
this, you have to say this, these are your options to move TQM forward.’”  Houle, 
who supported Ingham for the quality advisor job, declares in a matter-of-fact 
aside, “Jim Ingham stands probably 50 percent chance of being fired because 
he’s more outspoken and less tactful than I am.” 
 Ingham, for his part, saw his mission clearly:  “The most important 
challenge right now is to get TQM to be successful for headquarters.  If we’re not 
perceived as being successful at headquarters, then future leaders will cut it out.” 
 
10. Two Years of TQM 
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 As the Coast Guard finished its second year of TQM implementation and 
started its third, those tracking TQM began taking stock.  While no one claimed 
that the agency had achieved the “routine TQM maintenance phase” foreseen by 
IPT-1, many of the goals articulated almost two years earlier had, in fact, been 
realized.   A “critical mass” of the Coast Guard has been trained; the Leadership 
Institute had accepted its first class students in October; and the structural 
overlay, with its network of teams and groups, was largely in place.  About a third 
of the Coast Guard was implementing TQM aggressively, consultant Dennen 
estimated, while another third was mixed, and a final third was “still tied up at the 
dock.”  TQM coordinator Lieutenant Commander Carl Bromund was hopeful.  “I 
would say the first two years set the stage,” he says.  “We had a lot of activity 
and not many results.  Now we’re starting to get it.” 
 But despite the progress, a number of stubborn barriers remained.  
Although improved customer focus was a basic tenet of TQM, the agency’s 
multiple missions left many in the Coast Guard confused about who its 
customers were, and how it was supposed to serve them.  At headquarters, the 
issue was particularly clouded.  The Coast Guard interacted with groups 
including recreational boaters, fishermen, environmentalists, Congress, and the 
American Public. But most personnel based at headquarters were several steps 
removed from such external customers.  Instead, said Captain Ingham, the new 
quality advisor, headquarters needed to think about serving the rest of the Coast 
Guard: 
 The old paradigm in the Coast Guard was that the commandant and all the 
little commandants working for him considered themselves the most important 
people in the Coast Guard.  Along comes this philosophy that says, no, no, no, 
the most important person is the customer.  And guess who that is? It’s the 
people in the Coast Guard who are out in the field.  You talk about a paradigm 
shift!  All of a sudden the most important people are not in headquarters, the 
most important people are out in the field.  The question is are folds at 
headquarters going to be able to make that shift.  
 Even in the field, the question of how to “serve” customers was 
problematic.  “Some of the missions we do are diametrically opposed,” explains 
Captain Garrity of Air Station Cape Cod.  “The fisherman loves to see us when 
he’s sinking, but hates to see us when he’s out there trawling through the water 
with the wrong mesh size on his net catching small fish.  Do we wear a white 
hate or a black hat with these guys?” 
 Measurement was another sticking point.  IPT-1 has recommended a 
baseline organizational assessment as the first step in creating new measures.  
But flag officers voted against conducting the study, in part because they were 
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angered by the results of a pre-TQM survey criticizing the quality of the Coast 
Guard leadership.  Without the baseline assessment, it became more difficult to 
measure the TQM implementation process, let along to assess how the Coast 
Guard was doing with its basic operational missions.  “We don’t have real good 
measurements right now as to how well we’re doing.” Admits Vice Admiral 
Nelson.  
 In June 1992, the Measurement Quality Action Team chartered by IPT-2 
has presented its measurement plan.  Although the team had spent almost a 
year in its presentation, team leader Captain Marafioti acknowledged that the 
plan was just a start, recommending a standard measurement-training program, 
and suggesting the kinds of questions that the Coast Guard needed to be asking 
itself.   Captain Ingham, the new quality advisor, worried that such questions 
should have been asked sooner.  “Measurement is really part of an integrated 
philosophy,” he says, “and it needs to be embedded in how we do our process 
improvements, not a separate activity that – now we’re going to start measuring.” 
 Finally, many observers felt that how the Coast Guard evaluated people 
and what behaviors it rewarded needed to be changed if TQM was to take root.  
According to TQM coordinator Bromund, senior officers viewed from below as 
“anti-TQM” were still moving up through the system.  “We have a lot of bright 
people in this outfit,” he says, “and they’re watching like hawks to see what gets 
rewarded.”  Adds one captain:  “We still have profound Coast Guard systems that 
are anti-TQM.” 
 Even the most ardent supporters agreed that a great deal of effort lay 
ahead.  “There is a tremendous cost in terms of time,” says deputy chief of staff 
Captain Howard Gehring:  “You’re keeping two ways of business going at once.  
We’re spending a lot of time nurturing, bringing along, cajoling, convincing, and 
making things work.”  Commander Scott Allen, a TQM enthusiast who had seen 
all 215 members at Group Port Angeles in Washington trained by December 
1991, only to have 77 new people – most with no training – transferred in the 
next year agrees.  Although the management philosophy had come advertised as 
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a five-year program, Allen says, “Our general consensus is that it will probably 
take a full Coast Guard generation, which is 20 years.” 
 
11. TQM After Admiral Kime 
 With two years of TQM implementation completed, Admiral Kime prepared 
to push hard for further gains.  According to a draft of the Quality Council’s plan 
for Year Three, the ongoing effort would focus on three major goals:  streamlining 
and simplifying the program, and saturating the Coast Guard with TQM.  “There 
will be less and less freedom,” observes chief of staff Rear Admiral Robert 
Kramek, who nevertheless insists that the Coast Guard’s early focus on fast 
results had been fruitful.  “Washington lives year-to-year, but this is a long-term 
project,” he adds.  “It’s hard to sustain long-term projects in the government 
without some quick successes.” 
 But it was less clear what would happen after the third year of 
implementation:  In the spring of 1994, Admiral Kime would be stepping down.  
“We see a new commandant every few years, a new president every few years, 
a new Congressman every couple of years, and we weather the storm,” observes 
Commander Joe Brusseau, chief of the Inspection Department at the Marine 
Safety Office in Long Beach, California.  “People start to feel, well, in four years it 
will be something else.  Hanging TQM and all those three-letter acronyms out 
there is bound to elicit that response.” 
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 Kime insisted that the Coast Guard would stick with its quality program.  “I 
think our chances of success on a scale of one to ten are about eight-and-a-half 
right now,” he declares.  More significantly, perhaps, senior officials agreed that 
the four admirals considered most likely to succeed Kime were all supporters of a 
quality management program.  “The people who are not supporters will not 
compete well for the commandant position.” Ingham, the incoming quality 
advisor, asserts.  “I predict the name may change.  But the content of what we’re 
embarked on will not change.  That will be a steady maturing process.  And 
heaven help this country if it isn’t.  If we abandon the emphasis on quality, then 
we will be a nation in decline.”   
 TQM coordinator Lieutenant Commander Bromund echoed Ingham’s 
statement.  Bromund still harbored doubts about how the Coast Guard was 
implementing TQM.  But he embraced TQM as the service’s best hope for the 
future.  “If you look ahead and see all the things we have to do, it’s very 
discouraging,” he says.  “But if you look back and see the things that we’ve done, 
there is clearly a change in the organization.” 
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APPENDIX C: BUSINESS PROCESS TRANSFORMATION AT 
THE CIA 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The following text is an excerpt from “Business Process Transformation at 
the CIA” authored by Steven Kelman (1999a, 1999b, 1999c). 
 
B. BUSINESS PROCESS TRANSFORMATION AT THE CIA (A) 
1. Introduction 
  Casual visitors to the spacious, airy cafeteria at the headquarters of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in suburban Langley, Virginia, could easily 
imagine they were at the site of a large high-tech company in the Silicon Valley 
or, for that matter, at one of the many large high-tech firms in surrounding Fairfax 
County.  Employees line up behind brightly signed areas offering Mexican, 
Chinese, or soup and salad.  Some with beards and scraggly hair, many in jeans 
or tee shirts, others in suits and tires, many women and a smattering of people of 
color, they are on the whole younger than the workforce in most federal 
government agencies.  Many of the tables are scenes of animated conversation.  
 Closer inspection, however, reveals differences from the typical 
government, or private, cafeteria.  If you are in the building on a visitor’s red 
badge – rather than being a “blue badger” (employee) or “green badger” 
(contractor who’s received a security clearance) – somebody with the appropriate 
blue or green badge must accompany you at all times, even if you need to make 
a restroom visit.  The eating area is dotted with discreet signs reading, 
“UNCLEARED VISITORS IN AREA,” as a reminder to those who are undercover 
that they need to be careful because of the red badgers around.  
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 The same observation could be made about many of the administrative 
services provided in support of the CIA’s mission of intelligence-gathering, 
analysis, and covert operations.  The services themselves are a familiar litany – 
finance, logistics (moving materials to people who need them), personnel, 
telecommunications, information technology, training, medial and security.  
Often, however, there is something about the service that separates it from the 
garden variety.  Some logistics involve sending off-the-shelf police equipment to 
the American embassy; other times, however, the shipment contains highly 
classified high-tech gear, or something to be used in support of a covert 
operation in a place with no embassy.  Similarly, some doctors provide routine 
physical exams for new Agency hires; other times, the CIA needs doctors abroad 
who can treat injured officers operating undercover or psychologists in the US 
who can treat officers with psychological problems.  Even something as 
apparently straightforward as buying airline tickets can have a special Agency 
twist: when an employee is working undercover for another US government 
agency, part of protecting the cover is to make sure the ticket looks as if it were 
bought the same way tickets are bought for employees of that other agency. 
 Individually, the support services the CIA provides sound mundane.  But 
taken together, they cost a good deal of money – about 30 percent of the 
Agency’s budget – and are essential to the CIA’s ability to do its job.  
 
2. Administrative Services at the CIA 
Traditionally, the provision of administrative services at the CIA was 
organized the same way as in the vast majority of government organizations (and 
in most private businesses as well).  The CIA had three major mission-oriented 
divisions (or “directorates”): 
• The Directorate of Operations (DO), responsible for intelligence-gathering 
done by humans, and for covert operations.  This was the Agency’s elite 
corps, their “fighter pilots” (to use the expression of one insider), who did 
the risky, swashbuckling jobs. 
• The Directorate of Intelligence (DI), responsible for analyzing intelligence 
from both secret and public sources and producing reports, estimates, and 
recommendations.  These were the Agency’s analysts, often with PhDs, 
who ran an intelligence version of a think tank. 
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• The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), responsible for 
intelligence-gathering using technical means such as satellite monitoring 
or other forms of eavesdropping.  
Alongside these directorates stood a fourth, the Directorate of 
Administration (DA), which provided support services to the other three.   The DA 
was funded by an appropriation earmarked for it, and provided services to the 
mission directorates at no charge to them.  The DA has about fifteen offices, 
which managed administrative services such as personnel, training, information 
technology, and logistics.  The DA also employed hundreds of support officers 
who were physically located in the mission directorates and who helped those 
directorates obtain services from the DA.  (See Exhibit 1 for CI organization 
chart.) 
During most of the 1990s, the CIA budget was under relentless pressure.  
There were two reasons.  One was general spending cutbacks to reduce the 
massive budget deficits plaguing the country since the early 1980s.  The second 
was the winding down and then the end of the Cold War during the second of the 
1980s, which, at least initially, led some to believe there would be reduced 
demand for the CIA’s services.   
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As in most government agencies, when presidential and congressional 
budgeters sneezed at the Agency’s budget, the budget for administrative 
services caught the flu.  Although in principle everyone recognized that, without 
support services, the mission-oriented directorates could not do their jobs, 
nonetheless the provision of telephones, training, or travel by what others 
regarded as green-eyeshaded, pencil-pushing types hardly ranked in glamour 
with developing sophisticated new listening devices or risking one’s life running a 
covert operation in some remote part of the world.  So the DA was the lowest-
status of the four directorates.  Add to this the perspective of many in the 
mission-oriented directorates that the DA was a cesspool of waste (whose 
services, to add insult to injury, were sometimes seen as being of pool quality), 
and it’s easy to see why the DA, year after year, receive a disproportionate share 
of Agency budget cuts.  Between fiscal years 1991 and 2000, the DA suffered an 
actual dollar cutback of over 30 percent (the inflation-adjusted cutback was of 
course higher).  
The general view of the other directorates was that if the DA were not so 
incompetent, it could easily provide needed services at the reduced budget 
levels.  In the view of the other directorates, what the DA needed to do was to cut 
its costs – how it did so was its job to figure out.   And within the DA, an observer 
notes, the attitude was, “Woe is us, nobody understands our problems.”  DA 
people also felt that the mission directorates, in the words of one, had 
“outrageous needs” and an excessive “standard of living.”  As another puts it, 
“The view was that arrogant mission managers with no understanding of the 
problems beat up on a beleaguered DA.” 
In 1996 the DA embarked on a radical journey.  As a solution for its 
budget and responsiveness problems, the DA proposed to give its budget back 
to the mission directorates and to sell its services to those directorates, in 
competition with commercial (or even other government agency) providers.  The 
DA would exchange the security of its status as a monopoly provider for the 
uncertainty of competition.  
 
3. Enter Dick Calder 
The DA’s radical new strategy was the brainchild of Dick Calder, the new 
head of the directorate.  Calder had spent most of his career abroad, as a DO 
case officer, rather well-known and quite well-respected within the Agency.  In 
1991, as part of a normal rotation, he came back to headquarters to take a staff 
job in charge of human resources management in the DO.  While on that job, 
Calder had written a draft “strategic plan” on adapting the Agency’s mission to 
the post-Cold War world.  With its emphasis on new priorities for intelligence-
gathering and new sources of intelligence, as well as its discussion of the 
Agency’s need to have a better understanding of how it was spending its money 
and what bank its “customers” in the White House and the national security 
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community were getting from the different ways it was spending its bucks, the 
plan was controversial and never got adopted.  “People didn’t see the old DO 
anywhere in the plan,” Calder recalls.  “It was too different from where they 
were.” 
In 1995 Calder announced his retirement.  But just around this time the 
head of the DA was retiring, and John Deutch, then Director of Central 
Intelligence, asked Calder to stay and take over the DA.  The DO, Calder’s 
home, was the largest user of DA-provided services.  Calder had been a critic of 
the DA, which he regarded as unresponsive to users.  Deutch told Calder that 
having someone at the DA with a user perspective would shake up the 
directorates at a time when it was being both cut and criticized.  Calder was 
intrigued by the challenge of having a case officer run the DA, and he accepted.  
Deutch’s marching orders were the same as for Calder’s predecessor: find ways 
to deliver administrative services less expensively (to prevent service cutbacks in 
a time of declining budgets) and more effectively at the same time.  
Calder brought with him to the DA only one outsider, Jim Grayson, 
another DO veteran who had worked in the same region as Calder but never at 
the same station.  Grayson had made some enemies while overseas because of 
his blunt, outspoken manner and criticisms of the DO post-Cold Ware status quo.  
At the DA, Grayson worked out of Calder’s office, but had not title.  (“I don’t 
believe in titles,” he says.) 
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Calder’s first step, in response to direction from Deutch for the DA to 
examine how it did business, was to set up a task force to stuffy the DA’s existing 
costs for its operations, with the goal of either finding opportunities for cost-
cutting or (if everything was found to be in order) to be able better to justify the 
directorate’s budget.  That task force came upon an accounting technique, 
originally developed by Harvard Business School professor Robert Kaplan, called 
“activity-based costing” (ABC), a methodology that allowed companies to learn 
how various indirect costs should be assigned to a company’s different activities 
or products.  Calder decided he needed to bring ABC to the DA.   
Everybody in the DA agreed that getting a handle on costs through ABC 
was a good idea.  “The original plan,” says a DA manager who would become a 
strong critic of Calder’s direction, “was, let’s find a way to articulate our costs to 
our customers, so that the customers understood that we didn’t have some pot of 
money buried somewhere.” 
So far, it seemed as if Calder were treading along a pretty traditional path.  
But, in private conversations with Grayson, a far more radical brew was 
beginning to ferment.  Both had become enamored of ideas about customer 
service coming out of the total quality management movement and of anti-
bureaucratic, “shake things up” prescriptions of the 1980s and 1990s literature on 
corporate management.  Grayson in particular was struck by the contradiction 
between the free market principles on whose behalf the CIA fought the Cold 
Ware and the monopoly, command-and-control organization of the CIA both 
externally with its intelligence “customers” (such as the White House, the 
Defense Department, and the State Department) and internally between the 
mission directorates and the DA.  While the two of them had been at the DO, 
they had toyed with the idea of giving intelligence customers what they playfully 
called “Dulles dollars” (after Allen Dulles, the legendary one-time CIA Director) 
that they could use to buy intelligence or analysis from either the CIA or another 
agency in the intelligence community (such as the Defense Intelligence Agency 
in the Defense Department).  Soon after the pair arrived at the DA, they began 
playing with the idea of introducing such an approach there.  DA service 
providers would give back their budgets to the mission directorates.  Those 
directorates would decide how much of a service they wanted to use and whom 
they would buy it from.  
In Calder’s mind, the idea of the DA giving up its budget and monopoly 
status had two attractions.  The first was that competition would encourage the 
DA to provide better quality services at lower costs (or it would lose the 
business).  The prospect of losing money that keep an operation afloat would 
concentrate the mind on cost savings and customer service.  The second was 
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that it would make the mission directorates co-responsible for thinking about how 
to deal with the shrinking Agency administrative service budget (since they would 
not have an incentive to reduce unnecessary demand for services because they 
were paying for them instead of getting them “for free”).  So budget “giveback” 
would change both DA and customer behavior.  “This was a way,” an early 
support puts it, “both to satisfy customers and still leave the DA a viable entity.  
To a DA used to the security (albeit, with budget cuts, a shrinking security) 
of an appropriated budget and monopoly service provider status, this notation 
was sure to be, at the least a lot to swallow.  Calder realized that if any of this 
was every going to succeed, he had a massive task of organizational change 
management on his hands. So, as a first step, he did what many organizational 
leaders do when they want to get a process of change going.  In May 1996, he 
called an offsite meeting for DA office directors at the Wye River Plantation, a 
facility in Maryland owned by the Aspen Institute (and several years later the 
locale for the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations), and brought in a facilitator, 
Jim O’Toole, a one-time university professor affiliated with the institute and 
author of a bestseller called Leading Change. The topic was what kinds of 
changes were necessary for the DA in its new environment. 
As in most such meetings, lots of different ideas were tossed around.  The 
office directors did a fair amount of complaining about how they were 
misunderstood and expressed the hope that the ABC process would help them 
demonstrate to the mission directorates that the DA wasn’t a bloated 
bureaucracy.  But amidst the cacophony, Grayson in particular was vocal about 
the DA’s need to abandon its monopoly status and subject itself to the test of the 
marketplace.  “It was interesting,” a critic says, “that Grayson did more talking 
than anyone else in the group even though he had no experience in the DA.”  “It  
was clear,” another attendee states,” that Jim’s agenda was that all the money 
should be given back to customers.  None of the office directorates agreed.  Dick 
Calder was noncommittal.  
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In August a glossy booklet called The River House Report appeared to 
“summarize” the conclusions of the Wye retreat.  Grayson was its author.  By 
general account, it reflected what one sympathetic attendee calls “Jim and Dick’s 
rendition of what came out of the offsite.”  “The office directors developed a draft 
discussion document based on the Wye meeting,” remembers one attendee.  
“Then Dick decided to give it to Jim ‘finish up.’ What came out wasn’t coordinated 
within the directorate. 
Looked at with hindsight, the document, although obviously considered 
very radical at the time, had a strange ambiguity to it.  It was, to be sure, 
unrelenting in its commitment to the need for change. “Simply put,” it said, “we’ve 
grown complacent.  That’s a tough word.  It means that we haven’t kept up well 
enough.  Yes, we’ve changed, changed a lot.  But . . . the difficulty is that the 
world around us is changing faster.” 
The document also clearly introduced the idea that the DA might have to 
complete for customer business.  “Competition is a new word in our setting.  But 
it’s not a pejorative word.  We know about it and we welcome it elsewhere – 
indeed it’s the central theme of our economic system.” 
However, The River House Report never came out and said explicitly that 
the DA would give back its budget to the mission directorates.  It presented 
competition as one prong in a two-part over-arching strategy the document 
summarized with the phrases, “We will be out customers’ ‘provider of choice,’” 
and “we will be – now and future – an ‘employer of choice.”  It continued: 
Because our people and our customers have choices, and the more the 
better, they will know that we can and will provide the best working environment 
and the best service available.  Our customers will increasingly value what we do  
because they will be choosing us over others, making choices that value what we 
do, and spurring us on to be better and better because we want to keep them as 
customers.   
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The document also mentioned – as part of a subordinate clause referring 
to development of a “business ethic” – moving “into a competitive, internal 
marketplace where warranted or to better manage services we provide centrally.” 
And it did announce that “we will begin a yearly process of selecting two or three 
business areas for competition . . . for implementation in [fiscal year] 1999.” 
To be sure, it would have not have been difficult to infer that, if customers 
were to have a choice of providers, they would of necessity need control over the 
budget money for services in order to exercise such choices.  But The River 
House Report never specifically put two and two together. 
 
4. “The Burning Platform” 
In October 1996, Calder established a Business Process Transformation 
Program Office (BPTPO), reporting directly to him, to “help” the offices undertake 
activity-based costing.  Calder chose a DA manager, Paul Ericson, who had run 
the Office of Training and Education, to head the new office.  It was an 
interesting choice, since Ericson was an abrasive, controversial figure (“the most 
disliked program director in the DA” according to one critic).  Word got out that 
Ericson had been given marching orders to be a “junkyard dog” vis-<-vis the 
offices. Interestingly, as if to distance himself from Ericson’s hard-charging style, 
Calder placed the office on the sixth floor of another building, rather than in his 
director’s area on the seventh floor of the main building.  (Later, when Calder 
established a small staff unit to help offices deal with technical issues involving 
transition to non-appropriated status, he placed that office right near him).  The 
consulting/accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand was brought in to help BPTPO 
help the officers with ABC.  
While the offices were getting stated on ABC, Calder was deciding that he 
definitely wanted to move on to the next phase.  Having by this time been 
through a budget cycle as head of the DA, he had gotten a stronger appreciation 
for how desperate the directorate’s budget situation was.  “Originally,” Calder 
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recalls, “in my mind a lot of this was about providing better service to the 
customers.  I now fully appreciated that the DA needed to do this to survive.” 
So Ericson got to work figuring out how specifically to implement giveback.  
ABC was of course an important first step, since if an office’s services went up 
for sale, and had to be funded through payments from customers rather than 
appropriated funds, the operation would need to know what its costs were so it 
knew what to charge.  But there was an important next step as well:  the 
development, by offices destined for competition, of business plans that showed 
how they would improve, tailor, and market their services against likely 
commercial competitors so as to be able to survive without appropriated funds.  
In early 1997, the Coopers & Lybrand contract was expanded to include 
assistance in developing business plans for the offices Calder selected for the 
first giveback pilots.  
During these months, Calder’s team also came upon two new ideas that 
allowed them to give more flesh to their plan.  One was the idea of franchising, 
which Ericson learned about at the website of Vice President Al Gore’s 
“reinventing government” program. Under the franchising concept, one agency 
was authorized to sell its services to another agency, so that, for example, the 
Department of Agriculture got into the business of processing payroll checks for 
other government organizations.  In one case, an agency, had successfully bid 
against private vendors to win a contract to manage another agency’s data 
centers.  Franchising was appealing to Calder because it added a carrot for the 
DA in addition to the stick of losing appropriated funds.  The carrot was the 
prospect of gaining new revenue by selling DA services to other agencies in the 
intelligence and diplomatic communities (who, for example, could be better at 
helping the State Department retool embassies against terrorism?).  
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The other idea, which Calder first learned about from an Agency officer on 
a Harvard sabbatical, was “working capital funds.”  This is a mechanism federal 
agencies use for operations not financed through appropriations.  Working capital 
funds receive payments for services rendered, typically to other parts of the 
working capital fund’s organization, or to other government organizations.  The 
money is used to pay the operation’s expenses; but unlike appropriated funds, 
which generally expire at the end of a fiscal year and have to be returned to the 
Treasury if unspent, money in a working capital fund can stay there indefinitely, 
so that, hypothetically, for example, surpluses could be “invested” in trying to 
market the operation’s services to new customers.  Working capital funds had 
been set up in the State Department, the Defense Department, the Energy 
Department, and a number of other federal agencies.  When he learned about 
the existence of working capital funds, Calder realized there was an established 
government institutional mechanism for implementing the giveback idea. 
It was now time to spring the plan on the troops.  At the end of 1996, 
Calder held a series of town meetings with employees over a two-month period 
to talk about his goals for business process transformation in the DA.  The 
remarks he gave to start off the town meetings became known as the “burning 
platform” speech, because, to communicate a sense of crisis, Calder stated that 
the DA was perched on a burning platform. 
The briefing charts Calder used, government-style, for his speech were 
blunt and direct – and peppered with various quotes from management experts 
about the need for radical changes in the way large organizations were run.  
(See Exhibit 2 for selected briefing charges.) They announced a “Fundamental 
Shift”: the “support budget [would be] transferred to customer/mission 
managers.”  Summarizes Calder, “My messages was, ‘We have no choice.’” 
The reaction to the burning platform speech was fairly unanimous.  What 
had been somewhat vague talk about a few pilots had become a new order for 
the entire directorate.  “There was active opposition,” Calder recalls.  “People 
thought we were crazy.  There was a very confrontational atmosphere.” His two 
deputies announced their opposition.  Only one of the office directors supported 
him.  “Dick was alone,” states one observer.  “Jim was an outsider.  Paul was 
inside, but he was controversial.” 
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 5. Gaining Outside Support 
To establish a working capital fund, the CIA needed congressional 
approval.  In early 1997, Calder and Ericson went to the Office of Management 
and Budget to get administration endorsement for language in the upcoming CIA 
reauthorization bill allowing such a fund to be set up, and then to the 
congressional authorizing committees that would need to approve the idea.  In 
their visits, they were accompanied by the chief legislative liaison in the CIA 
Office of the General Counsel.  (Mary Sturtevant, the Agency’s new comptroller, 
or chief financial/budget official, and a support of Calder’s ideas, helped Calder to 
get the legislative liaison to go with them downtown.) However, the idea had not 
been subject to the inter-directorate clearance process that new legislative 
proposals affecting more than one directorate normally received.  “We went 
external before trying to sell this to the internal customers in the other 
directorates,” Grayson explains.  The mission directorate leadership had at that 
point paid no attention to Calder’s plans for the DA.  “We didn’t think we could get 
approved.  We couldn’t sell this conceptually, we could only see the results.  So 
Dick wanted to build enough outside momentum to get this change actually 
underway, so you could show results.” Notes a sympathetic non-DA observer, “I 
understand why Dick did it, but I it created problems with getting a consensus 
afterwards.” In the words of Paul Ericson, “Our strategy was to try to stretch a 
single into a triple without touching second base.”  This unorthodox strategy was 
possible because a still relatively new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) – 
George Tenet – and executive director (the CIA’s chief operating officer and 
third-ranking official) were focusing their attentions elsewhere, on rebuilding the 
DO and the DI and establishing a new agency-wide strategic direction. 
Calder was surprised at how easy it was to sell their proposal to OMB and 
the Agency’s authorizing committees.  “I was open to anything new coming out of 
that moribund agency,” recalls Cathy Eberwein, staffer for the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence.  “When new ideas surface, I tend to look quite kindly 
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on them.” “They thought this was a good government,” Grayson notes.  OMB 
was impressed by the way the Agency had linked the working capital fund to 
ABC costing, since many working capital funds in other government agencies 
had failed because operations didn’t charge prices that fully reflected their costs.  
An OMB staffer who was expert on working capital funds in other agencies 
began to advise the DA on lessons learned from other agencies.  
In talking with OMB and congressional committees, Calder and Ericson 
spoke about how the proposed changes embodied the intent and approaches of 
the Government Performance and Results Act, a bipartisan piece of legislation 
passed in 1993 that required government agencies to make more use of 
performance goals as a management tool, and Vice President Gore’s reinventing 
government program.  (Given the CIA culture’s strong inward-orientation and 
conviction that it was very different from the rest of government, the two seldom 
mentioned these external inspirations internally, and in interviews with DA 
managers they never came up as a perceived impetus for change).  In the 1998 
CIA reauthorization bill, the House included language authorizing the DA through 
March 2000 to provide services to the rest of the Agency on a reimbursable 
basis, and to establish working capital funds, with approval by OMB and an 
annual report by the CIA’s Inspector-General, both provisions added to the CIA’s 
original language by OMB.  In the House-Senate conference on the bill, the 
Senate accepted the House’s language.  The conference report on the bill in 
October 1997 noted laconically that “the managers welcome this initiative to 
make the administrative support services provided by the CIA more efficient and 
competitive.”  Noting Calder’s background in recruiting spies and in covert 
operations, an internal critic remarks that “people give him good marks for pulling 
off an operation.” 
 
6. Saving the Savings for the Customers 
A crucial part of preparing for the new order involved grappling with a 
chronic problem in government that often goes under the name “scooping up the 
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savings.”  The perception (and often the reality) in government agencies is that if 
an operation succeeds in saving some amount of money by doing business in a 
smarter way or eliminating an unnecessary activity, the entire sum will be taken 
away (or “scooped up”) by the organizations own budgeters, by the Office of 
Management and Budget, or by congressional appropriations committees at the 
first opportunity an redistributed to other programs or activities seen as more 
worthy.  This, of course, eliminates any incentive to save money in the first place.  
Business as usual would kill giveback immediately.  The way to convince 
customers that the new order was a good idea was to dangle in front of them the 
prospect that if they didn’t spend their whole giveback because they had gone to 
cheaper sources or economized on their use of services, the money left over 
would be theirs to keep for mission needs.  If the extra money was scooped up, 
the mission directorates would get no benefit from using more wisely the money 
they had gotten.  
Calder got Mary Sturtevant, the comptroller and a strong supporter of his 
efforts, to help them with this potentially deadly problem.  Sturtevant announced 
to the mission directorates that savings after giveback would not be scooped up.  
This policy would be implemented through the Agency’s five-year budget plan, a 
set of outyear numbers for projected CIA spending in fairly detailed categories 
that is updated each year.  The numbers are somewhat speculative, especially 
further out in the five years, and they do not represent actual appropriations or 
even a cast-in-stone commitment for what they president’s budget would actually 
propose for the next year, but they at least provide some sort of baseline.  (The 
Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies have such give-year 
projections, though many civilian agencies don’t.) The comptroller stated she 
would use historical date on how much money the mission directorates had been 
spending on any services subject to giveback and keep that sum in over the five-
year budget planning numbers.  Every organization had a list of unfunded 
projects that come in just “below the line” in their final budgets.  The idea was 
that savings on administrative services could be used to fund such projects.  
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“The message to the mission directorates,” Sturtevant says, “was “Keep good 
records.  We don’t want the savings going to buy furniture, but if you use it for 
mission, that’s okay.’”  OMB and congressional staffers accepted this idea with 
little resistance, at least partly because the amount of money involved wasn’t 
very much compared with the CIA’s overall budget.  “If a station chief gets an 
extra $20,000 because they’ve saved money, that’s meaningful to them, but for 
us it’s really below our radar screen,” a congressional staffer notes.  “I have 
assured them personally that I will not be looking for those savings,” says Peg 
Evans, who was in charge of monitoring the CIA for OMB.   
 
7. The Logistics Operation Center 
Originally, the plan called for three pilot programs beginning October 1, 
1997, (the beginning of the 1998 fiscal year).  These were the logistics operation, 
an onsite computer store, and the DA’s training operation.  But as the time 
approached to get approval to move forward, Calder concluded that only the 
Logistics Operations Center had its ABC data and its business plan in good 
enough shape to be ready.  
The main job of the Logistics Operations Center (LOC) is to ship material, 
both within the US and overseas, to CIA employees who needed it for their work.  
Some material is shipped, both domestically and internationally, by commercial 
means; classified material is transported internationally by special CIA flights and 
domestically by CIA-controlled trucks.  Materials are packed in different ways and 
shipped at different priority levels.   
The LOC had been a showcase for earlier business process improvement 
efforts at the CIA, starting as early as 1990.  Using a logistics contractor who 
helped them undertake a significant reengineering effort, the LOC had 
succeeded in cutting inventory levels dramatically enough to close down one of 
its two warehouses, as well as reducing customer order processing time from five 
days to two and incoming goods receiving time from three days to one.  For their 
efforts, they had won an award from Vice President Gore’s reinventing 
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government program.  Notes Calder, “They were our showcase for good 
management.  They needed to be first.” 
Approval for givebacks had to be obtained from the Agency Executive 
Board, a coordinating body consisting of the directors of the four directorates, the 
comptroller, and chaired by the executive director, which dealt with issues 
involving more than one directorate.  With the other two pilot candidates having 
dropped out, Calder went to the board in the summer of 1997 with the modest 
request that the LOC budget be given back to the mission directorates and the 
LOC financed through a working capital fund.  Both the executive director and 
the comptroller supported the idea, and Calder didn’t even need to defend it.  
“We presented it as a small prototype and said, ‘Give it a try.’” Ericson notes.  
The LOC constituted one-half of one percent of the DA budget. “We viewed the 
vote on the LOC as a mandate for the concept.  The rest of the board didn’t.” 
The head of the LOC during much of the process was Ken Good, son of a 
CIA employee, with a master’s degree in public administration from George 
Washington University, who had worked in the mailroom while studying, and in 
CIA logistics after graduating; he had also spent a number of years outside the 
Agency as a city planner in Maine.  Good has been a supervisor placed in charge 
of the LOC’s ABC effort.  When his predecessor was promoted in April 1997 to 
be the Agency’s chief procurement official, Calder chose Good as LOC chief.  
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“I was one of the first converts to what Dick was trying to do,” Good 
recalls. “The first time I head Dick talking about a working capital fund, I was 
convinced.  He’s pretty passionate. And I had read management books and 
articles in the Harvard Business Review on my own that made similar points to 
the ones he was making.” Good remembers an incident, after the giveback pilot 
had begun, when Calder called him out of his morning staff meeting to tell him 
about a cable he had received from the field expressing concern that the decline 
in the number of LOC support flights risked its ability to support the CIA mission.  
Calder wanted Good to get into a van with him later the same day to go out and 
visit the customer personally to explain the new order. Ten minutes later, Calder 
called back to say that would be impossible, since he had discovered that the 
customer was overseas. “That really sends a message that Dick cares about the 
customer and wants the customer to understand that this is not an attempt to cut 
back on service, but to provide better service, that we want the customer to value 
our service enough to be willing to pay for it.” 
“I went through a lot of emotions,” says Good. “I was very anxious.  I 
remember coming in one weekend one month before we came up.  I said to my 
folks, ‘We’ve got to run the numbers again!’ I was skeptical about whether we’d 
included all our costs in our prices.  We ended up changing our prices right up to 
the last minute.” 
The LOC began as a customer-funded organization on January 1, 1998.  
The result was far more dramatic than anyone had expected.  Quickly it became 
apparent that demand for LOC services was below projected levels.  Specifically, 
customers had previously routinely requested the highest-priority (and thus most 
expensive) shipment category and the most secure (and thus most expensive) 
packaging and transportation methods.  Suddenly, shipments that previously had 
been sent using the CIA’s own trucks and overseas flights began being sent by 
Federal Express. 
In May, Calder received the damage assessment for his pilot project.  
Demand for LOC services was down 30 percent, and, since LOC prices had 
spread out its fixed overhead costs over a larger number of transactions than 
actually materialized, the organization was bleeding cash at the rate of $500,000 
per month (on a budget of about $1.2 million a month).  If the LOC, the DA’s 
poster child for process improvement, was running into these problems, what did 
that suggest for how other parts of the DA, far more fragile plants in terms of 
process transformation, would fare in the cold world of competition? 
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 C. BUSINESS PROCESS TRANSFORMATION AT THE CIA (B) 
1. Introduction 
The response of the CIA mission directorates to the DA’s first experiment 
in giveback took its supports by surprise.  “The customer reaction to us giving 
them the money was a wake-up call,” Ken Good recounts.  “As part of our 
business plan, we had surveyed customers to estimate demand.  What we saw 
was that if you actually put money into customer hands, their behavior would 
change dramatically.  We had really underestimated the customer reaction.” 
In response to the LOC losses, Calder scrounged up a million dollars (by 
taking it from the rest of the DA’s budget) to bail them out.  The LOC also 
increased some prices and began pricing some previously free services.  Good 
also developed a “remediation plan” for the LOC.  In countless little ways, the 
LOC found opportunities to save money: 
• A number of contractor employees and detailees were let go.  Previously, 
the LOC had staffed at a capacity allowing it to deal with sudden surges in 
demand for its services.  Now, instead, it contracted with a commercial 
firm to deliver unclassified material, with another company to deliver 
cleared contractor employees on short notice, in the event of demand 
surges.  Letting go of contractor employees was considered a safer bet 
than dismissing any of the Agency’s own staff.  The CIA is even more 
sensitive about “reductions in force” (RIFs) – that is, firing government 
employees – than are most federal agencies because of the concern that 
RIF’ed employees would be security risks. 
• Truck cleaners had previously done their work on Saturdays, when they 
needed two escorts, on overtime pay, provided by the LOC.  They began 
to work on Fridays, when things were quiet (so they could get their jobs 
done) but no escorts were needed. 
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• Truck drivers on the road started buying gas at cheaper gas stations, 
rather than more expensive truck stops. 
• Customer service representatives were merged into the transportation 
booking operation; the two kinds of employees were cross-trained to do 
each other’s jobs, to minimize employee downtime due to peaks and 
valleys in demand for the two kinds of skills.  Something similar was done 
with employees who did receiving of inbound shipments and crating of 
outbound ones. 
Asked how the experience had changed him as a manager, Good 
responds: “I interact with customers much more than before.  Before I didn’t 
worry about how a customer might react to a mistake.  Now I see myself getting 
involved.  It’s hard to learn business skills.  I continued to learn them.  Now I read 
business books and magazines every change I get.  And I read them differently 
now than before.” 
By the end of 1998, the LOC was back in the black. 
 
2. Calder Presses Forward 
The losses at the LOC, however, were an issue for far more than just the 
LOC.  The LOC’s problems “didn’t help” with Calder’s efforts to gain support from 
skeptical office directors.  In the words of one observer, “Those who were 
skeptical began consciously to drag their feet.” Public griping began.  Calder was 
perceived by some internal critics as isolating himself within the DA, stopping, for 
example, regular meetings with some of his office directors.  
Still, Calder pressed forward.  BPTPO decided that seven offices, 
accounting for 40 percent of the DA’s budget, were promising candidates for the 
next round of givebacks.  These included some of the central administrative 
services in the Agency; the Office of Communications, which ran all of the 
Agency’s communications infrastructure (and was the largest single line item in 
the DA budget); space allocation; and the Agency’s in-house customer software 
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design operation.  The plan called for the givebacks to occur in fiscal year 1999, 
beginning October 1, 1998, only ten months after the LOC pilot.  
“Dick was surprised by how much demand had gone down at the LOC,” 
Paul Ericson notes.  “So he wanted to make sure that none of the other 
organizations went out until they had their acts together.”  They worked at 
refining their ABC numbers and their business plans, under the eye of the 
BPTPO. 
As preparations for a new round of givebacks proceeded, a partial “out” for 
some offices emerged.  Most DA offices argued that security considerations of 
various sorts precluded organizations outside the CIA from providing services to 
Agency customers.  Use commercial travel agents for airline tickets? Impossible, 
went the argument – ticket stock or ticket numbers that blew the cover of the 
Agency employees would get issued.  Use commercial livery services instead of 
the Agency’s own motor pool? Impossible – think of all the secret conversations 
drivers might hear.   
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Grayson tended to view such arguments skeptically.   There were often at 
least parts of a service being delivered where there were few security 
implications – airline tickets for employees not under cover, for example.  
Commercial vendors could get clearances for their employees.  And he argued 
that often the Agency could mandate certain policies to insure security without 
mandating that customers should be required to buy it from the DA in order to get 
those policies followed.  But Calder became willing to consider arguments for 
sheltering services from non-Agency commercial competition on a case-by-case 
basis – to have them provided as what came to be known as “utilities” (meaning 
that the mission directorates would get a budget giveback, but the DA would 
retain a monopoly for provision of the service).  In these situations, a DA “rate 
control board,” with the approval of the Agency Executive Board, would set prices 
rather than marketplace competition.  This was a departure from the strong 
theme, first articulated in The River House Report, that the impetus for change 
within the DA would come from giving mission directorate customers a choice 
about whether to use DA services, or not.  But it was not a total abandonment of 
the concept behind givebacks, since it would still reward customers for reduced 
consumption and thus encourage them to participate in cost-cutting efforts, which 
was one part of the case for the new order.  And it did provide at least some 
pressure (since smaller amounts of high-priced, poor-quality services would be 
brought by customers) for efficiency and effectiveness in service provision. 
BPTPO had chosen the seven organizations for the next phase o the 
basis of having worked with them to that point on ABC and their business plans.  
“None of them really volunteered,” Calder says.  By the time Calder was ready to 
seek approval from the Agency Executive Board for a new round of givebacks in 
the summer of 1998, BPTPO told Calder that not all of the seven had presented 
business plans that made a convincing case that they were ready to compete; 
accordingly, the list of seven was pared to three – the motor pool, secure 
telephone service, and building space.  Telephones and builder space were 
proposed to be run as utilities, the motor pool partly as a utility and partly in a 
competitive environment.  In terms of dollars and significance, the motor pool 
was a relatively minor operation, telephones somewhat larger, and space by far 
the most significant of the three.  
The motor pool ran limousines for senior officials (including the mission-
critical daily briefing for the President of the White House) and van service 
among the CIA locations (and to the State Department) for others.  It had been 
cut every year in the context of the Agency budget woes until it was finally 
defunded entirely in 1996.  For a year, the DA picked up the $3.5 million tab out 
of unearmarked funds, and the next year it passed the hat among the mission 
directorates.   
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Calder decided the limousine services would be opened up to outside 
competition (though the in-house motor pool had a real competitive advantage 
since its cares wouldn’t have to go through a special clearance process to get 
onto the complex).  Calder separated the operation from the LOC, of which it had 
previously been a part, and gave it a new director, Brent Fritzeen, who had 
worked on ABC as a relatively junior staffer in another office in the DA.  Calder 
choose  Fritzeen, whom he had never meet, at the recommendation of BPTPO 
head Paul Ericson.  “At first, I had no idea of what this was,” says Fritzeen.  “But 
now I’ve bought the concept.  I’m a total convert.  We have to be fiscally 
responsible and get out of the mindset of spending all of our appropriated money 
by the end of the year.”  Fritzeen was impressed that Calder quickly answered 
his e-mails and took his phone calls, though he was merely a GS-14 middle 
manager.  
To prepare itself during the business planning phase, the motor pool 
undertook dramatic cost-cutting.  It canceled an expensive sole-source contract 
for drivers and converted the employees into in-house staff working in limited 
term contracts.  It cut back the number of shuttles to the Sate Department.  And, 
most dramatically, it changed the shift structure of its shuttle drivers.  The shuttle 
operated between 7 a.m. and 5:30 p.m.; and since everyone worked a 9:00 – 
5:00 shift, 2-and-1/2 hours of overtime a day were built into the system.  By 
creating one shift that started at 7:00 and another that ended at 5:30, overtime 
was significantly reduced.  
As with the motor pool, the secure telephone service operation chose for 
the next phase of giveback was cut out of a larger unit and headed by a new 
manager.  Preparation for the transition to the new environment was the 
responsibility of Camille Hersch, who had recently come to the DA after 18 years 
at the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (where, towards the end of 
her career there, she had worked on process transformations issues) and was 
appointed to her job only in July 1997, when her previous boss retired.  “I have a 
lot of passion around the working capital fund notion,” Hersch says.  “We need to 
revitalize our infrastructure.  In a time of declining budgets, this is a matter of 
survival.” 
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The most important business Calder wanted put into working capital fund 
was CIA building space.  In terms of budget, it was one of the biggest elements 
of the DA, behind only information technology and communications.  There was a 
view that considerable space savings would be possible if mission directorates 
actually had to pay for what they were using; Congress had for years turned a 
skeptical eye to Agency requests to build or lease new space, based on the 
impression that waste in its use of existing space was rampant.  It also turned out 
that the cost of headquarters space was less than that of most of the space in 
other Agency leased or owned space; some congressional staff hoped that 
location decisions prompted by that price differential would allow the nicely 
symbolic step of closing an Agency building.  
“Rob” Robertson, the had of facilities management, got his job in the 
middle of the business planning progress within the division when the previous 
head retired; before that, he worked in the DA’s logistics operation.  “This 
seemed like the ultimate assignment, something new and different,” he recalls.   
 
3. The Depreciation Issue 
Proposing telephone and, especially, building space for giveback raised 
dramatically an issue that had been skirted in the way Calder had tried to sell the 
idea to the mission directorates.  Originally, the suggestion had been that the 
mission directorates would be given a sum of money equivalent to what they 
were currently paying for DA services and that the services would then be priced 
to reflect those costs.  If the directorates could economize on service use, they 
would pay less than they receiving in giveback, and the difference would be 
theirs to keep.  
The optimistic equation, however, didn’t take into account the need for 
investment to replace deteriorating capital assets. Say that headquarters needed 
a new heating and ventilation system every 2 years.  One way to deal with that 
would be to put some amount of money aside each year in a recapitalization 
fund, such that at the end of 25 years money would be around to pay for the new 
system.  However, as an Agency observer notes, “Recapitalization is not 
something the government does well.”  The tendency was to budget little or 
nothing for recapitalization, and then to obtain a one-time appropriation when a 
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capital asset broke or was about do so.  Alternatively, in the tight budget 
environments of the 1990s, the mission directorates often had money 
unceremoniously taken, or “taxed,” from them in the middle of the budget year to 
pay for an emergency capital expense.  So existing DA budgets – the sum of 
money that the mission directorates were to receive back – reflected insufficient 
amounts for recapitalization. 
This was not an important issue for the LOC, with minimal capital assets.  
It was much more important for telephone infrastructure equipment and for 
buildings, particularly because of the large unfunded recapitalization 
requirements for the Agency’s 40-year-old headquarters.  “We have a real fear,” 
notes Robertson, the facilities management chief, “that we’re going to system 
some major systems outages.”  The Agency had established a building 
recapitalization fund in the early 1990s, but it was woefully insufficient.  “We have 
huge unfundeds in this area,” Mary Sturtevant, the comptroller notes.   
In the new non-appropriated environment, the costs charged customers 
for DA services would need to include more realistic sums for recapitalization, 
since the possibility would no longer exist for one-time appropriations or an 
agency-wide “tax” to fund replacement or repair of capital assets for these 
operations.  DA activity business plans therefore included depreciation expenses, 
that is, an ongoing recapitalization amount that would be part of the business’ 
pricing structure.  
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But depreciation marred the rosy scenario of savings for plowback mission 
that could be obtained by virtuous economizing.  Recapitalization funds meant 
that unit prices for DA services would be higher than previously – and that at the 
end of the day the giveback money might no cover the expected demand for 
services at the new prices.  Says a sympathetic non-DA observer: “Dick’s 
message had been, ‘Look at how you’ll get this money back.’ But we said to Dick 
that he had to recognize that people will be paying more.  He had to start pitching 
this another way.” To be sure, as Mary Sturtevant notes, “the bottom line is that 
even if the customer doesn’t see the money in their pocket directly, they’re still 
ahead, because when these capital emergencies come  up, we just tax their 
appropriation during budget execution year to pay for them.” But the whole issue 
fed the suspicion of the mission directorates that, one way or another, they were 
going to get the short end of Calder’s revolution.  “The DO says that if you need 
extra money to fix up headquarters, the DA should go to the Hill, and ask for 
more, and we’ll support you, instead of what he’s doing,” a DO source suggest.  
“Dick’s only response is that that’s the old way of thinking.” 
It was however, decided that depreciation charges for telephones and 
buildings would be phased in gradually (reaching a full level, using IRS 
depreciation schedules and industry benchmarks, in 2001 for the initial working 
capital fund activities).  This would make the new order more attractive than 
otherwise to the mission directorates, and, it was rationalized, also give them 
more time to reduce their service demand levels so they could better absorb 
higher unit prices.  
 
4. The Customers Revolt 
As the new ideas approached more and more serious, opposition grew not 
only within the DA but also within the mission directorates, particularly the DO, 
which was by far the DA’s biggest customer.  The basic objection among DO 
officers was that their jobs were too important for them to be bothered with what 
they considered to be administrative trivia.  “This diverts me from my mission,” 
they would say.  “We joined the DO to go overseas and go in harm’s way.  We 
joined for that adventure.  We did not join to do unfun stuff.  This isn’t fun,” says a 
DO source.  “You have a customer base,” notes an internal DA critic, adopting 
the “customer” terminology, “that says, ‘We’re not McDonald’s.  DA, do your job.” 
People here don’t have business backgrounds.  So the terminology is foreign to 
them” (Another DA source referred to his unease about becoming a “rug 
merchant.”) To a considerable extent, this objection was a red herring, since the 
whole infrastructure of DA support officers in the mission directorates would 
continue to be there to shield DO gunslingers from having to make decisions 
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about what kinds of packaging they wanted their guns sent in.  It would be the 
support officers who would be making the economizing decisions on behalf of the 
mission directorates about how to spend budget giveback money.  And one 
might also say that DO customers were crying all the way to the bank, since by 
reducing their demand for DA service, they would be saving money that could go 
into mission.  
To be sure, many were skeptical that they really would get to keep any 
savings.  “Maybe it would work a year or two, then we’ll get a new comptroller, 
and the policy will change,” says a source in the DO.  “This culture isn’t always 
the most trusting, so lots of people assume that at the end of the day they’re 
going to lose from this,” notes a source in the Directorate of Intelligence.  And the 
new order got associated in the minds of many in the mission directorates with 
the general hard budgetary times the Agency was experiencing.  “At a staff 
meeting the other day,” a source in the DO states, “we gave out medals and 
were told that inscriptions won’t be put on the medals because of lack of funding.  
The suggestion was that this was related to the working capital fund.” The people 
in the mission directorates were used to high levels of service that were “free,” 
and they wished those glory days could continue.  
Whatever their reasons, DO officers made known their discontent to 
senior managers at the agency.  Their vocal opposition put a particularly ironic 
twist on Calder’s mantra about customer service; in effect, the oppressed 
masses on whose behalf he was waging a battle of liberation, against enormous 
internal resistance, were saying they weren’t interested in being set free.  To 
switch metaphors, the customers were acting a bit like those people who, after 
the breakup of the Bell system monopoly, longed for the days when they didn’t 
have to make choices about their long-distance carrier.  And the new Director of 
Central Intelligence, George Tenet, was, not surprisingly, silent, preferring to 
devote his time and internal political capital to “sexier” issues.  
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 5. The Meeting 
Tension was high around Calder’s office in mid-August. Calder was 
preparing to appear before the Agency Executive Board to obtain approval to put 
space, secure telephones, and the motor pool into a working capital fund 
environment. “This is our Rubicon,” Calder said in advance of the meeting.  “If we 
get approval, the question will be not whether we move to the new model, but 
how and when.” 
After his confirmation as Director of Central Intelligence in the summer of 
1997, Tenet had brought a new director of the DO on board, a career intelligence 
officer name Jack Downing.  Downing was “old school CIA,” Harvard class of 
1958 former Marine.  Downing had earlier been an internal opponent of Calder’s 
strategic plan for the DO. He had agreed in the Agency Executive Board to the 
LOC budget transfer, but that was only a month after his arrival.  “I don’t know 
what I’m voting on, but okay,” he said at the meeting, according to one account.  
As Calder prepared for the board meeting that would determine whether 
his ideas would be implemented, he knew that this wasn’t a central issue for 
Downing and that Downing’s opposition was mostly visceral.  But Calder also 
know he was the head of the weakest directorate in the Agency and that 
Downing, head of the most powerful one, would be opposed to what he was 
trying to do.  He could count on the support of Mary Sturtevant, the comptroller.  
The executive director, David Carey, was sympathetic in principle but concerned 
about the lack of political consensus.  George Tenent, the head of the Agency, 
would stay clear of these sorts of issues, unless, conceivably, the DO asked him 
to intervene against Calder.  
“The executive director wants to avoid a divisive meeting with a split vote,” 
said Calder, thinking about the meeting he was facing.  “He also wants to avoid 
having someone go to Tenent behind his back and kill it.  And, of course, if we 
don’t win at the board, that will embolden the opposition within the DA.” 
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“Dick has a lot of chits to pull in on this throughout the Agency,” one non-
DA insider notes.  “He’s made this into an issue of his personal success or 
failure.  In the back of their minds, many people are thinking, “If this goes down, 
it’ll cripple Dick, and we can’t cripple Dick.’ So opponents pull back.  They’ll give 
him more room than they’d give others.” But there’s another view as well.  “He’s 
Indira Gandhi,” says a DA support officer, referring to the Indian Prime Minister 
assassinated by her own bodyguards.  “He’s so far in front of the troops, if he 
looks behind he’ll see nobody’s there.” And Calder himself sighs, “Change is 
terribly difficult when there’s nobody pulling on the chord but you.” 
 
D. BUSINESS PROCESS TRANSFORMATION AT THE CIA (EPILOGUE) 
In advance of the August 1998 meeting of the Agency Executive Board, 
David Carey, the CIA’s executive director, decided he couldn’t support moving 
immediately to put the building space into the working capital fund environment.  
The reason, he stated at the meeting, was that the DA’s giveback formula, which 
divided up the space budget based on the square footage used by the different 
directorates, was problematic.  It would reward space gluttons and punish those 
who had already economized on space usage.  He presented these concerns at 
the beginning of the meeting.  Calder volunteered to go back to the drawing 
board and rejigger the formula.  Carey suggested that Calder return to the board 
in six months with a new formula the board could decide on.  Calder agreed.  
With the most ambitious give back off the table, the rest of the meeting 
was surprisingly calm. Downing stated politely that he’d prefer seeing six months 
more experience with the LOC before any additional organizations were added to 
the working capital fund.  But at the end he didn’t vote against the proposal that 
secure telephones and the motor pool be moved into the new environment.  
Less than two months later, on October 1, the old telephone services 
division of the Office of Information Technology changed its name to CINTELCO 
(Central Intelligence Telephone Company).  The most immediate and dramatic 
effect of the giveback on customer behavior was a sudden drop in the number of 
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phone lines customers were using.  Previously, there was no reason to 
economize on the number of phone lines in an office or to cancel a phone line if 
an employee left and wasn’t replaced.  A month after customers got their first 
bills, the mission directorates had requested removal of close to 15 percent of the 
Agency’s phone lines.  (Fortunately, with the LOC experience in mind, 
CINTELCO had priced its services to assume a decline in demand for lines three 
times that number.)  
The CINTELCO entry was not, however, without controversy.  The 
demand assumptions used by CINTELCO, plus the complicated manner in which 
telephone services were paid in the appropriated environment, led to the 
perception (and sometimes the reality) that there was a significant “gap” between 
the givebacks and the total phone costs under the new system.  This, plus bad 
data on actual telephone inventories, led to problems later on.  
The CINTELCO rushed to create both brand visibility and increased 
demand for its services. It bought up some old British red telephone booths and 
placed them in the area near the CIA cafeteria, with a big “CINTELCO” sign on 
each.  Very dramatically and visibly, CINTELCO opened up a store, also near the 
cafeteria, to provide advice and sell equipment such as pagers and phone cards.  
(These were initially only for official use, but there were plans to extend 
CINTELCO’s charter to include selling gear for personal use. “It’s easier than 
going to the mall.  And we can get quantity discounts based on the total volume 
of our purchases.”)   CINTELCO also began getting into the consulting business, 
advising customers how to use technology better (for example, a customer 
receiving many incoming phone calls could use automated call distribution 
technology to cover a given number of incoming calls with fewer people) – and, 
incidentally, buy more equipment through CINTELCO.  “For now,” says Camille 
Hersch, the CINTELCO head, “we haven’t looked for any external customers.  
But down the road we could provide secure telephone services to other federal 
agencies.  Our niche is secure networks.” 
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At the motor pool, Brent Fritzeen introduced a number of new service 
alternatives for customers.  Limousine customers could “rent” for a flat rate an 
on-call dedicated driver for an extended period of time; the very senior officials 
able to buy such service liked the idea of having the same person available to 
them.  Fritzeen got the idea after reading about a company that offered unlimited 
flat rate corporate jet service to executives.   The motor pool also sold hourly 
rates, with a one-hour minimum (commercial competitors imposed a four-hour 
minimum); it also introduced a service guarantee promising a free ride if the 
driver was 15 minutes late.  
In February 1999, the six-month waiting period David Carey had proposed 
for making the final decision about putting building space into the working capital 
fund came and went, with no decision made and the issue not yet brought back 
to the Agency Executive Board for consideration. During this time, requests were 
made for various refinements in the operation’s billing procedures.  The problems 
associated with the CINTELCO “gap” and related data issues led some to 
question how viable the building facilities enterprise would be.  In March 1999, 
the Agency Executive Board approved the entry of a small applications 
development enterprise into the working capital fund, but still balked at the “big” 
issue of building space.  Internal politics within the Agency continued to be on 
Carey’s mind, but in May, the internal politics began to move.  Jack Downing 
announced his retirement, effective July 31, 1999.  The CINTELCO gap began to 
close with the announcement of a significant rebate to customers and a 20-30 
percent reduction in line costs for the following year.  While the Agency looked 
likely to receive a nice cash infusion in the budget surplus environment of the 
turn of the century, and the fire on the burning platform looked not quite so 
dangerous, there also appeared to be a renewed effort to push a major 
enterprise into the working capital fund – after Downing left.  
Meanwhile, several additional DA activities were preparing to be next in 
line for entry into the fund.  As preparations for entry made it on the agenda of 
more offices, Calder began encountering his most dug-in opponents, who had 
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avoided being “volunteered” as long as possible.  The head of one organization 
scheduled to enter a working capital fund environment as a utility in fiscal year 
2000 grumbled that he had no desire to turn his operation into a collection of “rug 
merchants.” Some observers argued that Calder had gone too easy on his 
internal critics.  “He should have gone to the director and gotten an okay to get 
ride of some of these people,” argues on supporter.  “People were able to ignore 
or defy Calder without any consequences,” says another.  “I did have some 
heart-to-hearts with the critics,” Calder notes.  But he says it wasn’t so easy for 
him to sweep his internal critics aside.  “Customer resistance didn’t help and the 
lack of consensus among the Agency’s senior leadership also slowed us down.” 
However, as hostile office directors left (to retire or to take jobs outside the DA), 
they were replaced with enthusiasts.  “Over time,” a DA critic says, “as you 
continue to replace leaders, and the main criterion for appointment is loyalty to 
this, the opposition will go away.” 
In September 1999, the Executive Board approved the entry of the 
Agency’s “Landlord,” Facilities Management, into the Fund.  Representing over 
10 percent of the DA’s budget, it became the first significant component to enter 
the fund.  While the bulk of its service (the rental of floor space to Agency 
components) is a utility function, some consulting and rehabilitation functions 
were competitive from the outside.  At the same time, the Printing and 
Photography Group and the warehousing function at the LOC also entered the 
fund.  The later folded seamlessly into the LOC’s operations, but the fully 
competitive printing plant saw an initial downturn in demand that represented 
both industry-wide trends of reduced demand for printing services generally and 
the growing popularity of desk-top publishing within the Agency.  More 
importantly, even as a utility, the ability of customers to retain the results of 
smarter decisions about the use of space have, in the first six months, led to over 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 160 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Bailey, Charles R. and Kuenzli, John D. (2001). Making Systems Supportability a 
Reality; Applying the Principles of Organizational Transformation. Unpublished 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
 
Blank, Jared (1995). Gaucher: Successful Organizations Must Avoid Death 
Spiral. Retrieved August 15, 1995 from: 
http://www.umich.edu/~urecord/9596/Oct30_95/artcl23.htm 
 
Crawford, John W. and Krahn, Steven L. (1998). The Naval Nuclear Propulsion 
Program.  Public Administration Review, Volume 58, Issue:2 
 
Engelbart, Douglas C. (1992).  Toward High-Performance Organizations: A 
Strategic Role for Groupware.  Bootstrap Institute.  Retrieved July 20, 2003 from:  
http://www.bootstrap.org/augdocs/augment-132811.htm#12 
 
Gardner, Anton, Churchill Leon, Souza, Peter, and Willmarth, Mark. (2001).  
High-Performance Government. Proceedings of the November 2001 International 
City/County Management Association Convention, Retrieved December 2, 2003 
from http://www.highperformanceorg.com/publications/high-performance-gov.asp 
 
Gardner, John W. (1988a). Changing Nature of Leadership (The).  Leadership 
Studies Program, Independent Sector, July 1988.  
 
Gardner, John W. (1988b). Leadership: An Overview.  Leadership Studies 
Program. Independent Sector.  August 1988.  
 
Gardner, John W. (1986.) Tasks of Leadership (The). Leadership Studies 
Program. Independent Sector. March 1986. 
 
Garvin D.A. (1993, July-Aug). Building a Learning Organization, Harvard 
Business Review, 78-91 
 
Kelman, Steven. (1999a). Business Process Transformation at the CIA (A).  
Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Case Number CR16-99-1515.0 
 
Kelman, Steven. (1999b).  Business Process Transformation at the CIA (B).  
Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Case Number CR16-99-1516.0 
 
Kelman, Steven. (1999c).  Business Process Transformation at the CIA 




LaPorte, Todd and Keller, Ann. (1996, Nov-Dec). Assuring Institutional 
Constancy: Requisite for Managing Long-Lived Hazard. Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 56, No. 6. 
 
Likert, Rensis. (1967).  The Human Organization:  Its Management and Value.  
New York:  McGraw-Hill. 
 
Likert, Rensis. (1961).  New Patterns of Management.  New York:  McGraw-Hill. 
 
McGregor, Douglas. (1960).  The Human Side of Enterprise.  New York:  
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). (1997). Senior Executive Service (SES) 
Qualifications Guide.  Retrieved December 2, 2003 from: 
http://www.opm.gov/ses/handbook.html 
 
Pickering, John W, Brokaw, Gerald S. and Harnden, Philip D. (2002) Building 
High-Performance Organizations for the Twenty-First Century. Charlottesville, 
VA:  Commonwealth Center For High Performance Organizations, Inc., 
Unpublished Text 
 
Pickering, John W. and Matson, Robert E. (1992).  Why Executive Development 
Programs (Alone) Don't Work, Training & Development Journal.  American 
Society for Training and Development, 91-95. 
 
Porter, Tom, Pickering, John and Brokaw, Gerry. (1995).  Building High-
Performance Organizations for the Twenty-First Century:  Lessons from 
Charleston Naval Shipyard.  Project Management College, NAVSEA07. 
 
Publication Manual for the American Psychological Association (5th edition). 
(2001).  Washington DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Rosegrant, Susan. (1993).  An Organizational Sea Change: Total Quality 
Management in the Coast Guard. Kennedy School of Government Case 
Program, Case Number C16-93-1205.0 
 
Simon, Cary A. (1997). Alternative Frameworks for Improving Government 
Organizational Performance: A Comparative Analysis.  Unpublished Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
 
Smith P.L. (1984). Leadership In The Creative Process. Vital Speeches of the 
Day, August 20, 1984. 
 
 162 
Waltrop, M. Mitchell. (1996, Oct/Nov). Dee Hock on Organizations, Fast 
Company, Issue 5. Retrieved December 3, 2003 from:   
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/05/dee3.html 
 
Weisbord, Marvin. (December 1976).  Organizational Diagnosis:  Six Places to 
Look for Trouble With or Without a Theory, in Group and Organizational Studies.  
Volume I, Num. 4. 
 
Weisbord, Marvin. (Spring 1976). Why Organizational Development Hasn't 
Worked (So Far) in Medical Centers, Health Care Management Review. 
 
Yin, Robert. (2003a). Applications of Case Study Research.  Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications 
 
Yin, Robert. (2003b). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 164 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Professor Wally Owen 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Mr. Michael Godwin 
F/A-18 Subsystems Engineering 
San Diego, California 
 
5. Mr. Thomas Jarvis  
F/A-18 Subsystems Engineering 
San Diego, California 
 
 165 
